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Disease Management (DM) programs for Medicaid patients with chronic diseases have 
become very popular, with a majority of states having introduced some type of DM program in 
the last decade. These programs provide interventions designed to assist patients and their health 
care providers appropriately manage their chronic health condition(s) according to established 
clinical guidelines. Cost-containment has been a key justification for the creation of DM 
programs, despite mixed evidence that DM actually saves money for the Medicaid program or for 
society as a whole. 
While most studies on the impact of DM focus on estimating the impact of a single DM 
program, Chapter 2 estimates the average, national impact of state Medicaid DM programs by 
linking a detailed survey of state Medicaid programs to the nationally representative Medical 
Panel Expenditure Survey. Difference-in-difference models are used to test the hypothesis that 
medical expenditures change after a DM program is implemented, exploiting variation in the 
timing at which state Medicaid programs implemented DM programs. DM coverage also varies 
within states over time due to variation in program eligibility by disease, insurance category, 
and/or county of residence. Although the models estimate the effect of DM imprecisely, point 
estimates are stable across multiple specifications and indicate that DM programs for common 
chronic diseases may decrease total medical expenditures, potentially by 10 percent or more. 
Chapter 3 evaluates one DM program in the state of Georgia using a proprietary data set. 
By exploiting a natural experiment that delayed the introduction of high-intensity services for 
several thousand high and moderate risk patients, the research identifies the causal impacts of the 
program‘s interventions on total Medicaid expenditures, categories of health care utilization, and 
other indicators. These patients are observationally similar to those who received interventions at 
the beginning of the program. For example, I find the interventions lowered health costs and 
hospital utilization, after controlling for unobservable individual characteristics. Health 
expenditures were lowered about 4.4 percent for patients with positive expenditures. Heterogene-
ous treatment effect analysis indicates that the savings were largest at the most expensive tail of 
the distribution. JEL Classification Codes: I12, I18, H51 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Medicaid serves as America‘s major public health insurance program for low-income 
individuals and has become a dominant aspect of the United States health care system and 
government expenditure. In recent decades, federal and state governments have experienced 
dramatic growth in annual Medicaid spending. Concerned about the fiscal sustainability of the 
program, yet reluctant to either dramatically reduce the number of individuals eligible for benefits 
or to eliminate services, states have implemented a variety of reforms intended to improve the 
cost efficiency of the program. States have specifically looked for cost savings via the small 
fraction of individuals who account for a disproportionately large fraction of health care 
spending, particularly the chronically ill. Furthermore, a growing body of research indicates that 
significant numbers of individuals, especially those with chronic illnesses, receive inadequate 
health care. Inappropriate management of chronic conditions is linked to a number of expensive, 
undesirable outcomes, including more bouts of acute illness, avoidable hospitalizations, 
complications from co-morbidities and lengthy hospital inpatient stays. 
Policy makers have increasingly turned to Disease Management (henceforth DM) to ad-
dress both of these important concerns – cost containment and deficiencies in the quality of health 
care – in the Medicaid program. DM programs have the broad objective of assisting patients and 
their health care providers to appropriately manage their chronic health conditions according to 
established clinical guidelines. Proponents of DM argue that services provided by the program 
will assist in proper management of chronic health conditions such as proper medication use and 
preventive treatments. This could subsequently decrease hospitalization and other medical 
expenditures, ultimately providing policy makers with the ―best of both worlds:‖ higher 
achievement of health quality for program enrollees at a lower cost. 
Although cost-containment has been a key justification for the creation of DM programs, 
there is actually mixed evidence that DM actually saves money for the Medicaid program or for 
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society as a whole. Comprehensive literature reviews from the private insurance sector failed to 
find conclusive evidence that DM reduces net medical expenditures. (CBO 2004; Goetzel et al. 
2005; Mattke, Seid, and Ma 2007) However, it is unlikely that the financial impact of DM in the 
private sector is comparable in the Medicaid setting, due to the fact that Medicaid recipients are 
demographically different than individuals insured in the private sector and have different health 
care utilization patterns. Given that Medicaid‘s DM programs have been evaluated in only a few 
cases, sometimes with questionable research designs, the financial effect of Medicaid DM 
programs remains an unanswered question.
1
 
Despite limited evidence of cost savings, Medicaid DM programs for the chronically ill 
have become a popular component of state Medicaid programs throughout the United States over 
the last decade and a half. Figure 1 plots the number of states with a Medicaid Disease 
Management program, showing a significant increase in DM coverage in the late 1990s and early 
2000s. At the end of 2008, 36 states with at least one DM program accounted for 82 percent of 
the total Medicaid population in the United States. DM program size can vary across states. Some 
programs have fewer than 1,000 people in the program, while more than 25 percent of Medicaid 
recipients may be ―eligible‖ for services in other states (with perhaps 5 to 25 percent of eligible 
patients actively receiving DM services). More recently, the federal health reform law passed in 
2010 implements or encourages the introduction of DM programs for selected segments of the 
U.S. health market. 
This dissertation addresses the question, ―How do Medicaid DM programs affect medical 
expenditure and utilization patterns for program participants?‖ In light of the policy debate and 
unresolved questions in the literature, I focus on the financial effects of DM. The following 
chapters empirically evaluate the effect of Medicaid DM programs on medical expenditures from 
two different perspectives. Chapter 2 estimates the effect of Medicaid chronic disease 
                                                     
1
 The existing literature on DM programs is discussed below in Section 2.2, Section 3.2, and 
elsewhere.   
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management programs using nationally representative survey data. This offers a new perspective 
on the research question, but has limitations in the absence of detailed data on program activities. 
Chapter 3 performs an evaluation of a single DM program: the Georgia Enhanced Care program, 
which was introduced in Georgia in the fall of 2005. Both research approaches benefit from the 
presence of individuals who do not receive DM that are similar to the groups who do receive DM, 
providing plausible counterfactuals for what would have occurred in the absence of the DM 
programs being studied. 
The remainder of Chapter 1 provides further background information on Medicaid DM 
and summarizes the results of Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. 
1.1 The policy environment: Medicaid and chronic disease  
Medicaid serves as America‘s major public health insurance program for low-income 
individuals and has become a dominant aspect of the United States health care system and 
government expenditure. The policies of Medicaid are of substantial importance because it (i) 
serves as the major source of health care for a large fraction of American individuals and (ii) 
consumes a large fraction of the U.S. federal and state budgets. An estimated 50.3 million people 
received health insurance coverage from Medicaid in June 2010.
2
 In 2009, Medicaid accounted 
for 373.9 billion dollars in expenditures, or about 15 percent of all health care expenditures in the 
United States and 2.6 percent of GDP.
3
  Medicaid and the Children‘s Health Insurance Program 
(CHIP) are expected to expand dramatically in future years because of modifications to program 
enrollment criteria passed into law with the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010. 
The Congressional Budget Office (2010) projects that Medicaid and CHIP enrollment will 
                                                     
2
 Children comprise 26.5 million (53 percent) of these enrollees. About 12.1 million (24 percent) were 
classified as aged or disabled. Enrollment estimates are from the Kaiser Family Foundation (2011b). 
Some 58.7 million individuals, roughly 20 percent of all Americans, were enrolled in Medicaid for 
some length of time during the federal fiscal year 2007. (KFF 2011a) 
3
 Total national health expenditures were an estimated 2.49 trillion dollars in calendar year 2009 
(Martin et al. 2011). Medicaid estimate excludes the Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP). 
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expand by 16 million, relative to baseline projections, with an incremental cost of at least $80 
billion per year after 2016.  
In recent decades, federal and state governments
4
 have experienced dramatic growth in 
annual Medicaid expenditure due to expansions to the eligible population, increases in the 
utilization of health care services, increases in the costs associated with the provision of health 
care, the introduction of new medical technologies and procedures, and other factors. (Gruber 
2000; CMS 2005) As seen in Figure 2, the federal government‘s share of Medicaid expenditures 
has grown from a relatively small program to about 7.9 percent of total federal government 
outlays. Unlike Medicare, which provides health care for retirement-aged Americans and is 
completely federally funded, state governments spend a significant share of their budgets on 
Medicaid; Medicaid accounts for 21.1 percent of all state government expenditures, making it one 
of the two largest expenditure categories in state government budgets (tied with primary and 
secondary education).
5
 Growth in the program has been seen as a major fiscal burden to many 
state governments, with expenditure growth unsustainably outpacing that of state revenue, 
inflation, and GDP. (e.g., Burgess 2004) 
Reluctant to dramatically reduce the size of the population eligible for benefits or elimi-
nate services, states have implemented a variety of reforms intended to increase the cost 
efficiency of the program. States have specifically looked for cost savings among a small fraction 
of individuals who account for a disproportionately large fraction of health care spending. 
Nationwide, the 3.6 percent most expensive enrollees accounted for roughly half of Medicaid 
expenditures in FY2001. (Sommers and Cohen 2006) 
                                                     
4
 Both federal and state governments jointly fund Medicaid, with the federal government paying 
approximately two-thirds of total Medicaid expenditures (excluding CHIP). (Martin et al. 2011) The 
federal government‘s share represents about 44 percent of all federal grants to state and local 
governments. Federal spending estimates and data for Figure 2 from the U.S. Office of Management 
and Budget (2011, Table 16.1). 
5
 Estimates from NASBO (2010, pp. 4-5). Data in FY2009 show Medicaid is slightly smaller than the 




One categorical population within Medicaid that receives much focus is the aged, blind, 
and permanently disabled (ABD) population, who normally qualify for Medicaid in conjunction 
with Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits. As seen in Figure 3, expenditure on this 
population has grown dramatically since 1985, despite relatively modest growth in the number of 
enrollees. The ABD population currently comprises 22 percent of the enrollees, yet accounts for 
two-thirds of payments. (SSA 2011) This implies that Medicaid pays, on average, 6.4 times 
higher annual costs for ABD enrollees when compared to other categories. Thus, when designing 
cost containment initiatives for the Medicaid program, it behooves policymakers to directly 
address the growth rate of payments per capita for the ABD population and other high-cost 
categories of Medicaid enrollees. The program I evaluate in Chapter 3 provided DM interventions 
to the Medicaid ABD population in the state of Georgia. 
A significant fraction of health expenditures have been linked to chronic conditions. For 
example, Anderson (2004) found that more than 80 percent of Medicaid expenditures for non-
institutionalized beneficiaries are attributable to individuals with chronic conditions.
6
 Members of 
the ABD population are far more likely to have one or more chronic conditions than the typical 
non-disabled adult or child. It is estimated that 35 percent of Medicaid recipients with disabilities 
and 39 percent of the aged had three or more chronic conditions, compared to 2 and 10 percent 
for non-disabled child and adult recipients, respectively. While Medicaid beneficiaries without 
chronic conditions rarely accumulate significant acute care expenditures, acute health 
expenditures increase with the presence of a chronic disease and nearly all of the highest-cost 
disabled beneficiaries have multiple conditions. Among disabled Medicaid enrollees, the 45 
percent with three or more chronic conditions account for 75 percent of expenditures, and nearly 
all individuals in the highest percentile have one chronic condition (87 percent of the top 
percentile has three or more chronic conditions). (Kronick et al. 2007; Kronick, Bella, and Gilmer 
                                                     
6
 Estimate based on analysis of the 1998 and 2001 AHRQ Medical Expenditures Panel Surveys 
(MEPS) and the 2001 Medicare Standard Analytic File. 
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2009) The probability of hospital re-admission (within 30 days) is 15.2 percent among those with 
zero conditions, but is 36.1 percent among those with 10 or more conditions. (Gilmer 2010) 
For common chronic conditions, medical practitioners have established guidelines that 
outline a recommended treatment plan or course of action for patients.
7
 This often involves 
ongoing medical attention from the patient‘s medical providers, a ―maintenance‖ regimen of 
medication or other treatments, regular monitoring to identify acute episodes at an early stage, 
and overall healthy lifestyle behaviors by the patient. 
In practice, however, actual treatment of chronic conditions may fall short of these guide-
lines for a number of reasons. Not all patients manage their health as recommended, perhaps due 
to lack of education, addiction or lack of self control, and/or individual tastes. (Gertler and 
Simcoe 2009) In addition, patients‘ health care providers may contribute to the non-optimal 
treatment of health care. High-cost patients are very often treated by a ―traditional‖ network of 
individual providers (doctors, specialists, nurses, laboratories, pharmacists, etc.) who each have a 
different expertise or responsibility, are motivated by a diverse set of financial or non-pecuniary 
incentives, and access different information. These providers are often uncoordinated and have a 
tendency (historically, at least) to focus on acute health events as opposed to the ongoing, routine 
needs of the chronically ill. (Beaulieu et al. 2006; Cebul et al. 2008; McDonald et al. 2007) 
Furthermore, a growing body of research, including studies by the Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality (2007a), Institute of Medicine (2001), McGlynn et al. (2003), and National 
Committee for Quality Assurance (2007), compares the health care services that individuals 
receive to established clinical guidelines for the treatment of common chronic diseases and 
reports that a significant number of individuals receive ―inadequate‖ health care. These 
shortcomings are linked to a number of expensive, undesirable outcomes: more bouts of acute 
                                                     
7
 These are also known as ―clinical guidelines,‖ ―evidence-based guidelines,‖ or ―best practices.‖ For 
example, the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force (USPSTF) provides recommendations for 
preventative clinical services and the NCQA publishes a set of indicators, the Healthcare 
Effectiveness Data and Information Set (HEDIS) that are used to track the quality of health care. 
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illness, avoidable hospitalizations, complications from co-morbidities, lengthy hospital inpatient 
stays, and more. Thus inefficiencies leading to under-utilization of health care in some aspects 
(noncompliance with a prescribed medication regime, smoking or not exercising, and the like), 
may in fact lead to over-utilization of health care (an emergency department visit that could have 
been avoided). Given these findings, it is believed that there remains significant potential for 
improvements in the management of chronic diseases to prevent health expenditures that are both 
avoidable and undesirable. 
1.2 What is Disease Management?  
DM programs have the broad objective of addressing shortcomings in the management of 
chronic diseases by aligning health care practice with the established clinical guidelines. DM is 
defined by the Disease Management Association of America as ―a system of coordinated health 
care interventions and communications for populations with conditions in which patient self-care 
efforts are significant.‖ (DMAA 2007) Most commonly, medical payers (insurers or, in the case 
of public programs, government agencies) implement these programs by (i) contracting with a 
Disease Management Organization (DMO) to provide identified services, (ii) building the 




One observes a large diversity in the scope and methodologies of individual DM pro-
grams, although some general patterns emerge. Krumholz et al. (2006) developed a typology for 
DM programs, classifying programs according to patient population, intervention recipient 
(patient and/or health care providers), intervention content, intervention delivery personnel, 
                                                     
8
 Faulkner (2003) compares these approaches and discusses several Medicaid programs as case studies 
and Foote (2003) recommends the use of performance-based contracting with DMOs for the Medicare 
FFS population. Arora et al. (2008) and Roby, Kominski, and Pourat (2008) discuss a number of 
details related to Medicaid DM program design and contracting. 
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method of communication, intensity and complexity of interventions, environment (or context of 
interventions), and clinical outcome measures.  
Not all individuals in a state‘s Medicaid program receive DM. In some states, only the 
highest risk patients are enrolled in a program, and therefore only a small fraction of the overall 
Medicaid population receive DM interventions (sometimes fewer than 1,000 individuals). In 
other states, large fractions of the population are eligible for services. For example, some states 
enroll the entire ABD population (about 25 percent of Medicaid enrollees) in their DM program.  
Using the data that I collect on DM programs (discussed in detail in Chapter 2), I plot the 
number states with a program targeting selected chronic diseases in Figure 4. The most 
commonly targeted diseases – which I call the ―top-5‖ chronic conditions – are diabetes, asthma, 
congestive heart failure (CHF), chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), and coronary 
artery disease (CAD).
9
 The top-5 diseases are followed by hypertension and depression. Some 
DM programs target patients with other less common, but particularly high-cost diseases, such as 
sickle-cell anemia, schizophrenia, hemophilia, renal failure, and HIV/AIDS. Relatively fewer 
programs address other mental diseases, high-risk pregnancy, and cancers.  
My understanding is that these ―top-5‖ diseases are most commonly targeted because 
they sit at the intersection of several criteria: First, these diseases are relatively prevalent. 
(Kronick, Bella, and Gilmer 2009) Fixed costs of operation (for each disease) would cause states 
and DMOs to provide DM only for the most common diseases. Second, there is reason to believe 
that there are ―gaps‖ in the management of these patient‘s diseases. The top-5 diseases are often 
discussed in relevant publications, including studies by the Agency for Healthcare Research and 
                                                     
9
 In the literature, these are consistently discussed as the five most commonly targeted diseases for  
Medicaid DM programs. See Arora et al. (2008, p. 3:2), Bella (2003, 2005), Kuo (2004), Owens 
(2006, p. 9), Rosenbaum et al. (2008, p. 13), and Williams (2004, p. 2). In a report on of private sector 
disease management programs, Matheson, Wilkins, and Psacharopoulos state the following: ―Only a 
handful of chronic condition have been clearly identified and widely accepted as suited to the 
approach [disease management]: diabetes, asthma, CAD, congestive heart failure [CHF], and chronic 
obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD)—conditions often referred to as the „five core conditions.‟” 
(2006, p. 13) [emphasis mine] 
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Quality (2007a), Institute of Medicine (2001), McGlynn et al. (2003), and National Committee 
for Quality Assurance (2007). To the extent that these gaps are associated with undesirable health 
expenditures, states could generate financial savings by bringing health care into alignment with 
established guidelines. Arora et al. (2008, sec. 3) argue that these diseases have potential to yield 
outcomes within the required timeline of state administrators. Third, the recommended clinical 
guidelines are established for these diseases, allowing for DM interventions to be programmed 
into computer algorithms, call center phone ―scripts,‖ and other DM tools (unlike, for example, 
cancers which often require more idiosyncratic treatment plans for each patient).  
Once administrators decide the set of diseases covered by a DM program, they typically 
use a risk stratification process to identify members who are expected to benefit from the DM 
interventions. This process usually includes an analysis of the individual‘s historic health 
insurance ―claims‖ records and is sometimes supplemented with available clinical data, an in-
house intake assessment, or other data acquired by the program‘s staff.
10
 DM programs continue 
to monitor and evaluate the patients‘ health care utilization and symptoms (e.g., new medical 
claims or weekly phone calls regarding a diabetic‘s blood sugar) and use the new information to 
(i) identify opportunities for helpful interventions (―action items‖) and (ii) provide summary 
reports and recommendations to health care providers. In this capacity, the DM program‘s agents 
identify shortfalls from the recommended chronic care clinical guidelines and subsequently 
coordinate an appropriate response. 
Selected patients receive targeted, proactive services from the DM program staff. Typi-
cally, services provide patients with education about their chronic disease, instruction and 
encouragement on how to manage their condition; they may also receive medical advice, such as 
information on smoking cessation or weight loss, non-specific to their medical condition. These 
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 DM programs implemented by health care providers (as opposed to insurers) may use Electronic 
Medical Records (EMRs) as the basis of their data analytics. Advances in information technology 
offer the potential for new methods, such as web-based education and remote monitoring, to be 
incorporated in DM program design. (Bigelow et al. 2008) 
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services are usually provided by nurses or other health workers from a telephonic call center, but 
may sometimes involve on-site case workers who visit a high-need patient‘s home or accompany 
the patient to a doctor visit. Some programs, including Georgia‘s GEC program (evaluated in 
Chapter 3), may coordinate an even larger scope of community services, such as transportation 
for the patient to attend health care visits. DM may be understood as one model for managing 
chronic illness(es) within broader frameworks of collaborative or managed health care, such as 
the so-called ―chronic care model.‖ (Von Korff et al. 1997; Wagner, Austin, and Korff 1996)  
Thus, not all individuals enrolled in a DM program receive significant levels of interven-
tions (except from the states that risk-stratify a large pool of patients, and then enroll the highest-
risk patients into the DM program). Consider Georgia‘s program (evaluated in Chapter 3), which 
enrolled most ABD Medicaid recipients. The ABD population is about 22 percent of the 
population in a typical state. (SSA 2011) The Georgia program had one of the largest target 
populations, with 25 percent of enrollees classified into the ―moderate‖ and ―high‖ risk groups. 
Thus, even in this large program, less than 6 percent of Medicaid enrollees where likely receiving 
DM interventions in Georgia. Perhaps 75 to 80 percent of ABD patients have a chronic disease 
(Kronick, Bella, and Gilmer 2009), so in the case of Georgia, it is clear that a significant number 
of chronically ill individuals fall do not fall into these categories. For DM program enrollees 
without chronic diseases and enrollees with a chronic disease considered ―low risk,‖ the program 
may (only) affect them through DM services such as access to a ―1-800‖ phone number to contact 
a nurse with questions. In some programs, administrators would routinely monitor insurance 
claims data and only ―upgrade‖ these enrollees for more proactive DM interventions based on 
unexpected events. 
In addition to the choice of DM interventions to provide, two policy dimensions are par-
ticularly important in the design of a DM program: administrators must carefully select enrollees 
into the program and then must choose the ―intensity‖ of the interventions the enrollees receive. It 
is reasonable to believe that a significant fraction, perhaps the majority, of enrollees would be 
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poor candidates for DM interventions because the impact of DM services should be expected to 
vary within a heterogeneous population. If the program targets too large a population, it may 
provide costly services to members who are ―too healthy‖ to show significant improvements; if 
services are limited to a very small population, the program may leave significant inefficiencies 
unaddressed. 
The cost efficiency of a program will depend on the unit cost of providing DM to pro-
gram participants, yet DM interventions are costly to provide. While some components of a 
program may benefit from economies of scale, many important components of DM depend on the 
time and involvement of skilled staff (e.g., nurses) and therefore are associated with nontrivial 
cost increases. If the intensity of DM interventions could be reduced to a single dimension, the 
relationship between intervention intensity and its effect on health expenditures is likely non-
linear. At very low levels of intensity, the program might have no effect or a small effect and 
increased intensity is likely to experience diminishing returns at the highest intensity levels. Thus, 
a nontrivial selection process drives both (i) selection into the program and (ii) the intensity of 
interventions given to the enrollees. This implies that those who receive a given set of DM 
interventions are likely to differ from those who do not receive the interventions, making it 
difficult to find a reasonable comparison group. 
According to the logic of DM program design, one may expect some Medicaid beneficia-
ries, including the ABD population, to respond especially well to DM programs.
11
 There is a high 
prevalence of chronic conditions among the ABD population (see above), yet many of these 
patients receive ―fragmented‖ health care from a number of providers in a fee-for-service 
payment model. Thus, DM programs may be able to take advantage of ―low-lying fruit‖ of 
improvements in the care of their patients. As a simple example, Zillich et al. (2008) and Esposito 
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 For descriptive overviews Medicaid DM, see Arora et al. (2008), Faulkner (2003), Flowers (2007), 
Gillespie & Rossiter (2003), Health Strategies Consultancy (2004ab), Kuo (2004), RAND (2011), 
Wheatley (2001, 2002), and Williams (2004). 
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et al. (2009) found low rates of compliance to recommended prescription drug regimens among 
Medicaid patients with cardiovascular diseases, something that can presumably (i) be addressed 
by DM programs and (ii) could lead to substantial cost savings by preventing the need for 
hospitalizations and other high-cost medical events. In addition, there is less turnover in the group 
of individuals receiving SSI benefits, increasing the likelihood that investments in DM services 
would yield net cost savings before a typical individual exits the Medicaid program.
12
 
On the other hand, there are several reasons why chronically ill individuals who receive 
their insurance from Medicaid may not respond positively to the introduction of a DM program 
(compared with those covered by other types of insurance). These patients have lower incomes 
than most other patient insurance pools and do not pay out-of-pocket for their health care. Thus, 
they do not have the same financial incentives to help avoid unnecessary health utilization as 
other patients. Compared to individuals with private health insurance, Medicaid enrollees may 
also have less education, less healthy living environments, or otherwise have more or less 
capability/willingness to manage their chronic condition and thereby comply with the objectives 
of the DM program.
13
 Medicaid‘s payment rates and administration may also cause Medicaid 
patients‘ health care providers to behave differently than they do with other insurers.  Finally, 
programs implemented by (or on behalf of) the public sector may also differ from the programs in 
the private sector. Thus, despite the fact that many observers point to the Medicaid ABD 
population as a ―prime‖ population for DM interventions, it remains an empirical question 
whether Medicaid DM programs are, in fact, successful at meeting their objectives. 
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 The Medicare-Medicaid ―Dual Eligible‖ population also has a high prevalence of chronic disease 
and low turnover. However, they are often excluded from DM programs because of a conflict of 
interest between the states and federal government: the state government would pay a large share of 
the DM program costs, yet the financial benefit of lower health expenditures (e.g., lower inpatient 
costs) would accrue primarily to Medicare, and hence the federal government. (Gruber 2000, pp. 10-
11; U.S. Congress 2004, pp. 15:8-9) 
13
 Rothman et al. (2004) found that a diabetes disease management program ―benefited patients with 
low literacy to a greater degree than it did patients with higher literacy‖ in a small randomized trial. 
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1.3 Overview of findings  
In Chapter 2, I use a national survey to study health care utilization patterns for chronical-
ly ill Medicaid patients between 1998 and 2007, a period in which the presence of DM programs 
expanded rapidly across the country, leading to substantial variation in the design and coverage of 
DM programs for Medicaid enrollees. I can identify the impact of these programs on health care 
utilization by exploiting (i) variation in the timing at which states implemented DM programs for 
Medicaid enrollees and (ii) within-state variation in eligibility criteria by disease, eligibility 
category, and/or county of residence. In some states, DM coverage varies across groups over 
time, as policies were changed to include or exclude particular classes of individuals from 
eligibility; empirical estimates are not identified with a simple pre/post statewide indicator. I link 
state/county DM program information to data on individuals surveyed in the nationwide Medical 
Panel Expenditure Survey (MEPS). Individuals linked to a DM program represent about 3.76 
million individuals, or about 7.3 percent of the nation‘s Medicaid recipients.   
Using difference-in-difference models, I test for evidence of a change in Medicaid ex-
penditures after DM is implemented in a state or county. Although estimates have large standard 
errors, the point estimates are fairly consistent across model specifications, indicating that DM 
may cause a decrease in total medical expenditures, perhaps as much as $100 per person per 
quarter. Mean expenditures for chronically ill Medicaid enrollees are around $1,045 (excluding 
dual eligibles), thus $97 corresponds to almost a 10 percent decrease in total expenditures. The 
process of assigning individual to DM program may assign individuals to programs when they do 
not, in fact, receive DM interventions. Results, therefore, may be biased down. 
 This decrease in total expenditures occurs despite an increase in the probability that a 
chronically ill individual purchases medications or has an office visit with their medical provider. 
Expenditures decrease relatively more for patients with cardiovascular diseases or asthma than 
other common chronic diseases and the estimated effect is stable across a variety of specifications 
with different sets of relevant control variables. 
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The effect of DM is estimated imprecisely in Chapter 2 because individuals who are can-
didates for DM make up a relatively small share of survey respondents in the MEPS. This is one 
of the main limitations of this empirical method. Furthermore, the empirical approach with 
national data takes a fairly ―high level‖ approach to studying the effect of DM, offering less 
insight into which types of DM programs work better than others, how well the programs target 
interventions to program participants, and the particular mechanisms through which DM has an 
effect. 
Chapter 3 complements this research by focusing on a single Medicaid DM program, 
thereby gaining insight into these outstanding issues. In particular, I evaluate the Georgia 
Enhanced Care (GEC) Disease Management program. This program is of particular interest 
because idiosyncratic aspects of the program‘s implementation process postponed the 
introduction of the intended level of DM services for a significant number of high and moderate 
risk individuals. As such, some patients begin receiving high-intensity interventions when the 
program begins, while another group of observationally similar patients mistakenly receive only 
the low-intensity interventions at the beginning of the program. Moderate interventions included 
outbound phone calls tailored to their chronic conditions and high risk members were assigned to 
care managers who performed additional DM interventions. This feature of the program 
introduced a natural experiment that can be used to empirically identify the causal impact of the 
high-intensity and moderate-intensity interventions – administered to high and moderate risk 
patients – compared to the counterfactual of what would have occurred if these individuals had 
instead only receive the very minor low-intensity interventions. I am the first researcher to use 
this natural experiment to evaluate the effect of DM interventions. Detailed administrative data 
allows me to observe DM interventions and relevant health spending and utilization. 
The point estimate indicates that the high and moderate intensity interventions lower the 
level of expenditures by an average of 4.4 percent for those patients with positive expenditures. 
The effect of the program is much larger for the high-intensity interventions. A subset of patients 
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sometimes has no medical expenditures in a given month; for these patients, the intensive DM 
interventions increase the probability of a zero-expenditure month by about 0.8 percentage points. 
Of the five diseases most commonly covered by DM programs, the largest decrease was for 
asthma, which was associated with a large decline in the number of asthma-related hospital and 
emergency department admissions. The source of empirical identification – a delay before some 
patients began receiving DM interventions – also allows me to identify the effect of the program 
over time. I find evidence that the decrease in medical expenditures from the high-intensity 
interventions appears relatively early (within the first 8 months of the program) and is sustained 
over time. 
In addition, I examine the quantile treatment effect of these high and moderate intensity 
interventions over the distribution of medical expenditures using the methodology from Athey 
and Imbens (2006). In the baseline specification, the 90th percentile saw a decrease of about $200 
per member per month, while the 10th percentile decreased only $80 per member per month. 
Because the baseline medical expenditures are highly skewed, this is actually a larger percentage 
decrease in expenditures for the lower end of the distribution. 
Taken together, the results in these chapters indicate that appropriately targeted Medicaid 
DM programs can decrease medical expenditures for chronically-ill Medicaid enrollees. But the 
impact is relatively modest. 
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Chapter 2: The Effect of Medicaid Disease Management 
Programs on Medical Expenditures  – Evidence from the 
Medical Expenditure Panel Survey 
2.1 Introduction 
In recent decades, states have experimented with various Medicaid policies to contain 
costs and improve health care outcomes for program participants. This chapter focuses on one 
strategy widely adopted by states across the country: the introduction of Disease Management 
(DM) programs for Medicaid enrollees with chronic diseases. By design, DM programs aim to 
increase the share of chronically ill patients who adhere to established clinical guidelines for their 
chronic disease(s). Program designs vary widely, but it is common for nurses or other trained 
staff to interact with enrollees (and/or their health care providers) by telephone, providing data-
driven health interventions such as health education, health coaching, monitoring, or assistance 
coordinating health care services. These interventions are intended to reduce the likelihood of 
future complications with the patient‘s chronic disease, mitigating unnecessary health 
expenditures via better management of their condition(s). 
Cost-containment has been a key justification for the creation of DM programs, despite 
mixed evidence that DM actually saves money for the Medicaid program or for society as a 
whole. The financial impact of Medicaid‘s disease management programs have been evaluated in 
only a few cases, while comprehensive literature reviews from the private insurance sector failed 
to find conclusive evidence that DM reduces net medical expenditures. (e.g., CBO 2004; Goetzel 
et al. 2005; Mattke, Seid, and Ma 2007) Despite limited evidence of cost savings, Medicaid DM 
programs for the chronically ill have become a popular component of state Medicaid programs 
throughout the United States over the last decade and a half. Figure 1 plots the number of states 
with a Medicaid Disease Management program, showing a significant increase in DM coverage 
 
17 
in the late 1990s and early 2000s. At the end of 2008, 36 states with at least one DM program 
accounted for 82 percent of the total Medicaid population in the United States. 
This chapter empirically estimates the effect of Medicaid chronic disease management 
programs using nationally representative survey data. While the existing DM impact evaluation 
research literature measures the impact of individual Medicaid DM programs, this chapter 
explores the average ―national‖ impact of multiple state Medicaid DM programs. In particular, I 
use a national survey to study health care utilization patterns for chronically ill Medicaid patients 
between 1998 and 2007, a period where the presence of DM programs expanded rapidly across 
the country, leading to substantial variation in the design and coverage of DM programs for 
Medicaid enrollees. I can identify the impact of these programs on health care utilization by 
exploiting (i) the timing at which states implemented DM programs for Medicaid enrollees and 
(ii) within-state variation in eligibility criteria by disease, eligibility category, and/or county of 
residence. Although this approach has been used to study other aspects of the Medicaid program 
and other public expenditure programs,
14
 I believe this is the first study to use this methodology 
for estimating the effect of Medicaid DM on medical expenditures for common chronic diseases. 
After constructing a detailed survey of state Medicaid programs,
15
 I link state-month-
disease eligibility criteria with individuals surveyed in the nationwide Medical Panel Expenditure 
Survey (MEPS). Using difference-in-difference models, I test for evidence of a change in 
Medicaid expenditures after DM is implemented in a state or county. The effect of DM is 
estimated imprecisely because individuals who are candidates for DM make up a relatively small 
share of survey respondents in the MEPS. I investigate the robustness of these results to a variety 
of control variables – including state-time and disease-time interaction term effects – and sub-
                                                     
14
 Difference-in-difference models that exploit variation in program implementation are well known in 
public economics. To name a few examples on Medicaid policy, Yelowitz (1995), Currie and Gruber 
(1996, 2001), and Dafny and Gruber (2005) use difference-in-differences to evaluate the impact of 
Medicaid eligibility expansions on health outcomes. Currie and Far (2005) and Burns (2009) study the 
effect of Medicaid Managed Care. 
15
 See Section 2.3.2 and Appendix A for information on data construction. 
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samples of the data. This approach allows me to estimate the effect of Medicaid DM on 
individuals with targeted diseases, under the assumption that medical expenditures for other, non-
targeted Medicaid enrollees (or individuals with other insurance) (i) are not influenced by DM 
spillover effects and (ii) have secular trends that are not correlated with the timing of DM 
program introduction. To the extent that DM influences long-term health care expenditures – a 
category excluded from the MEPS – my estimates will understate the overall population. 
Although estimates have large standard errors, the point estimates are fairly consistent 
across model specifications, indicating that DM may cause a decrease in total medical 
expenditures, perhaps as much as $100 per person per quarter. This decrease in total expenditures 
occurs despite an increase in the probability that a chronically ill individual purchases 
medications or has an office visit with their medical provider. Expenditures decrease relatively 
more for patients with cardiovascular diseases or asthma than other common chronic diseases. 
Due to the lack of comprehensive, standardized data on program costs, the net savings to state 
Medicaid programs cannot be established at this time. 
In the remainder of this chapter, I first provide background on Medicaid DM programs. 
Sections 2.3 and 2.4 then introduce the data used in this study and my empirical approach. 
Results are discussed in sections 2.5 and 2.6 and a concluding discussion is provided in section 
2.7. 
2.2 Background 
Medicaid DM programs are designed to improve the management of chronic conditions 
for enrollees by aligning patient behavior and health care providers‘ interventions with 
established clinical guidelines for the patient‘s chronic disease(s). The motivation behind DM can 
be understood from a cost-containment perspective, as growth in Medicaid expenditures has 
outpaced growth of state revenue, inflation, and GDP, increasing the pressure on program 
administrators to deliver benefits efficiently. The crux of cost-containment initiatives lies in the 
 
19 
fact that most Medicaid spending is concentrated on a small subset of very high-costs enrollees, 
many of whom have chronic diseases. The top five percent of enrollees accounted for 57 percent 
of Medicaid spending in 2004.
16
 (KFF 2009) Over 80 percent of Medicaid expenditures for non-
institutionalized beneficiaries are attributable to individuals with chronic conditions. (Anderson 
2004) Given that a significant number of individuals with chronic conditions do not meet 
established clinical guidelines (AHRQ 2010; IOM 2001; McGlynn et al. 2003; NCQA 2007), 
there is reason to believe that costs could be reduced through cost-effective management of 
chronic conditions. In theory, Medicaid DM can increase the quality of living for program 
participants and lower Medicaid expenditures simultaneously. 
DM interventions are intended to improved management of the chronic conditions (i.e., 
increased use of ―preventive care‖), which in turn will be followed by a reduction in total 
expenditures. In particular, increased adherence to established clinical guidelines should mitigate 
the risk of expensive complications in the short term (e.g., ED visits and hospitalizations) and the 
long term (e.g., the development of additional comorbid conditions). States explicitly (or 
implicitly) ―target‖ patients with chronic illnesses such as asthma, chronic obstructive pulmonary 
disease (COPD), diabetes, coronary artery disease (CAD), congestive heart failure (CHF), and 
other diseases. A typical DM program collects and monitors data on the enrollees‘ health care, 
identifies intervention opportunities (―gaps‖ in care vis-à-vis the relevant guidelines), and then 
provides services intended to improve the education or health behaviors of the enrollee and/or his 
or her health care providers. These services are most often provided through a telephonic call 
center staffed by nurses or other trained staff, but may include mailings, in-person visits, 
electronic monitoring systems, and other forms of contact. Program administers try – with 
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 Estimate from the Kaiser Family Foundation (2009). Kennedy, Ruhter, and Selden (2009) show 
that 73 percent of spending for children in Medicaid/CHIP is for children in the highest decile and 
two-thirds of this spending is for children with a chronic disease; the top three deciles account for 90 
percent of spending. A number of issues relevant to health care quality for high-cost Medicaid 
enrollees are discussed by Lipson et al. (2010). 
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varying degrees of sophistication – to balance the intensity of interventions with the potential 
benefit expected from intervening in the health care of a particular beneficiary. It is common for a 
small subset of high-cost (or ―high-risk‖) patients to receive the majority of attention from DM 
program staff. 
Naturally, Medicaid DM programs vary from state-to-state along a wide variety of di-
mensions. The term ―disease management‖ does not refer to a homogeneous set of interventions 
or policies. Instead, it a loose term that can involve a variety of different target audiences, 
interventions, and institutional arrangements. Most commonly, states implement DM programs 
by contracting with a Disease Management Organization (DMO) to provide identified services. In 
some cases, they build the necessary capabilities in-house or use a ―hybrid‖ combination of 
outsourced and in-house service provision. DMOs often have actuarial cost-savings targets they 
must meet in order to receive full payment for the services. 
Programs have idiosyncratic rules about who exactly is eligible for program interven-
tions. Inclusion or exclusion can be based on age (e.g., children, adults, aged) or categorical 
definitions (e.g., SSI, dual eligibles). Some programs have large eligible populations and then 
give their DMO vendors latitude to use risk stratification algorithms to select which individuals 
receive interventions. For example, the Indiana Chronic Disease Management Program enrolled 
participants from the Aged, Blind, and Disabled (ABD) population who had diabetes or CHF 
while the Georgia Enhanced Care Program included most ABD adults and children in the 
program, regardless of chronic disease status, and allowed the program vendor to target 
interventions by disease. More on these idiosyncrasies is discussed below. 
Matheson, Wilkins, and Psacharopoulos (2006) and Shelton (2002) describe an evolution 
in DM program design in the private sector. In the early 1990s, DM was primarily sponsored by 
pharmaceutical companies and focused on the correct use of medications. In the mid-1990s 
DMOs began to provide a wider array of DM services for payers and hospitals, usually focusing 
on a single disease. Recent trends in the private sector point towards coverage for multiple 
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diseases (i.e., comorbidity pairs) and some programs are now targeting populations at risk of 
acquiring a chronic condition. My review of Medicaid DM programs indicates that this trend was 
mirrored in Medicaid. Early programs in Virginia (1997) and Mississippi (1998) focused on 
program enrollee‘s drug usage. The ―Florida: A Healthy State‖ program (2001/02), was funded 
by pharmaceutical companies as a negotiated settlement to avoid paying rebates for their drugs 
inclusion on Florida‘s preferred drug list and to ―to test the theory that better management of 
services and drugs would reduce costs and achieve better health outcomes through DM 
programs.‖ (White et al. 2005) As Medicaid DM evolved, program designs tended to have more 
comprehensive intervention approaches and often explicitly targeted one disease or a few 
diseases. Recently implemented (or redesigned) programs in Maine, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Texas, 
and Washington state rely primarily on risk-stratification, not simply disease categories, to 
identify who receives DM services. 
As discussed in the literature review below in Section 3.2, there are several studies that 
estimate the financial impact of Medicaid DM programs by evaluating a single DM program. 
Although some studies report that Medicaid DM may lower medical expenditures for (at least a 
subset of) treated patients, it is unclear how much external validity there is to these findings, 
particularly when one considers the widespread heterogeneity in DM program design. This 
chapter attempts to understand the wider impact of DM, beyond one-at-a-time evaluations of 
individual DM programs. Although this method abstracts from the rich details idiosyncratic to 
specific programs, it may help by providing an indication of the aggregate financial effect of 
Medicaid DM. 
Katz et al. (2009) provide what is perhaps the most comparable study to this chapter. 
They use the case of the Indiana Chronic Disease Management Program to study the impact of 
Medicaid DM on Medicaid expenditures. The state was divided into three regions and DM began 
in the central region about one year earlier than elsewhere. Using administrative claims data, they 
report that DM interventions for CHF and Diabetes patients lowered the growth rate of total per-
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member-per-month Medicaid expenditures. However, this interpretation is not straightforward, 
given that the growth rate in expenditures also falls in the non-treated regions at the same time the 
central region begins receiving treatment; this finding casts some doubt on the causal link 
between the observed break in the trend in expenditures and the DM intervention.  
Also related, a study by Rossiter et al (2000) examines the Virginia Health Outcomes 
Health Partnership, a program for fee-for-service asthmatic enrollees. Here, particular 
communities received DM interventions and these communities were matched to comparable 
communities based on observable characteristics. The relative risk of an emergency department 
visit ranged from .74 to 1.09 (treatment vs. comparison communities) over the quarters in the 
post-intervention period and use of acute-asthma inhaler medications increased. 
2.3 Data 
This study combines data from several sources. The Medical Expenditure Panel Survey 
(MEPS) provides data for patient‘s health utilization and outcomes. Second, I merge the MEPS 
with state- and county-level panel data on DM programs available to Medicaid enrollees, which I 
compiled for the purposes of this study. 
2.3.1 Data on health outcomes (MEPS) 
The primary data source on health care utilization and outcomes is the Household Com-
ponent of the Medicaid Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), a household survey that focuses on 
health care expenditures and health care insurance. The MEPS is collected by the United States 
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) and is regarded as one of the most 
complete sources of nationwide data regarding the cost and use of health care and health 
insurance coverage in the United States. Each year, a new panel of sample households is selected 
from the previous year‘s National Health Interview Survey (itself a nationally representative 
survey) and each panel responds to five ―rounds‖ of interviews covering two calendar years. 
Panels are introduced yearly, so that two panels are interviewed in any given calendar year. When 
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adjusting for the complex design of the MEPS, the sample is considered nationally representative 
of the civilian, non-institutionalized population. The Household Component fields questionnaires 
to individual household members and their medical providers to collect complete, detailed health-
related information on the individuals, including health insurance coverage, health conditions, 




Unless otherwise noted, I limit the analysis sample to individuals in the MEPS dataset 
who receive health insurance through the Medicaid program at some point in the two calendar 
years of survey reporting.
18
 The data is restricted in this manner due to the concern that trends in 
health expenditures may be different for individuals in the Medicaid program (compared to the 
rest of the population) due to national Medicaid policies and other factors. In alternative 
specifications, I check for robustness by experimenting with data samples that include chronically 
ill survey respondents who are not insured by Medicaid. In most specifications, I use all available 
observations (quarters) for the individual, even if they leave the Medicaid program. However, I 
also show results using alternative data samples; for example, I present results dropping 
observations (quarters) where an individual is not enrolled in Medicaid and limiting the sample to 
individuals who are continuously enrolled (see p. 47-49 and Table 6). 
The data in this study pools observations for interviews conducted in 1998 through 2008 
(i.e., the second year of panel 2, both years of data for panels 3 through 11, and the first year of 
panel 12). For each household, I compile quarterly time series data with the number of health-
related events, by type of service, and total expenditures by payment source. I use the 
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 For more information on the MEPS‘s survey design, sample, and questionnaires and to download 
the public-use files, refer to the MEPS website (http://meps.ahrq.gov), Ezzati-Rice, Rohde, and 
Greenblatt (2008), and Cohen et al. (2003; 2009). 
18
 I always drop individuals who appear in the raw MEPS files, but are excluded by AHRQ from the 




methodology from Selden (2009) for assigning each event to the date of its occurrence.
19
 The 
month and year of most health events is provided by MEPS, although individuals are not asked 
for the dates they filled pharmaceutical prescriptions. However, I could often assign pharmaceuti-
cal events to a quarter of the year based on (i) when the person first started taking the prescription 
or (ii) the date of an event linked to the prescription (e.g., a medicine taken in the hospital during 
an inpatient stay). For the pharmaceutical events that cannot be assigned to a specific date in this 
manner, I assigned a date at random in the year and interview round in which the particular event 
occurs.
20
 As the MEPS conducts five rounds of interviews covering two years, this procedure 
leads to a reasonable chance of assigning an event to the quarter of the year in which it actually 
occurred, although measurement error is introduced. When building this dataset with event-level 
data (not AHRQ‘s ―consolidated‖ summary files), I tabulate quarterly health expenditures with 
mutually exclusive categories by payer and type of service. Before calculating quarterly totals, all 
charges are adjusted to January 2005 dollars using the monthly series of the BLS‘s Consumer 
Price Index for all urban consumers. 
A notable limitation of the MEPS is that the survey excludes institutionalized individuals 
– those living in nursing homes, other long-term care facilities, and prisons – and omits most 
Medicaid long-term medical care expenditures. This may not be a first-order concern because 
many Medicaid DM programs (e.g., Georgia‘s program evaluated in Chapter 3) exclude 
institutionalized individuals from program eligibility under the assumption that DM interventions 
would be redundant because nursing home personnel already perform education, care 
coordination, or other interventions. To the extent that DM influences long-term health care 
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 I thank Thomas Selden for generously sharing event-date assignment files from his study. For the 
years prior to or after his study, I follow his methodology as closely as possible. 
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 I also randomly assigned dates for a very small number of other events where the date was not 
reported. This was the case for 0.1 percent of inpatient, outpatient, and emergency department events, 
for example. Dates were most commonly missing for ―other‖ (uncategorized) medical expenditure 
events, a category which accounts for just 1.7 percent of all Medicaid spending. 
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The MEPS questionnaire asks respondents if they have one or more chronic conditions. 
In addition, diagnosis codes are recorded for any of the individual‘s medical events in the two 
calendar years of the MEPS. These ICD-9 diagnosis codes are reported at the 3-digit level for 
confidentiality. Following Lewis (2009), I identify inpatient, outpatient, and emergency 
department events with diagnosis for the following chronic illnesses: Asthma (493), COPD (491, 
492, 494, 496, 506), CAD (410, 411, 413, 414), diabetes (250), and Heart Failure (404, 425, 428). 
These are the five most common chronic diseases targeted by Medicaid DM programs and are 
referred to as the ―top-5‖ chronic conditions in this study. To identify an individual‘s chronic 
illnesses, I identify them as having the illness if they responded positively to the MEPS 
questionnaire or if the MEPS contains an event where they were diagnosed with the disease. This 
combined methodology gives higher diagnosis rates than either method alone. Other algorithms 
used in Chapter 3, such as the CDPS and the PQI procedure to identify ―potentially preventable‖ 
hospitalizations, depend on 5-digit ICD-9 codes and cannot be used with the MEPS dataset. 
The  MEPS does not collect information on DM program enrollment, DM-related pro-
gram (e.g., fees paid by Medicaid to a DMO or costs incurred by states for the administration of a 
program).  Therefore, DM enrollment and the related costs cannot be observed directly in the 
MEPS.  
2.3.2 Data on Medicaid Disease Management 
In addition to the MEPS, this study requires a second dataset containing information on 
Medicaid DM programs in each individual‘s state of residence in each quarter. Comprehensive 
data on Medicaid DM programs has not been previously compiled; this study collects relevant 
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 This sentence assumes that DM affects long-term medical expenditures works in the same direction 
as other medical expenditures. This would not be the case if, for example, DM somehow delayed 
medical treatments until after the program participants enter nursing homes or if DM increases long-
term medical use, beyond the amount saved on all other expenditures in the near term. 
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information from a variety of sources. This data represents a history of Medicaid DM programs 
for all 50 states plus the District of Columbia through the end of 2008. For each state and quarter, 
I identify if there is at least one DM program or pilot program, diseases the program(s) targeted, 
if dual eligibles were included in the program, and other details. This information was collected at 
the county-level when states implemented programs that were not statewide. 
Additional details on the DM program data file construction, a list of programs, and a list 
of key data sources are included in Appendix A. 
My definition of DM has remained broad enough to reflect the evolution in DM program 
design over the last few decades, although I generally attempted to follow the literature, including 
programs referred to as ―disease management‖ by other researchers and excluding programs that 
were not. As the design of Medicaid DM program activities are heterogeneous in this sample, I 
also indicate whether the program belongs to a subset of programs meeting a more strict 
definition of ―disease management.‖ This definition is an attempt to restrict the sample of 
programs to ―traditional‖ telephonic-oriented programs targeted at subgroups of the population 
who are high-risk. This strict definition rules out programs that feature relatively less-intensive 
interventions, pharmaceutical-management programs, programs that interact exclusively with 
health providers (not patients), and a few other programs. In my estimates below, I infer if an 
individual might be enrolled in a DM program by comparing characteristics of an individual in 
the MEPS to characteristics about the DM program(s) in his or her state/county of residence. 
Data on DM program costs could not be collected uniformly. Table 1 presents estimated 
program costs for a few example programs. Costs per enrollee range from $1 to over $90 per 
member per month (PMPM). Very low program costs tend to occur when states select large 
demographic groups for program eligibility with their DMO contractor (with a PMPM fee for the 
entire eligible population), and then leave the DMO to target DM interventions to a subset of the 
individuals who they deem appropriate. (Arora et al. 2008, pp. 5-8) This was the case in 
Georgia‘s program, where about one-quarter of eligible members were classified as ―moderate‖ 
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or ―high‖ risk and therefore receiving the bulk of the DM interventions. (see Chapter 3) Thus 
monthly costs per high/moderate risk member was over $125, even though the average monthly 
cost per enrollee was $32. My estimates below make no attempt to estimate DM-related 
expenditures.  Therefore, my results only represent one-half of a full cost-benefit analysis. 
Most of the MEPS data used in this study is publicly available. However, the MEPS pub-
lic access files do not identify each individual‘s state of residence (for confidentiality), preventing 
the combination of Medicaid DM information with the survey responses. Therefore, all research 
was conducted in the AHRQ‘s data center, where DM program information could be merged with 
each individual‘s state and county of residence with the assistance of AHRQ staff. Access to the 
MEPS data at the AHRQ data center is available by application. 
2.4 Methodology 
This chapter exploits cross-state and within-state variation in DM coverage to estimate 
difference-in-difference models for the impact of Medicaid DM programs on quarterly health care 
utilization. This section (i) discusses the variation in DM coverage and then (ii) introduces the 
econometric specification of the models. 
2.4.1 Variation in DM coverage 
2.4.1.1 Cross-state variation 
Over the last decade and a half, Disease Management programs for the chronically ill 
became a popular component of state Medicaid Programs throughout the United States. I have 
identified 41 states (including the District of Columbia) that have implemented a DM program or 
pilot program for their Medicaid enrollees. The 36 states with an active DM program at the end of 
2008 account for 82 percent of the total Medicaid population in the United States. As shown in 
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DM activities remained relatively limited until 1998, when Florida and Mississippi im-
plemented the first statewide programs for Medicaid FFS patients that targeted multiple diseases, 
making these states the primary ―early adaptors‖ of Medicaid DM programs.
24
 Over the next 
several years, DM began to gain more widespread attention and the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS) began to discuss DM as an important component of future operations. 
(CMS 2004, 2006) States have continued to experiment with DM programs over the last decade. 
By the end of 2004, over half of the states had established or were developing Medicaid DM 
programs for the FFS populations. To date, 41 out of the 51 Medicaid agencies have implemented 
some kind of program (Figure 5). This growth in Medicaid DM largely tracks, with a lag, the 
dramatic rise in the DM service industry in the private sector. (Matheson, Wilkins, and 
Psacharopoulos 2006; Williams 2004) 
Two factors are associated with the ten states that did not implement a DM program and 
other ―late adopters‖: overall Medicaid enrollment and Medicaid Managed Care (MMC) 
penetration. First, several states without Medicaid DM programs have small Medicaid 
populations (e.g., Alaska, D.C., Delaware, Hawaii, and South Dakota). At the other end of the 
spectrum, California and New York (the two largest large Medicaid populations) have not 
implemented statewide DM programs, but have implemented regional programs covering a subset 
of the states‘ counties. Several other states, such as Arizona, South Dakota, Tennessee, and (until 
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 This discussion on state-based coverage of Medicaid DM is based on tabulations from the author‘s 
survey of Medicaid disease management programs. Details about the data are discussed in section 
2.3.2 and Appendix A. Maps in Figure 6 identify states that had implemented a DM program at two 
arbitrary points in time – December 31 of 1999 and 2008. This discussion applies to fee-for-service or 
similar insurance payment schemes (i.e., excluding DM in Medicaid Managed Care). 
23
 For descriptive overviews Medicaid DM, see Arora et al. (2008) (2008), Faulkner (2003), Flowers 
(2007), Gillespie & Rossiter (2003), Health Strategies Consultancy (2004ab), Kuo (2004), RAND 
(2011), Wheatley (2001, 2002), and Williams (2004). 
24
 Maryland and Virginia had introduced the first DM programs in 1991 and 1993, respectively, for a 
limited group of patients with specific diseases. 
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recently) Kentucky, rely primarily on MMC programs to provide care to their members and have 
very few, if any, fee for service enrollees. However, these factors are certainly not prescriptive: 
there are states that have DM programs, despite having small enrollments (e.g., North Dakota and 
Wyoming), high enrollment (e.g., Texas), or high MMC penetration (e.g., Oregon). 
To implement DM programs, most states hire an outside disease management organiza-
tion (DMO) to run their DM programs (about two-thirds of the programs) as opposed to running 
the program in-house or through a hybrid model. Most commonly, programs target patients with 
specific chronic diseases, but a few states target patients with previously observed high costs 
(e.g., Kansas and Oklahoma) or designate large groups of patients as eligible for the program and 




This cross-state variation in the timing of DM program rollout serves as the main source 
of variation for difference-in-difference estimates of the impact of a DM program on health care 
expenditures and other health care utilization metrics. The underlying assumption is that the exact 
timing of DM program implementation is not correlated with other determinates of health care 
utilization. One state may implement their DM program a few months or years earlier than other 
similar states, and my model relies on the assumption that this variation in timing is not 
systematically related to the outcome determinants, except through the impact of the DM 
interventions themselves. For example, a standard difference-in-differences analysis would be 
confounded if states are more likely to implement a DM program earlier if a particular patient 
pool had particularly high medical expenditures. Another potential concern is that a DM 
program‘s implementation occurs concurrently with other state-specific policy changes (or other 
factors) that affect medical expenditures. Fortunately, there are several sources of within-state 
variation in DM coverage that can be used to control for potential state-specific trends in the 
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 Arora, Boehm, Chimento, Moldawer, and Tsien (2008) provide an introduction to Medicaid DM 
program design and contracting. 
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outcomes of interest.  My empirical estimates do not use a simple pre/post statewide indicator, 
but are instead determined for each individual based on geographic and categorical determinates, 
exploiting with-in state variation in DM coverage. 
2.4.1.2 Within-state variation 
Exclusion of dual eligibles: First, DM programs are often implemented with categorical 
eligibility rules that exclude subgroups of Medicaid enrollees who are fairly similar to the 
individuals included in the program. One example is the common practice where states provide 
DM services to the ABD Medicaid enrollees while excluding individuals eligible for both the 
Medicare and Medicaid (henceforth, ―dual eligible‖ enrollees). This policy is the result of the fact 
that state Medicaid programs have little incentive to provide DM services to a dual eligible 
enrollee: the state government would fund the costs for the individual‘s DM services, but the 
financial savings would likely benefit the federal government via the patient‘s Medicare 
insurance coverage. While both of these groups are similar – at least to the extent that both groups 
have higher rates of chronic diseases and higher levels of health care utilization than other 
Medicaid enrollees – one group often receives DM while the other does not. To the extent that 
health care utilization in the state is affected by the same factors (for example, state Medicaid 
policy, health care cost inflation, or access to new health care technology), the dual eligible 
population can be used to identify state-year changes in utilization patterns that would have 
affected the ABD population, even if a DM program had not been introduced. My DM treatment 
variable in the analysis below always matches DM programs to an individual taking into account 
his or her status as a dual eligible enrollee. 
Disease targeting: Second, Medicaid DM programs, with few exceptions, ―target‖ pa-
tients with selected chronic diseases, providing relevant program interventions only for the 
selected disease(s). The most commonly covered diseases, which I call the ―top-5‖ chronic 
conditions, are diabetes, coronary artery disease (CAD), congestive heart failure (CHF), asthma, 
and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD). As I discussed in section 1.2, these diseases 
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are most commonly covered because (i) they are relatively prevalent, (ii) their DM interventions 
can be more easily standardized, and (iii) shortfalls in health care quality are common. Some DM 
programs target patients with other less-common, but particularly high-cost diseases such as 
sickle-cell anemia, schizophrenia, hemophilia, renal failure, and HIV/AIDS. 
There is substantial variation in the list of diseases targeted from state to state. For exam-
ple, the state of Washington implemented a large DM program targeting asthma, diabetes, and 
chronic heart failure (CHF), which rolled out in 2002/2003. Shortly later, in 2004, the state of 
Texas contracted with the same company to provide a DM program that was similar to the 
program implemented in Washington. One of the key differences (aside from implementation 
timing) was that Texas‘s DM program targeted patients with COPD and CAD, in addition to the 
diseases targeted by Washington‘s program. Thus, in the time period after both programs are 
active, the COPD and CAD patients in Washington remain a comparison group for as similar 
group of treated patients in Texas. As different type of example, consider the state of Missouri.  A 
statewide DM program was implemented in 2002 and covered asthma, COPD, diabetes, and CHF 
patients. In 2006, administrators modified the program and began targeting a number of 
additional diseases.  Thus, Missouri provides one example where policy changes caused DM 
coverage to change for individuals with different diseases within a state over time.  
The major exception to disease-based policies is a group of states that select patients 
based on historical claims data, targeting patients with high utilization.
26
 In this chapter, I focus 
on the ―top-5‖ chronic conditions, as the MEPS data is not well suited for identifying the impact 
of DM on populations that represent a very small share of the United States. There are simply not 
enough Medicaid enrollees in the MEPS survey to reliably estimate the effect of DM programs 
that target rare diseases or other limited populations. 
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 For example, the Enhanced Care Coordination Program in Nebraska targeted an estimated 850 
patients with previously observed costs over $50,000 per year (who were not foster children, dual 
eligibles, individuals in MMC programs, in a nursing home, or belonged to other groups). 
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County-level variation: Third, some states either implemented limited pilot programs or 
introduced programs in limited geographical regions. (See Figure 1.) Thus, these states have 
periods of time where some patients receive DM services while there are patients in other 
counties who are otherwise similar, yet are not included in the DM program. To the extent that 
both groups are subject to policies (or other factors) that would affect the health outcomes for 
chronically ill patients statewide, the patients in un-treated counties can serve as proxies for 
trends in expenditures that would have occurred if these programs had not been implemented. For 
example, this is the case in the two states with the largest Medicaid populations, California and 
New York. Although neither state implemented a statewide program, both states have large 
programs in particular counties or regions. California implemented a ―pilot‖ program in 2007 in 
Alameda and Los Angeles counties – two counties with a combined Medicaid population larger 
than most states. (KFF Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF) 2011a; Lundy et al. 2004, sec. 5.1c) The 
―Regional DM program or pilot program‖ lines in Figure 1 indicate this is fairly common, 
especially in larger states. In the empirical work below, I use a person‘s county of residence to 
identify individuals who are covered by a DM program, where appropriate. 
DM coverage can also vary within states over time due to county-level variation.  Several 
states implement ―pilot‖ programs that cover a few counties and then are scaled up or replaced 
with statewide programs. For example, Texas transferred patients from a pilot program (six cities) 
into a new statewide program in November 2004. Indiana provides another example of within-
state (county-level) variation in DM coverage over time; this case was evaluated by Katz et al. 
(2009) and is discussed below (section 2.2). 
2.4.2 Econometric specification 
I use difference-in-difference models to estimate the impact of Medicaid DM programs 
on quarterly health care expenditures (by payer and type of category of service) and other 
utilization measures. As discussed in more detail below, I use generalized linear models (GLM) 
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because the density of medical expenditures exhibits a mass at zero dollars and positive 
skewness. In particular, I estimate models of the following form: 
                                        1 
    is a measure of health care expenditures (or other outcome) for person   in quarter  . All 
specifications include fixed effects for the individual‘s state of residence     , the quarter     , 
and MEPS panel     . I discuss the GLM link function        and distributional family ( ) 
below. In a series of additional regressions, I examine the sensitivity of the results to including 
state-specific linear time trends, state-by-year interaction fixed effects, and chronic disease-
specific linear time trends, chronic disease-by-year fixed effects, chronic disease-by-quarter of 
year (seasonality) fixed effects, and other controls (not shown in equation 1). Section 2.6, below, 
discusses a special case where individual fixed effects can be included in the model. 
The disease management treatment variable,     , equals one if individual   lives in a 
state or county with a Medicaid DM program in quarter  . As the MEPS does not collect 
information on DM program enrollment or program fees paid by Medicaid to a DMO, I cannot 
observe DM enrollment directly. Instead, I infer if an individual might be enrolled in a DM 
program by comparing characteristics of the individual to characteristics about the DM 
program(s) in his or her state/county of residence. In the main specifications, I construct      by 
matching an individual‘s insurance coverage and chronic diseases (asthma, COPD, diabetes, 
CAD, or CHF) to the program eligibility criteria and target disease(s) for any DM program(s) in 
their geographic region.
27
 For example,        for a dual-eligible asthmatic enrollee only in 
the case where the geographic region has a DM program that (i) targets asthma patients and (ii) 
accepts dual eligible enrollees. Conversely,        if there was no DM program in the 
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        whenever the individual an individual is not enrolled in Medicaid. If someone with DM 
leaves a Medicaid program, the      variable switches from   to  . 
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state/county or the DM programs do not target asthma or the DM programs do not admit dual 
eligible patients. 
As was discussed above, DM coverage varies across individuals due to (i) variation in the 
quarter at which their state of residence introduced DM programs, (ii) variation in DM eligibility 
between Medicaid enrollees that do not have Medicare coverage and those that do (dual 
eligibility), (iii) variation in the chronic diseases targeted by the DM program in their region, and 
(iv) the fact that some DM programs were not implemented statewide (introducing county-level 
variation).  Thus      is constructed for each observation for each individual through a matching 
process.  The variable can equal one for some individuals in a state, but not others, and the 
inclusion/exclusion criteria can change over time within a state as states change the diseases, 
counties, and/or eligibility groups targeted by their program(s). 
Any DM treatment variable with this data set will ultimately be imperfect, as the data in 
this study does not contain detailed enough information to link individuals to specific DM 
programs. Even if one could perform this data linkage using (unavailable) eligibility criteria or 
administrative enrollment data, one would not necessarily be able to identify the patients who 
received DM interventions (e.g., a phone call from a nurse) because many DM programs only 
provide substantive interventions to a subset of enrolled patients: those who are deemed ―high 
risk‖ patients or otherwise meet idiosyncratic (or proprietary) criteria. Therefore, this treatment 
indicator may be more accurately considered an indicator for a policy intention to provide DM 
interventions within a population of Medicaid enrollees – specifically, the population of patients 
who share  ‘s state/county of residence, chronic diseases, and insurance coverage in period  . One 
concern is that this treatment variable inappropriately classifies untreated individuals in the 
MEPS to the ―treated‖ group. Furthermore, this construction will omit the DM programs that do 
not target the ―top-5‖ five chronic diseases (discussed above), misclassifying observations into 
the ―untreated‖ group when they are, in fact, receiving DM. To the extent that the treatment 
variable tends to misclassify individuals in this direction, I expect the models in this study to 
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underestimate the impact of DM programs.
28
 I experiment with alternative measures of      
below. 
The remaining variables, represented by the vector    , are an array of individual-level 
dummy variables: gender; 10-year age bins; race/ethnicity categories for white non-Hispanic, 
black, Hispanic, Asian or Pacific-Island, or Native American; highest education completed as no 
degree, GED, high school diploma, bachelor's degree, graduate degree, under-16, or oth-
er/missing; the presences of the five chronic illnesses focused on in this study (discussed above); 
and insurance coverage (in quarter  ) by Medicaid, Medicare, both, or neither. 
In the results below, I focus on the effects of DM on total health expenditures (all pay-
ers). In additional specifications, I also consider several sub-categories of health expenditures, 
grouping by payer (especially focusing on Medicaid expenditures) and type of service (e.g., 
inpatient, outpatient, office visits, pharmaceuticals, etc.). Disaggregation by payer allows, for 
example, one to determine the effect of the program on medical expenditures paid by Medicaid, 
which could be used to estimate the return on investment (ROI) for the Medicaid program if 
paired with detailed program cost information. Disaggregation of expenditures by service type 
allows some insight into the channels of DM‘s effect on total health expenditures. As mentioned 
above, the estimates excludes (most) long-term health care expenditures, as the MEPS excludes 
institutionalized individuals from the survey population. 
This approach allows me to estimate the effect of Medicaid DM on individuals with tar-
geted diseases in states (counties) with programs. Difference-in-difference models require that 
secular trends in the outcome variable health expenditures) for non-treated individuals are not 
systematically related to (correlated with) the timing of program implementation. Although this 
                                                     
28
 To estimate the effect of DM intervention on DM enrollees who actually receive significant levels 
of DM interventions, it would be necessary to scale up the results in Section 2.5. Under the 
assumption that DM has no effect on ―untreated‖ individuals enrolled in the DM program, one could 
multiply the treatment effect by the ratio                                      . This would 
require an estimate of this ratio for the ―average‖ DM program, which is currently unavailable. 
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cannot be tested directly, I check the robustness of the model with alternative control variables 
and alternative data samples in the results below. One form of systematic correlation that could 
potentially influence the model‘s results would be the presence of ―spillover‖ effects. I assume 
that DM does not have an indirect effect on non-program participants.
29
 Although these effects 
cannot be ruled out, I expect they are, at best, second-order in magnitude compared to the main 
effect of DM on program participants themselves. These models implicitly assume DM does not 
affect Medicaid enrollment or disenrollment. This assumption would be violated if DM attracts 
patients to apply for Medicaid, improves satisfaction with the Medicaid program, assists enrollees 
in maintaining their benefits, or otherwise increases (or decreases) enrollment for the target 
population. Finally, the identification strategy requires that the date of DM introduction (     
   is not systematically correlated with Medicaid policy changes. Some policies are potentially 
troublesome, such as the movement of enrollees in or out of Medicaid Managed Care (MMC) 
plans. However,      is constructed by matching survey respondents to DM programs via their 
disease, dual eligibility, and county of residence. Thus, there are typically other individuals in the 
same state with       , yet who may be subject to the policies of concern, including MMC. In 




As is common in health economics, the outcomes variables in this study prove challeng-
ing because health expenditures (i) are strictly nonnegative, (ii) a large fraction of observations 
are zero, and (iii) the distribution of nonzero observations is highly skewed. Among continuously 
enrolled Medicaid recipients in the 2007 MEPS, the top decile accounted for 79 percent of 
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 Examples of potential spillover effects include the following: (1) General equilibrium effects on 
health care prices (which may be at work in the Florida example on p. 19) could alter health care 
utilization in the broader economy. (2) DM interventions that educate health providers may influence 
their decision-making with non-program participants. (3) Participants may pass along information to 
non-participants. 
30
 In particular, see the discussion related to Table 4 (columns 2 and 3, p. 40), Table 5 (p. 41), and 
Table 8 (p. 45). 
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Medicaid expenditures (accounting for complex survey design of the MEPS). The summary 
statistics in Table 2 present the fraction of observations with zero expenditures, by category. 
Aggregating to quarterly data only partially smoothes the data inter-temporally and does not 
remove its kurtosis.  
In light of these issues, my primary specification is a two-part model, with a generalized 
linear model (GLM) in each stage.
31
 The first stage models the probability of any expenditure 
conditional on the independent variables,                    , using a Bernoulli distribution 
and a probit link function (            in equation 1).32 Here,     refers to the remaining 
independent variables.  
The second stage models the outcome conditional on positive expenditures, 
                     . I choose to use a GLM model with a gamma distribution and a log link 
function               . This formulation with the log link function is essentially the 
nonlinear least squares estimator (NLLS) from Mullahy (1998, p. 260), and use of the gamma 
distribution was first used in this context by Blough et al. (1999).  Alterative functional forms for 
the second stage of the model have been compared by Manning and Mullahy (2001) and Basu, 
Manning, and Mullahy (2004). The gamma regression model with the log link was shown to fit 
health expenditure data and, relative to the alternatives, was more robust to alternative data 
generating processes in Monte Carlo simulations. I used the model tests proposed by Manning 
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 The use of two-part models in health economics dates at least to the Rand Health Experiment (Duan 
1983; Duan et al. 1983, 1984; Manning et al. 1987) and is widely used today. For example, Burns 
(2009) uses two-part models with the MEPS data set in her study on Medicaid Managed Care. Jones 
(2000) provides an excellent introduction to the topic. Two-part models are covered by econometric 
textbooks such as Cameron and Trivedi (2005) or Wooldridge (2002). Leung and Yu (1996) use 
Monte Carlo simulations to compare this model to the (Heckman) sample selection model. I did not 
consider the sample selection model for this research because there is no apparent exclusion restriction 
that could be used to fit the sample selection part of the model. 
32
 The Bernoulli distribution is the canonical link for the logit function. Given the similarity of the 
probit and logit functions, this distribution should usually behave similarly with either link function. 
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and Mullahy (2001, pp. 471-472) and Deb, Manning, and Norton (2010); test results suggested 
that this link function and distribution would work well for the MEPS data.
33
  
 As discussed by Duan et al. (1983, pp. 118-119, 1984, p. 286), Jones (2000, pp. 285-
292), and Cameron and Trivedi (2005, pp. 544-555) , this model allows the censoring mechanism 
and the outcome to be modeled using separate processes, which is appropriate if the researcher 
believes that one process explains the decision to seek medical care and another process 
determines the consequent expenses.  As such, the estimated effects of DM in stage 1 and stage 2 
of the model are interesting in their own right.   
 Furthermore, the estimates from the two stages of the model can be combined to calcu-
late the effect of DM on the (observed) dependent variable as: 
                                                          2 
Accounting for the panel data structure, I fit the GLM models in both stages with a generalized 
estimating equation (GEE) with an exchangeable within-individual correlation structure and 
provide robust standard error estimates.
34
 
The DM treatment variable      ) is dichotomous, thus marginal effects are calculated 
for the discrete change of the variable using the following equation, based on the estimated 
parameters from the two regressions: 
        
     
                   
                                                  
                      
                                             
3 
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 For a Box-Cox test for total expenditures and the baseline set of treatment and control variables, the 
95-percent confidence interval for the power parameter ranged from -.0267 to -.0224, which was close 
to zero, indicating a log link function is a close fit. The modified Park test fell between the ranges 
recommended for the Poisson distribution and the gamma distribution. A modified Hosmer-
Lemeshow Test for linearity indicates a problem only for outliers at the far right tail of the 
distribution. Robust standard errors are used throughout the chapter to adjust for heteroscedasticity. 
34
 For more on these models, see Liang and Zeger (1986), Zeger, Liang and Albert (1988), or some 
econometrics textbooks (e.g., Cameron and Trivedi 2005, sec. 16.4.1 and 23.2; Wooldridge 2002, sec. 
15.8/19.6). Models were estimated using Stata. 
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Here,           is the estimated probability of positive expenditures and      is the estimated 
expenditures conditional on positive expenditures (other dependent variables suppressed). Note 
that the main      variable is based on matching an individual‘s characteristics and the design of 
DM programs in their state (if any), so the DM variable is not an interaction term.
35
 
Because these models are nonlinear, the marginal effect will vary across observations, 
depending on the realization of the other RHS variables      . I calculate the effect of      using 
two methods. First, I present the marginal effect of      at a specific value of the other 
dependent variables: the mean,     . Second, I calculate 
        
     
 for each observation and then take 
the average across the treated observations to calculate the ―average treated effect on the treated‖ 
(ATET). These estimates can be bootstrapped to obtain standard error estimates using a ―block 
bootstrap‖ procedure to account for the panel data.
36
 
In equation 1,    is the primary parameter of interest, as it identifies the effect of the pres-
ence of a DM program on the Medicaid enrollees who would have been eligible for the program 
in period  . Unbiased identification relies on exogenous timing in the introduction of state DM 
programs at the quarterly frequency. If one state implements a DM program, we might expect a 
decline (or smaller increase) in     among DM-eligible enrollees, relative to similar individuals in 
states without a DM program or other individuals in the state who are ineligible (e.g., a dual-
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 In a few alternative specifications, the      variable is an interaction term based on other 
dependent variables. In these cases, marginal effects are calculated for each individual as the double 
difference proposed by Ai and Norton (2003). Specifically, if          , then (subscripts and     
suppressed): 
             
                                                     
                                        
                                                       
                                          




 Due to computational limitations – each estimate would require multiple days or weeks to run – 
bootstrapped standard errors are provided only for a limited number of specifications in this version of 
the chapter. The reported results and other preliminary inquiries found the statistical significance of 
the bootstrapped standard errors to be intuitive in light of the standard errors from the first and second 
stages of the model. 
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eligible enrollee). As such, for expenditure-reducing DM programs, the hypothesized sign of    is 
negative in a single-equation model. However, the predication is not so clear in the two-part 
model, as it is possible for        to decrease even though           increases, due to the effect 
of DM on             . Indeed, this would be the case if DM lowers the likelihood of 
expensive hospitalizations via increased used of low-cost preventative health care such as office 
visits or prescription drugs among low-utilization Medicaid recipients. 
2.5 Results 
2.5.1 Summary Statistics 
The main data sample contains 40,415 individuals who received Medicaid at any time 
during the MEPS, constituting 289,452 person-quarter observations. Most individuals have two 
calendar years (eight quarters) of data; the major exception is that the first and last MEPS panels 
have one year (four quarters) of coverage due to the overlap of the MEPS sampling design. Table 
2 presents summary statistics for this sample, grouped by the presence of at least one of the five 
chronic diseases mentioned above, age less than 18, and dual-eligibility with Medicare.
37
 In this 
table, means are presented unweighted, and thus the table reflects the MEPS‘s oversampling of 
minorities and low-income households (e.g., percentages of individuals by race and education do 
not match those of the entire Medicaid program). 
In the sample, 9,503 individuals have one of the ―top-5‖ chronic conditions mentioned 
above, about one-third of the adults and one in seven children. Asthma is the most common 
chronic disease (149 diagnosed per 1,000 people) and the only disease common among children. 
Among adults, asthma, diabetes and CHF are more common than either COPD or CAD. Over one 
quarter of chronically ill dual eligibles have diabetes. As discussed above, I focus my analysis on 
the ―top-5‖ chronic diseases most commonly targeted by DM programs. There are other common 
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 The categories are mutually exclusive; I cut the sample by (1) having a chronic-illness, then by (2) 
dual-eligibility, then by (3) age group. (i.e., ―Medicaid adults‖ does not include dual eligibles.) 
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chronic conditions – cancers, mental illnesses (especially development disabilities), and other 
diseases – that are present in this population but receive less focus from DM. See Kronick, et al 
(2009, pp. 11-15) for more information on the prevalence of diseases in Medicaid.
 38
 
In the MEPS, one observes some turnover in insurance status as some individuals enter or 
exit Medicaid enrollment during the sample period. On average, Medicaid insurance covers this 
sample 76 percent of the time they are in the MEPS and about half of the individuals are 
continuously enrolled in Medicaid. Individuals with a chronic disease are more likely to be 
continuously enrolled in Medicaid. 
Panel B of Table 2 presents average quarterly Medical expenditures for these groups. 
Individuals with at least one of the five chronic diseases have, on average, significantly higher 
medical expenditures than their counterparts (for example, $1,736 versus $679 for Medicaid 
adults), and are more likely to have positive expenditures in a particular quarter (78 percent 
versus 51 percent). Medicaid pays for all medical expenditures for over half of Medicaid 
recipients and, on average, pays 80 percent of Medicaid-only enrollee‘s total expenses; on the 
other hand, Medicaid only pays 35 percent of total expenditures for dual eligible with chronic 
conditions while Medicare pays the majority of costs (not shown in table). Even though inpatient 
hospitalizations are relatively infrequent among Medicaid recipients with chronic conditions – 
only 6.7 percent, 1.8 percent, and 9.7 percent of chronically ill Medicaid adults, children, and 
dual eligibles, respectively, have any inpatient expenditures in a typical quarter – these rare 
events are associated with very high expenditures, such that the inpatient expenditure category 
accounts for 34 percent of total expenditures ($633 per person per quarter, on average). 
Prescribed medicines are quite common and are the second largest spending category (24 percent 
of total costs), followed by office-based provider visits (18 percent). Emergency Department 
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 Their report uses full ICD-9 diagnosis information from administrative datasets, making it more 
reliable than the MEPS. Differences with the MEPS may occur because of sampling and because the 
MEPS excludes institutionalized individuals, a group with high rates of chronic diseases. The authors 
also emphasize the prevalence of particular 2- and 3-disease co-morbidity pairs. 
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visits are more common than inpatient stays but account for a small fraction of total expenditures 
(2 to 6 percent, depending on the category). Among adults, individuals with diabetes and COPD 
are hospitalized for their disease at the highest rates, followed by CAD and Asthma. Diabetes is 
associated with the largest number of hospitalizations. Asthma is the second most commonly 
diagnosed disease in hospitals due to its status as the most common disease. 
The final rows of Table 2 (Panel B) present information on Medicaid DM coverage. 
Please note that the columns of this table do not separate treatment or control groups, as treatment 
varies by locality over time within groups. I find reasonably large numbers of Medicaid adults 
and children are treated in the MEPS panel. On average, an individual lives in a state/county with 
at least one DM program for 33 percent of person-month observations. For adults and children 
with chronic diseases and Medicaid insurance (excluding duals), 21 percent of observations have 
a DM program in their state/county that targets their chronic disease(s). This is a weighted 
average of the DM coverage for the years 1998-2007. 
Figure 7 plots a DM coverage over time for adults and children with chronic diseases and 
Medicaid insurance. As expected, DM program coverage at the individual level tracks the state-
level trends identified in Figure 1. In early 1998, the beginning of the MEPS sample, less than 
four percent had any DM program in their state/county. By the end of 1997, this figure increases 
to 62 percent. Most, but not all, individuals (with a top-5 chronic disease) have a program that 
targets their disease when there is a program is in their state/county (e.g., asthma patients who 
live in a state/county with an asthma DM program).  At the beginning of the sample, less than one 
percent of MEPS respondents had a DM program that matched their top-5 chronic disease(s), but 
this figure increases to 52 percent at the end of the sample. My research indicates that very few 
DM programs included eligibility for dual eligibles, and thus less than four percent of dual 
eligibles are matched to a DM program in their state/county at any point in the sample. This is 
expected, given the states‘ financial incentive structure (see above, p. 30). 
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My DM coverage indicators can be combined with the MEPS‘s complex survey weights 
to create national estimates of DM coverage.  In Table 3, I present the weighted number of people 
who are matched to a DM program using my      coverage variable (see above, pp. 33-35). The 
MEPS survey weights produce nationally representative estimates. Nearly all the growth in DM 
coverage occurs during the time frame covered by this study, as can be seen in Figure 8. The 
number of people matched to a DM program starts from a negligible level in 1998 and increases 
to 3.76 million individuals in the final quarter of 1997.  In the final time period, 1.79 million (48 
percent) of these observations are adults with Medicaid insurance (not dual eligible) and 1.89 
million are children (50 percent), while less than 100,000 are dual-eligible adults.  This represents 
38 percent of adults in Medicaid with a top-5 disease and 48 percent of children with a top-5 
disease (columns 5 to 7).  These 3.76 million individuals are 7.3 percent of the nation‘s Medicaid 
recipients. 
2.5.2 Main results – The effect of DM on medical expenditures 
Table 4 provides the results of the difference-in-difference analysis on the effect of Me-
dicaid DM programs on (i) total medical expenditures and (ii) expenditures paid by Medicaid. As 
discussed above, the models use pooled MEPS data from 1998 through 2007 and the two stage- 
specification outlined in section 2.4. For each outcome, Panel A presents the estimated marginal 
effects of DM on the probability of positive expenditures (the first stage of the two-part model) 
and Panel B presents the marginal effect of DM on the level of expenditures conditional on 
positive expenditures (the second stage). Combining these results, the marginal effect on total 
expenditures at the mean and the average treatment effect for the treated observations (calculated 
according to equation 3) are reported in Panel C. For each dependent variable, I present the effect 
of DM with four specifications of control variables. The following tables will present variations 
upon this base model, using alternate control variables, data samples, models (e.g., OLS instead 
of two-stage GLM), and outcome variables. 
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In Table 4, column 1 reports the results from the equation 1, which includes unrestricted 
state and time (year-by-quarter) fixed effects and the other control variables discussed in Section 
2.4.2. This column reports an increase in the probability of having a medical expenditure of about 
1.5 percentage points when an observation is matched to a DM program. This estimate is 
statistically significant at the 90 percent level. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that 
some chronically ill Medicaid patients were receiving no health care services and that DM 
induced these patients to receive recommend levels of ―preventative‖ care (e.g., prescription 
drugs, regular doctor‘s office visits, and so on). DM may still lower expenditures to the extent 




For patients with positive expenditures, the point estimate indicates that DM is associated 
with a decrease in expenditures of about $87 per quarter. However, the second stage regression 
lacks statistical power to estimate this effect precisely: the p-value for this estimate is 0.149 and 
the 95 percent confidence interval ranges from -$204 to +$31. Thus, the results from the two 
stages of the model work in opposite directions: the first stage indicates an increase in 
expenditures while the point estimate in the second stage indicates a decrease (although it may be 
positive). The results from the first and second stages of the model are combined to obtain a point 
estimate for the marginal effect of DM on total expenditures using equation 3. At the mean, the 
model estimates that DM reduces total expenditures by about $33, so there is some evidence that 
the (negative) second stage impact of DM may outweigh the (positive) impact in the first stage.
40
 
The control variables for treated observations are not centered around the sample mean, so the 
average treatment effect on the treated (ATET) differs from the marginal effect at the mean. The 
ATET calculations show that expenditures are reduced by $97. Bootstrapping indicates this result 
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 An alternative theory is that DMOs may benefit from a small increase in expenditure for individuals 
without medical spending.  For example, increasing expenditures above $0 may reduce the probability 
of an exit from Medicaid and/or the DM program. 
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 The mean of the dependent variable is 53.9 percent in the first stage and $1,395 in the second stage. 
 
45 
is imprecisely estimated (standard error 72.4). In Table 2, the weighted average of total medical 
expenditures for chronically ill Medicaid enrollees (columns 1 and 2) is $1,045 ($1,709 including 
dual eligibles, columns 1 through 3). Thus, $97 corresponds to a 10 percent decrease in total 
expenditures. 
In Appendix Table B1, I present the GLM regression coefficients and marginal effects for 
all the control variables of Table 4 (columns 1, 3, 5, and 7). The marginal effects for the controls 
are generally as expected: individuals tend to have higher expenditures if they are insured by 
Medicare, insured as a dual eligible, have one of the top-5 chronic diseases, are male, are aged 
less than ten, are elderly, and/or are not in a racial/ethnic minority. This level of detailed reporting 
is suppressed for other regressions for the sake of brevity. 
Columns 2 and 3 add controls for potential within-state variation over time by adding 
state-specific time trends and unrestricted state-by-year interaction dummies, respectively.
41
 The 
results are robust across specifications with the point estimates remaining similar in magnitude. 
Second stage estimates continue to lack statistical power. The robustness of the result between 
columns 1 and 3 is very encouraging, as the state-by-year fixed effects control for any potential 
policy changes implemented at the state level during the sample. Here, the effect of DM is 
identified by the within-state complexities of DM coverage by county, disease, and/or insurance 
status, not simply the state-level timing of the introduction of DM. For example, these 
specifications may better control for statewide changes in structure of MMC plans. 
One potential reason I do not find large DM treatment effects is that the DM treatment 
variable may be imprecise, in the sense that the DM programs in the sample are heterogeneous 
and some programs may have a small effect while others have a larger effect. It is not 
unreasonable to expect low-intensity interventions to be less effective at lowering medical 
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 For columns 2 and 6, year fixed effects and quarter-of-year fixed effects are substituted in lieu of 
the full array of time fixed effects      to ease the computational burden. Analogous substitution for 




expenditures or improving health. (Coleman et al. 2010) In column 4, I use an alternative, strict 
definition for DM, which drops some of the programs with less intensive interventions or 
coverage (see Appendix A). The results indicate that programs meeting these criteria tend to have 
a larger impact: the point estimate for the second stage doubles in magnitude (approximately) and 
the estimate becomes statistically significant. (Note that the point estimate for the first stage 
effect is smaller.) The ATET is a $216 reduction in quarterly expenditures after the introduction 
of a DM program. This indicates that at least some DM programs may be having an effect on 
total expenditures. 
Columns 5 through 8 repeat this exercise for medical expenditures paid for by Medicaid, 
which is perhaps the outcome variable of more concern to program administrators. The results 
from the first stage of the model indicate that DM increases the probability of having a Medicaid 
insurance claim in a quarter by 3 to 5 percentage points. As before, I find a statistically 
insignificant treatment effect in the second stage with a negative sign. The result remains stable 
when state-year fixed effects are included in the model. This second-stage effect is smaller and is 
not large enough to offset the first-stage effect (except in column 8, which uses the strict DM 
definition). To conclude, these main results fail to find statistically significant evidence that DM 
lowers Medicaid expenditures. 
Table 5 examines the robustness of the previous results to the inclusion of various arrays 
of control variables. In this table, I address the concern that DM targets individuals with 
particular chronic conditions, for whom health care expenditures may trend differently than for 
the Medicaid population as a whole. Therefore, I introduce disease specific time trends (column 
1) and unrestricted disease-time fixed effects (columns 2, 3, and 4) into the model to control for 
observable differences in medical expenditures by disease over time. All four columns control for 
expenditure levels by including disease-insurance group interaction dummies and I include 
insurance group-year fixed effects in column 4. 
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The results indicate that DM may lower medical expenditures. Compared to Table 4, both 
the first stage and second stage results are responsible for this finding: Panel A shows a more 
modest increase in the probability of medical spending (to a trivially small level) than was found 
above. In Panel B, the second stage results indicate that DM may decrease expenditures (for those 
with spending) as much as $100 per person per quarter at the mean, or $120 to $180 for the 
treated population. The differences between this table and the results presented above is 
consistent with a scenario where secular increases in expenditures are growing faster-than-
average for the individuals with diseases targeted by DM. 
Table 6 examines the robustness of the main results (Table 4) by using alternative data 
samples. Remember that the results thus far have used data for all individuals who ―touch‖ the 
Medicaid program while they are in the survey and I use all available observations (quarters) for 
the individual, even if they leave the Medicaid program. First, I repeat the analysis while 
dropping observations (quarters) from the dataset where the individual is not enrolled in 
Medicaid. Results would differ if the control variables in the baseline regression do not properly 
control for utilization differences before/after the patients enroll in Medicaid. The effect of DM, 
measured in the first and second stage regressions are similar to the results above and the 
estimated ATET is a net decrease of $93. 
Columns 2 and 3 present results when the data is sampled as to only include the individu-
als continuously enrolled in Medicaid (49 percent of the main sample). Thus, I provide a 
specification that may (i) eliminate potential concerns of attrition [selection] bias and (ii) identify 
the effect of DM on the policy-relevant population of patients (in the sense that the effect of DM 
on people who leave Medicaid matters relatively less to Medicaid policymakers).
 
However, this 
―stable‖ population of enrollees can differ from Medicaid patients with short spells of Medicaid 
coverage on observable characteristics (e.g., SSI disability patients often have stable insurance 
coverage) and also because insurance coverage ―churning‖ provides less opportunity and 
incentive for preventative health care. (J Currie 2000, p. 1061; Fairbrother, Emerson, and 
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Partridge 2007) Column 4 uses an intermediate-sized sample, include those who are enrolled at 
least half the time they are in the MEPS (78 percent of the main sample). Results in these three 
columns are similar in magnitude to those found above, demonstrating some robustness. 
However, there is less statistical precision (presumably from the smaller sample size): only with 
the strict definition of DM are second stage results statistically significant (in column 2, a $141 
decrease in total expenditures). 
The empirical strategy in this chapter relies on fixed effects to control for secular trends 
in total medical expenditures. One concern is that underlying trends in expenditures for the 
potential DM-eligible population differ from the trends in expenditures for other sub-populations 
(e.g., relatively healthy Medicaid children). By dropping Medicaid patients without chronic 
conditions, for example, the estimated fixed effects may more appropriately control for trends in 
expenditures for the population of interest, although I lose power because of the smaller sample 
size. This is an alternative to using disease-time controls (as in Table 5). Column 5 in Table 6 
presents results when I limit the data to the sub-sample of 9,503 individuals who have a ―top-5‖ 
chronic condition and column 6 limits the sample to only the adults who receive Medicaid (i.e., 
those over 18 years of age). The standard errors are significantly larger than the main results but 
the point estimates are relatively similar in magnitude: the implied ATET from combining the 
first and second stage results are $101.90 and $92.94 reductions in medical expenditures, 
respectively, compared to a $97.29 reduction in Table 4 (column 1). 
In the final columns of Table 6, I run models with additional data (compared to the pri-
mary data set), adding all MEPS observations for individuals who have at least one of the ―top-5‖ 
chronic conditions. This could improve the estimation, as the secular trend in time fixed effects 
for treated individuals may be more similar to the trends for the chronically ill (than it is for an 
average Medicaid recipient). Furthermore, the much larger sample size increases power (as long 
as it does not introduce bias). To control for differences across insurers, I include insurance-by-
disease interaction dummies in all regressions. One concern with this setup is that I do not have 
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any information to identify which chronically ill individuals do or do not receive DM outside of 
the Medicaid program, and thus        for non-Medicaid observations. However, it is likely 
that a significant number of privately insured chronically ill individuals do, in fact, receive DM, 
due to large increases in DM coverage in the private sector over the period. (Matheson, Wilkins, 
and Psacharopoulos 2006) If DM coverage is widespread in the private sector and DM decreases 
costs, the trend in medical expenditures for non-Medicaid chronically ill individuals may increase 
more slowly than it does for comparable untreated Medicaid enrollees, understating the effect of 
Medicaid DM in my regressions. 
Columns 7 and 8 of Table 6 present the results with this larger sample (over three times 
as large), indicating a larger reduction from DM in the second stage regression than was found 
previously. In column 9, I use the larger data set and include a large array of additional fixed 
effects to control for differences in the levels and trends of medical expenditures by disease 
(disease-by-year and disease-by-quarter-of-year fixed effects) and insurance (disease-insurance 
dummies and insurance-by-year fixed effects). The results are consistent with those found 
previously: DM increases the probability of a medical expenditure in a quarter by 1 percentage 
point and, for those with expenditures, reduces the level of expenditures by $138. Combining the 
results, DM appears to have reduced expenditures by $133.08 for the treated individuals ($82.54 
at the mean). 
Next, I check the decision to use a two-part model based on two GLM regressions.  Table 
7 presents alternative empirical models, using the control variables from the first regression 
presented in Table 4 (above). The first two columns reproduce the first and second stages of the 
model using simple ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions. Columns 3 and 4 re-run the model 
with the complex survey weights that are provided with the MEPS data for each individual. The 
results in columns 1 through 4 have similar signs and similar magnitudes to the results found 
above, which reassure that the results are not dependent on the functional form of the GLM 
models. The columns 6 and 7 present marginal effects for probit models on the probability an 
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individual has quarterly expenditures in the quarter over two arbitrary cutoff points. Point 
estimates indicate that DM has a positive impact on the probability of an individual spending 
$1,000 or more in a quarter, but reduces the probability of spending over $5,000. This result is 
potentially consistent with the findings above, which indicated DM was associated with an 
increase in expenditures at the far left tail of the distribution (stage 1) but decreasing expenditures 
for higher-cost individuals (stage 2).  In Appendix C, I discuss an alternative model: the tobit 
model. Under the assumptions of a tobit model, individuals with zero expenditures are not viewed 
as having ―actual‖ zeros, but are instead modeled as having a ―latent‖ demand for negative 
expenditures. This ―latent‖ demand for health care is interpreted as a censored dependent 
variable. The appendix presents results from the tobit model and explains why the results may 
differ from the two-part model. 
Unfortunately, the model has difficulty converging with the full array of potential fixed 
effects that I have discussed in this section. That is, the data does not have the power to identify 
state-time fixed effects, time fixed effects, disease-time fixed effects, and/or insurance-time fixed 
effects in the same regression while at the same time using the (preferred) two-stage GLM 
models. However, it is possible to include large arrays of control variables with simple OLS 
models without the models becoming computationally burdensome. The results of this exercise 
are presented in Table 8. The first columns reproduced specifications from above, for 
comparison. OLS estimates are similar to the results found above. The point estimates continue to 
indicate that DM lowers medical expenditures, but results are estimated without precision 
(nothing is significant at the 95 percent level). 
The remaining columns of Table 8 add various combinations of interaction effects from 
the variables for state of residence, time (year or year-quarter), disease, and insurance group (e.g., 
dual eligibles are an insurance group). Hence, the effect of DM is identified by the within-state 
variation in      across diseases, insurance groups, and/or counties. The point estimate is robust 
to these control variables, with the estimated effect of DM reducing quarterly expenditures about 
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$95 per person in each of the specifications (expect for column 10, which attempts to include 
many interaction effects at once). 
I also ran models with a simple triple-difference-in-difference model where the DM inde-
pendent variable equaled one for individuals who simply had a chronic disease and had a DM 
program for their insurance group in their state/county (tables not shown). The point estimates 
indicated a large decrease in expenditures. 
2.5.3 The effect of Disease Management by target disease and for sub-
populations of interest 
These difference-in-difference models can also identify the effect of DM for each of the 
target diseases by introducing additional treatment variables into the regression. The results of 
this exercise are presented in Table 9. As before, the main ―DM‖ independent variable equals one 
if an observation is matched to a DM program in the individual‘s state/county based on their 
chronic disease(s) and insurance, and zero otherwise. The ―Asthma DM‖ variable equals one if 
this match was between the individual‘s diagnosis for asthma and the program targeted asthma 
(and likewise for the other ―top-5‖ diseases). These treatment variables are included for the ―top-
5‖ diseases. The first column includes disease-specific time trends and the following two columns 
use disease-time interaction effects, similar to previous tables. Column 3 uses the larger data 
sample, including people who never enter the Medicaid program (i.e., the same data as in the final 
columns of Table 6, above). 
Because the ―DM‖ variable equals one whenever one of the disease-specific DM variable 
equals one, the net effect of DM can be taken from adding the marginal effect of a disease-
specific DM variable to the marginal effect of the main ―DM‖ variable.
42
 For example, the 
implied marginal effect for someone with only asthma would equal                      
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 The six treatment variables are not colinear because some individuals have more than one top-5 
chronic condition that matches a DM program in their state/county. 
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dollars (in column 1, panel C). In Figure 9, I plot the results of this simple arithmetic, for easy 
comparison across diseases and across specifications.  
The first stage results in Table 9, indicate that DM increases the probability of medical 
expenditures for COPD, Diabetes, and CHF patients. This increase is particularly large for COPD 
patients. In the second stage (Panel B), the results indicated that DM has a negative effect on 
expenditures – consistent across specifications – for asthma, CHF, and CAD. In Panel C, the 
marginal effect of DM on expenditures in the two-part model is a reduction in costs for CAD, 
CHF, and asthma patients. For COPD, the effect is mixed (with the first and second stage 
working in opposite directions for two specifications) while diabetes is the only disease where 
DM increases medical expenditures in both stages of the model.  
In Table 9, the negative sign on the main      treatment variable indicates that DM 
causes expenditures to increase (or decrease less) for individuals with more than one chronic 
condition, relative to individuals with only one top-5 condition treated by a DM program.
43
 This 
result is explored further in Table 10, where I interact the      treatment variable with a dummy 
variable that equals one if the individual has more than one top-5 disease.  Using this interaction 
term as the treatment variable (Column 1), I find that DM for this group of individuals is 
associated with a small, positive change in expenditures. In the second column, I include the 
     and comorbidity variables, in addition to the interaction term, and calculate the average 
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 For expositional purposes, consider the treatment effect in Table 9, column 1 for patients that may 
have asthma and/or CHF.  From panel C, we calculate the effect of DM is                  
for patients with asthma,                 for patients with CHF, and                
      for individuals with both asthma and CHF.  This result could have been calculated with the 
following equation:  
                                                       
Note that the coefficient on the third term is simply the marginal effect for      (from Table 9) with 
the opposite sign. 
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incremental effect for the treated individuals.
44
 The average incremental effect for the treated 
individuals is positive and large ($491), again indicating that there are not costs savings from DM 
among the population with comorbidities.
45
  In the third column, I introduce a variable that equals 
one if the individual is matched to a DM program in their state/county using more than one 
disease.  Results are similar with this alternative variable.   
There is one confounding factor to be aware of when interpreting these results in Table 
10. One concern with the construction of my main      variable is that some individuals may be 
assigned        when, in fact, they actually are not enrolled in a DM program. Or, if they are 
enrolled, they may not receive many DM interventions (e.g., the low-risk group in Chapter 3). 
There is reason to believe, however, that individuals with comorbidities would be more likely to 
get DM interventions than someone with only one disease (even though        in both cases).  
That is, I would expect fewer ―false-positives‖ in my      variable construction for the comorbid 
population. (This cannot be tested in the data.)  Thus, the estimated effect in Table 10 could 
potentially confound (1) differences in the effect of DM with (2) differences in the likelihood of 
receiving intensive DM interventions between the population with one disease and the population 
with more than disease. 
One concern about these results is that there could be differential time trends: secular cost 
growth for comorbid individuals is growing faster than it is for those with zero or one top-5 
condition, biasing the results. Thus, in columns 4 through 6, I replicate the results with an array of 
year fixed effects for the comorbid individuals, disease-year interaction term effects, and disease-
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 Given the formula for calculating treatment effects for interaction term treatment variables (see 
footnote 35), it is only appropriate to present average incremental effects for the treated individuals in 
the results.  The computational burden of these calculations prohibits the estimation of bootstrapped 
standard errors at this time. 
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 This cost increase for comorbid treated individuals can be consistent with an average cost decrease 
for all treated individuals given that there are relatively few individuals with more than one disease 
and a DM program. Of the 264,018 observations in the regression, 5.8 percent have more than one 
top-5 disease. Just 11 percent of these observations are matched to a DM program, or 0.66 percent of 
the entire sample. 
 
54 
quarter-of-year (seasonality) interaction term effects.  The results are very similar to those found 
in the first two columns. I conclude that secular trends in expenditures for comorbid individuals is 
not the reason why I find DM does not decrease costs for comorbid DM program enrollees. 
In Table 10, I also introduced a variable into the baseline regression to measure the effect 
of DM for dual eligible enrollees (column 7 and 8). This is an interaction term between the main 
treatment variable,      and the dual eligible insurance indicator (one of the control variables 
included in all regressions). Because so few dual eligibles receive DM due to the reasons 
discussed above, the average incremental effect for dual-eligible DM should be interpreted as 
having little statistical power. The estimated effect for dual eligibles is of the opposite sign and 
much larger in magnitude to the main DM effect, indicating that it is unlikely DM decreases costs 
for this population.  
2.5.4 The effect of Disease Management on disaggregated categories of 
medical expenditures 
In this section, I further explore the impact of DM by disaggregating medical expendi-
tures by type of service. The impact of DM should follow a logic model where program activities 
lead to short term outputs and outcomes, which only ultimately results in long-term outcomes. 
(Esposito, Taylor, and Gold 2009) The underlying logic of DM indicates that the effect of DM 
may work in opposite directions for difference categories of expenditures. For example, DM 
interventions might encourage the use of more prescribed medicines (e.g., asthma inhalers) or 
encourage patients to schedule their annual (screening) visit with their primary care provider. 
Increases in medical expenditures for these categories of care could lead to a net reduction in total 
expenditures if the medical care results in better-managed chronic diseases over the long term, 
ultimately causing decreases in spending for categories such as emergency department visits or 
inpatient hospitalizations. A priori, in a study design with limited statistical power, I expect that I 
will be more likely to detect an impact of DM for the categories most directly affected by DM in 
the logic model. 
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Table 11 and Table 12 disaggregate spending into mutually exclusive categories: (1) 
office-based medical provider visits, (2) prescribed medicines, (3) emergency department events, 
(4) inpatient hospital events, (5) outpatient hospital events, (6) home health, (7) dental and vision, 
and (8) other medical expenses. Table 11 and Table 12 provide results for total expenditures (all 
payers) and Medicaid expenditures, respectively, and the model specification corresponds to 
those in columns 1 and 5 of Table 4. 
Columns 1 and 2 begin with what are likely the most proximate categories to DM, office 
visits and prescribed medicines. In the first stage, there is an increase in the probability that an 
individual has at least one office visit (paid by Medicaid) of 1.5 percentage points (standard error 
.0064). For prescribed medicines, there is a 5.4 percentage point increase in the probability of an 
expenditure (paid by Medicaid). Thus, I find fairly strong evidence that DM has an effect on 
getting patients who are not receiving routine care into their providers office and taking 
prescribed medicines. To get some understanding of the financial size of this first-stage effect, we 
can pair the results with the summary statistics in Table 2. For example, Medicaid Adults with a 
chronic disease who are on prescribed medicines spend, on average, $672 per quarter (i.e., $464 
divided by 69 percent) on their prescriptions. The 95 percent confidence interval for the first stage 
effect is 3.93 to 6.87 percentage points, implying that quarterly expenditures for this group 
increase somewhere between $26 and $46 dollars per person on average. The second-stage effect 
of DM on pharmaceutical and office visit expenditures is trivial. 
The next three columns continue this analysis with the hospital-related expenditure cate-
gories: emergency department visits, inpatient events, and outpatient events. The results are 
modest. The estimated effect in the first stage of the model has an absolute value less than 2 basis 
points across all three outcome variables, payer (all payers and Medicaid), and definition of DM 
(regular or strict) and is actually positive for ED and outpatient visits. The decrease in the 
probability of a hospital stay is small and does not appear to represent significant cost savings. 
For exposition, I can demonstrate this finding by establishing a lower bound estimate. The largest 
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estimated effect (Table 11) is an 11.8 basis point reduction in the likelihood of an inpatient event; 
the 95-percent confidence interval from -37.4 to 13.8 basis points. In Table 2, the dual eligibles 
have the highest inpatient expenditures at $12,721 per quarter, conditional on an inpatient event 
($1,235.17 divided by 9.71 percent). Therefore, the lower-bound savings estimate might be 
savings of as high as $47.55 per quarter ($12,721 times 37.4 basis points), although more modest 
savings is likely (about $15 near the point estimate of 11.8 basis points). The second stage of the 
model is imprecise and less robust – perhaps because sample sizes are very small – I hesitate to 
draw further conclusions. 
Finally, for completeness, columns 6 through 8 provide results for home health, dental 
and vision, and other medical expenses. Perhaps unsurprisingly, I fail to find significant cost 
savings from DM in these categories. 
All results are replicated with the strict DM definition in Appendix Table B2 and Appen-
dix Table B3 and the results are replicated with the larger data set that includes non-Medicaid, 
chronically ill individuals in Appendix Table B4. 
In order to verify the robustness and further understand the previous findings, Table 13 
presents results for models – similar in form to Table 11 and Table 12 – where the dependent 
variable is the number of medical events for selected services categories. Linden (2006) argues 
that hospitalization utilization rates may be a superior outcome variable to hospitalization costs, 
as utilization rates are not affected by changes in unit costs for hospitalization services. As the 
dependent variable is now count data, the second-stage GLM models use a negative binomial 
distribution and a log link function (the equivalent to a Poisson regression). Comparing Table 11 
to Table 13, negligible differences in the first stage of the model arise because the table with 
count data includes a small number of events that were recorded as having zero dollars in related 
expenditures. In column 2, the results show an increase in the number of prescribed medicines 
filled in a quarter (among those on medication, in the second stage regression). Thus, even though 
the previous results did not find an increase in pharmaceutical expenditures for patients on 
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medications, this table indicates that DM may help patients manage their disease with additional 
medications. The second-stage results for all other outcome variables – office visits, emergency 
department visits, and inpatient hospital visits – were statistically insignificant. 
It may be expected that hospitalization rates cannot drop completely from DM interven-
tions, as DM is not expected to mitigate the risk of hospitalization for reasons unrelated to the 
person‘s chronic disease (e.g., broken legs). Thus, I also examine the effect of DM on 
hospitalizations (emergency department, inpatient, and outpatient) where the patient received a 
diagnosed for one of the ―top-5‖ chronic conditions. In columns 5 and 6, we find that the effect of 
DM on the probability of one of these events is very small and maybe actually positive. Column 6 
limits the sample to those who are chronically ill. In column 7, I increase the sample size using 
chronically ill individuals without. Results for the three samples consistently indicate a small 
increase in hospitalizations, if anything. 
 In columns 8 and 9, I focus exclusively on asthma hospitalizations for people diagnosed 
with asthma. With the strict definition of DM, there is a negative effect (marginally significant at 
the five percent level) on the number of hospitalizations in the second stage. Perhaps this 
indicates that DM has some effect on reducing hospitalization for asthmatics who repeatedly visit 
the hospital. Hospitalizations with a diagnosis for the other four diseases (COPD, diabetes, CHF, 
CAD) were too infrequent to conduct a similar analysis. 
2.6 Within-panel treatment variation 
All of the results thus far have relied on an array of covariates to control for determinates 
of medical expenditures, including individual-specific variables that are known to be correlated 
with medical services use (for example, age, race, education, chronic conditions, and so on). 
However, this study could suffer from omitted-variable bias if DM is correlated with variables 
that are excluded (or unavailable) from the regressions; with nonlinear models, this concern 
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extends to the omission of interaction terms.
46 
The concern of omitted variables also applies to the 
possibility of unobservable heterogeneity, such as individual preferences for healthy (or 
unhealthy) behaviors. To the extent that these omitted diseases are correlated with      in the 
MEPS panel, it could bias the results presented above (see equation 1).   
One standard method to address this issue to is to introduce an individual-specific fixed-
effect that will control for all idiosyncratic, time-invariant aspects particular to the individual, 
including age, gender, and the presence of chronic conditions and co-morbidities, but also 
unobservable characteristics. However, in the MEPS, my Medicaid DM variable        is a 
constant (always zero or always one) for the majority of individuals, and thus the impact of DM 
would be ―differenced out‖ in the estimation procedure. In the main results, presented above, I do 
not include an individual fixed effect in the regressions, which allows the effect of DM to be 
identified via the whole panel‘s cross-program variation in DM treatment. 
However for a subset of individuals, a DM program is introduced in their country/region 
while they are in the survey. For these people, I observe one to seven quarters of data without DM 
treatment, followed by a post-DM phase where a DM program is available in their state/county 
for the remainder of the panel.
47
 Thus, I can use within-person variation in treatment status for 
these individuals to identify the effect of DM, controlling for an individual fixed effect, using 
models of the following form: 
                               4 
The variables are the same as equation 1, except for the introduction of the individual fixed effect 
     which precludes the need for control variable that are constant for an individual (  ,   , and 
                                                     
46
 For example, the limitation of the MEPS data to 3-digit ICD-9 codes prohibits the use of detailed 
disease indicator variables, which means that some chronic disease were inevitably omitted from    . 
Fleishman and Cohen (2010) were given access to the MEPS‘s 5-digit ICD-9 diagnosis codes and 
used this data to fit prospective risk stratification models. They predict year-2 expenditures with 
higher precision than my results in section 2.5.2. 
47
 There are 10,348 person-quarter observations for people who experience variation in DM while they 
are in the MEPS, about half of these observations are pre-treatment. In Table 4, over half of the 
―treated‖ observations are for people where        the entire time they are in the MEPS. 
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some variables in    ). In addition to measuring the average effect of DM across the post-
intervention period, it is also possible to estimate a profile for the effect of the cumulative DM 
treatment over time by estimating regressions of the following form: 
                    
 
   
                  
5 
Here,          is a dummy variable that equals one   quarters after a DM program is first 
matched to individual  , and zero otherwise. These dummy variables equal 0 for all   if individual 
  does not experience variation in     .
48
 The coefficients    estimate the change in expenditures 
that result from receiving DM in period       and subsequent quarters. This effect is measured 
relative to the periods where   is untreated. The coefficients will be estimated less precisely for 
longer periods of treatment (e.g.,    and     because this variable will be estimated with fewer 
people (by construction). 
The first stage of the regression is modeled with a conditional logit model; it excludes 
individuals for whom quarterly expenditures are always zero or always positive during the 
survey. The second stage is an OLS regression with the logarithm of expenditures (conditional on 
positive expenditures). 
The entire panel of individuals who receive Medicaid while in the MEPS are included in 
the sample, which improves estimation of the secular time fixed effects. However, it is important 
to remember that the DM effect is identified only by the small subset of individuals with variation 
in      in both equations 4 and 5. As such, a primary concern with this model is that the DM 
effect for these 10,348 is not representative of the DM effect for Medicaid as a whole. 
                                                     
48
 That is,           
   if           and              
   otherwise
  for the   periods individual   is in 
the panel. This dummy variable does not depend on the individual receiving DM in period subsequent 
to    , although many of the individuals do receive treatment continuously after DM is introduced. 
This would not be the case if DM is stopped shortly after its introduction in the state/county, or if the 
individual‘s insurance status changes. However, there may be a treatment effect in these periods, even 
after the individual exits the DM program (e.g., from patient education). 
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The regression coefficients from equations 4 and 5 are presented in Table 14. As was the 
case above, the first stage point estimate indicates an increase in the probability of medical 
expenditures after a DM program begins in the individuals‘ state/county. This DM effect is 
statistically insignificant in equation 4 and for the majority of values for   in equation 5. 
Turning to the second stage of the model, the estimates in columns 4 and 5 of Table 14 
are very imprecise. For example, the 95 percent confidence interval of the effect of DM on 
medical expenditures ranges from negative 1.1 percent to positive 14.8 percent (column 3). The 
point estimates are all positive and do not trend downward. In any case, the estimates are too 
imprecise to draw strong conclusions. That said, the models do not find evidence that DM 
significantly lowers medical expenditures: the second stage estimates reject the hypothesis, for 
example, that DM lowers medical expenditures by 5 percent, 10 percent, or more in the final 
periods of the model. For ease of interpretation, the    coefficients from equation 5 are also 
graphed in Figure 10. There is no obvious trend to support the hypothesis that DM increases 
expenditures initially but this is ―paid back‖ by large decreases in expenditures in later as the 
length of time with DM accumulates. However, the 95 percent confident intervals are wide 
enough that such a trend may exist undetected. 
There are several plausible interpretations for the failure to find evidence that DM lowers 
medical expenditures for the second stage point estimates in Table 14. First, the results could be 
due to statistical variation; the 95 percent confidence intervals in columns 4 and 5 do include 
negative values. Second, one could accept the apparent increase in expenditures as the causal 
effect of DM. It is certainly plausible that DM may encourage the use of some medical services 
but fail to address the underlying issues that drive (undesired) health care costs for the chronically 
ill. Third, DM may actually decrease expenditures (relative to a counterfactual) and the cost 
increases observed in Table 14 are the result of state-specific or disease-specific time trends that 
are correlated with DM provision but excluded from the regressions. (The models do adjust for 
CPI inflation and unrestricted time fixed effects). One might consider adding disease-specific 
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time trends, state-specific time trends, and/or other controls to the model. However, the small 
sample sizes and imprecision of the models discourages any further investigation with the MEPS 
data. 
2.7 Discussion 
Supporters of disease management have stressed the potential for DM to lower the cost of 
health care for chronically ill Medicaid enrollees. Thus, if DM has the intended effects, it offers 
Medicaid policymakers an attractive alternative to the status quo. However, empirical research to 
validate these claims has been elusive to date. Very few Medicaid DM programs have variation in 
treatment that could be used to establish a valid comparison of what would have happened to 
medical expenditures in the absence of the intervention. Medicaid policy is often set at the state 
level, providing treatment to the entire population of individuals in the state in a particular group 
(e.g., Medicaid SSI recipients with asthma). Or, individuals remain untreated for reasons that may 
invalidate comparison, such as when individuals are allowed to voluntarily opt-in to the treatment 
group. In the few cases where valid study designs exist, it is unclear if the results from one 
program have the external validity necessary to understand the effect of DM in other states or for 
other populations, given the wide heterogeneity in program designs across states and over time. 
This chapter avoids these limitations by utilizing national data on health care expendi-
tures. While DM rapidly spread across the country, states created rich variation in timing at which 
DM coverage was introduced to various disease groups. My DM treatment variable is much more 
complex than a simple, statewide pre/post variable; it is constructed by matching program 
inclusion criteria in each month to the characteristics of individuals in the MEPS, accounting for 
the evolution of program design within-states over time.  
Exploiting this treatment variation, this study provides suggestive evidence that a "typi-
cal" Disease Management program may lower health expenditures for individuals in the targeted 
population. For a given treated population, other individuals in the same state with different 
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diseases provide reasonable estimates for underlying secular trends in the state while comparable 
individuals with the same disease in other states provide plausible counter-factual trends for a 
particular disease-insurance group-time cell. 
However, this chapter has data limitations that merit attention in future work. DM con-
sists of relatively high-intensity interventions and are, by design, targeted toward a small subset 
of high-risk or high-cost individuals. Given that the MEPS is designed to provide national 
estimates, it simply does not have high sample sizes for the subset of chronically ill Medicaid 
enrollees. The empirical results in this chapter are identified with relatively small samples and 
therefore the impact of DM is estimated imprecisely. In addition, the MEPS does not ask 
respondents questions about their participation in DM programs directly. Therefore, this study 
can only infer DM participation based on broad categories. As such, the results herein are more 
akin to ―intent to treat‖ estimates than they are actual treatment effects. To estimate the effect of 
DM intervention on DM enrollees who actually receive significant levels of DM interventions, it 
would be possible to ―scale up‖ the results under the assumption that DM has no effect on 
―untreated‖ individuals enrolled in the DM program. Given that some programs provide DM 
interventions to only a minority of the enrolled members, it is possible that actual treatment 
effects are significantly higher than the results stated in this study. DM-related costs for 
individuals in DM programs are not collected in the MEPS and not included in this analysis.  
Therefore, my results represent only one-half of a cost-benefit analysis.  The financial savings 
observed in this chapter would need to be compared to an estimate of average DM program costs 
to determine the cost-efficiency of the programs or the net social financial benefits. 
Both of these problems could be addressed by combining multiple-state administrative 
Medicaid enrollment data matched to insurance claims and records of DM interventions. Given 
large samples of high-cost, chronically ill Medicaid patients, this empirical methodology could be 
used to produce high-quality estimates. A researcher would be able to more precisely estimate the 
effect of DM on the main outcome variable, total medical expenditures (and, perhaps, include all 
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fixed effects and control variables in a single regression model). Furthermore, he or she could 
explore the effect of DM on outcome variables that occur in the MEPS infrequently. For example, 
one could estimate the DM effect on inpatient expenditures, separately for each disease. 
Administrative data could also be used to explore longer-term impacts of DM for a particular 
treated individual, perhaps controlling for individual fixed effects, beyond the two-year length of 
a MEPS panel. 
Measuring the effect of DM on long-term health care expenditures is left to future work. 
Given the types of health behavior changes encouraged by DM programs, coupled with the fact 
that program participants are expected to have their disease(s) for life, it is possible for DM to 
have significant, long-term effects, particularly due to patient education and learned behaviors. 
Long-term effects would not be captured by the research methodology in this paper, given that 
identification relies on differences in the timing of DM implementation and that the MEPS does 
not collect data that would allow one to track the effect of DM in periods long past the DM 
interventions. Furthermore, most states have less than 10 years experience with Medicaid DM 
programs, and thus many long-term effects are yet to be observed. 
The potential for long-term effects has important policy implications. I already mentioned 
that states lack an incentive to provide Medicaid DM services that would primarily reduce costs 
for other insurers, namely Medicare, in reference to the common practice whereby states tend to 
exclude dual-eligibles from program eligibility (p. 30). However, if DM has significant long-term 
effects, there would also be an externality for current Medicaid program participants (not just 
dual eligibles): state Medicaid agencies may under-provide DM services when benefits accrue to 
the individuals, to private insurers, or to Medicare after an individual exits Medicaid. It is 
possible that DM has more broad-based effects and Medicaid DM is currently targeted only at 
patients likely to yield very-fast, large reductions in Medicaid expenditures. 
Similarly, this paper also leaves the measurement of ―spillover‖ effects of DM on non-
program participants to future work. The identification methodology implicitly assumes that such 
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spillover effects are small or non-existent. However, it is possible that Medicaid DM could drive 
system-wide improvements in the health care sector, through its influence on individuals (e.g., a 
doctor becomes better at managing the population of all patients under his or her care) and better 
understanding of how to manage chronic diseases (e.g., from data gleaned from DM information 
technologies). 
The results in this study indicate that the introduction of a ―typical‖ DM program for 
common chronic diseases may be associated with reductions in medical expenditures, although 
the effect is modest. These findings merit future research to validate the findings with higher 
precision and better explore the causal pathways by which DM affects Medical expenditures. 
Given the heterogeneity of DM program designs, it will be important for future research to 
identify "best practices" in Medicaid DM. 
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Chapter 3: Evaluation of the Georgia Enhanced Care Disease 
Management Program 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter contributes to the literature by providing evidence on the health care cost 
efficiency of one Medicaid DM program in the state of Georgia: the Georgia Enhanced Care 
(GEC) disease management program. In this program, relatively low risk patients received a very 
limited set of interventions, while moderate and high risk patients (constituting approximately 
one quarter of all patients) qualified for more intensive and comprehensive services. For example, 
the highest risk patients were assigned to local nurse care managers, who contacted them 
regularly to help them manage their chronic conditions. I use a proprietary administrative data set 
to measure the impact of the DM program interventions on health care expenditures and other 
health utilization measures. 
I use a natural experiment to empirically estimate the causal impact of the high-intensity 
and moderate-intensity interventions – administered to high and moderate risk patients – 
compared to the counterfactual of what would have occurred if these individuals had instead only 
received the very minor low-intensity interventions. I use a natural experiment to identify the 
causal impact of these interventions by exploiting an administrative error that postponed the 
introduction of the intended level of DM services for a significant number of high and moderate 
risk individuals. As such, some patients begin receiving high-intensity interventions when the 
program begins, while another group of observationally similar patients only receive the low-
intensity interventions at the beginning of the program. Moderate interventions included 
outbound phone calls tailored to their chronic conditions and high risk members were assigned to 
care managers who performed additional DM interventions. The effect of the program is 
identified by differences in the timing at which individuals began receiving DM interventions, as 
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the data only includes individuals that are (eventually) enrolled in the DM program. I am the first 
researcher to study the effect of DM using this idiosyncratic feature of the GEC program.  
Under the assumption that low-intensity interventions do not increase medical expendi-
tures or lead to worse health outcomes, my estimates form a lower bound estimate of the effect of 
high-intensity DM interventions relative to no DM interventions. The point estimate indicates that 
the high and moderate intensity interventions lower the level of expenditures by an average of 4.4 
percent for those patients with positive expenditures. The estimated effect of the program is much 
larger for the high-intensity interventions. A subset of patients sometimes has no medical 
expenditures in a given month; for these patients, the intensive DM interventions increase the 
probability of a zero-expenditure month by about 0.8 percentage points. Of the five diseases most 
commonly covered by DM programs, the largest decrease was for asthma, for which there was a 
large decline in the number of hospital and emergency department admissions. The source of 
empirical identification – a delay before some patients began receiving DM interventions – 
allows me to identify the effect of the program over time. I find evidence that the decrease in 
medical expenditures from the high-intensity interventions appears relatively early (within the 
first year of the program) and is sustained over time. 
In addition, I examine the quantile treatment effect of these high and moderate intensity 
interventions over the distribution of medical expenditures using the methodology from Athey 
and Imbens (2006). In the baseline specification, the 90th percentile saw a decrease of about $200 
per member per month, while the 10th percentile decreased only $80 per member per month. 
Because the baseline medical expenditures are highly skewed, this is actually a larger percentage 
decrease in expenditures for the lower end of the distribution. 
This chapter compliments Chapter 2, by using detailed administrative data, which allows 
me to observe DM interventions and relevant health outcomes for thousands of high-cost, 
chronically ill Medicaid patients. By exploring the details of the program and, in particular, its 
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use of risk stratification and intervention targeting, I gain new insights into the mechanisms of 
DM program effects, as well as the size of the effect on sub-populations of eligible enrollees. 
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows: Section 3.2 discusses relevant DM 
program evaluations already conducted by other researchers. Section 3.3 provides relevant details 
about the GEC program and the source of empirical identification. Section 3.4 describes my 
empirical models and Section 3.6 reports the findings. Section 3.7 concludes. 
3.2 Relevant literature  
Despite the rapid expansion of DM programs for the Medicaid population (see Chapter 
2), the net fiscal impact of these programs has remained unclear. Many existing studies simply 
compare outcomes for treated individuals to baseline measures, in some cases after adjusting for a 
preexisting trend. This methodology is potentially confounded by other changes that occur 
simultaneously with the introduction of the DM program that have an effect on outcomes of 
interest. Furthermore, the measurement of preexisting trends are sensitive to key variables (such 
as the timeframe length and claims runout periods) and changes in the risk profile of the 
population. (Juster et al. 2009; Duncan et al. 2008) Another common approach is to compare 
outcomes between individuals who do and do not opt into a program. However, these two groups 
likely differ along a variety of both observable and unobservable characteristics, potentially 
biasing estimates of the program‘s effect. DM program evaluation is also difficult because there 
are large numbers of important outcomes to choose from, many of which are difficult to measure 
precisely, and it may take many years to have an effect on some variables. Health spending is 
often very skewed and subject to random fluctuation, making it particularly difficult to obtain 
precise estimates from small randomized trials. (Farah et al. 2008)  Finally, the financial effect of 
a DM program will depend on the details of the program‘s design, including what population is 
covered and the scope of DM interventions and services. It is possible that differences in the 
 
68 
design of DM programs contribute to variance in the results between existing studies, although 
the extent of this phenomenon is unclear.  
In the only existing publication on the GEC program, Rust et al. (2011) discuss the first-
year growth of average Medicaid expenditures for adult Medicaid enrollees eligible for Georgia‘s 
GEC program in the northern region  (i.e., the counties not evaluated in this chapter, see below). 
They compare tabulations of realized Medicaid costs rate to four alternative actuarial cost 
estimates (by other authors) and conclude the program may have saved Georgia Medicaid over 
$200 per member per year, or 20 percent.
49
 The program in the northern region cost the state 
$13.94 per person, leading the authors to conclude the program resulted in substantial net savings 
for the state of Georgia. The authors lack a control group and make no further attempt to 
empirically estimate the counterfactual of what would have occurred in the absence of the 
program. 
Very few DM programs within the U.S. public health care system have been rigorously 
analyzed for their financial impact. A recent study by Holmes et al. (2008) made progress on this 
issue by presenting results from the Indiana Chronic Disease Management Program (ICDMP). 
This program was implemented for the state‘s Aged, Blind, and Disabled (ABD) population with 
diabetes or congestive heart failure.
50
 In two urban provider group practices, the implementation 
of the program was staggered in a randomized manner across fifty individual practices, creating a 
treatment group with 387 individuals and a control group of 439. The authors report some 
                                                     
49
 The four actuarial cost estimates were (1) a cost-trend analysis commissioned by the state of 
Georgia with Mercer consulting, (2) the consumer price index (CPI), (3) US medical inflation rate 
from CMS, and (4) US Medicaid program cost trends from CMS.  The Mercer report is unavailable to 
the public and the most recent CMS estimates were summarized by Martin et al. (2011) and are 
available online from CMS (2011). 
50
 High risk patients received nurse care management while lower risk patients received a less 
intensive telephonic program. More information about the ICDMP program and the evaluation 
methodology is provided by Rosenman et al. (2006) and the technical appendix to the article. Two 
additional studies from the ICDMP program present generally negative results, failing to show a link 
between the DM interventions and the desired outcomes (lower medical expenditures and increased 
drug regimen compliance, respectively). (BP Katz et al. 2009; AJ Zillich et al. 2008) 
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evidence that the program induced cost savings for low risk CHF patients; the estimated effect for 
the other three groups – high risk CHF and high and low risk diabetes patients – was statistically 
insignificant. There are some concerns with the study, given the small sample sizes (especially for 
CHF patients) and that baseline comparisons between the treatment and comparison cohorts do 
not match well on observable characteristics (p. 858). 
The state of Washington recently began a DM pilot program which included a rando-
mized trial evaluation component. A study by Qualis Health (2008) examined the impact of the 
program over the first 9 (or 10) months of the program showed some indication of an increase in 
medical expenditures, although this result was statistically insignificant.
51
 
 Several additional studies review the impact of Medicaid DM, although they suffer be-
cause the treatment and comparison groups are formed by comparing individuals who opt-in (or 
do not opt-out) to the program to those who do not opt-in using propensity score matching 
algorithms. As such, the studies are subject to potential selection bias. Afifi et al. (2007) evaluate 
a large program in Florida, comparing 15,275 enrollees who opted-in to the program and 32,034 
who did not. They report that the hospital utilization rates were lower for the treated group, with 
the strongest effects for the SSI patients with CHF and diabetes and asthmatic patients eligible for 
Temporary Aid for Needy Families (TANF). Results were generally consistent across racial 
groups. (Kominski et al. 2008) In this Florida study, pre/post comparisons for individuals in the 
treatment group showed increased probability of self-reported healthy behaviors (e.g., quit 
smoking, dieting) and related health outcomes (e.g. blood pressure decrease) after participating in 
the program. (Morisky et al. 2009) Linden, Berg, and Wadhwa (2007) evaluate an asthma DM 
program with Medicaid patients in Oregon and report some evidence of increased office visits 
and a decrease in asthma-related emergency department visits (no financial outcomes reported). 
                                                     
51
 A predecessor program in Washington state, the Washington Medicaid Integration Partnership 
(WMIP) was evaluated by Esposito et al. (2007, pp. 185-195). They show some positive results on 




Thiebaud et al. (2008) find that DM was associated with higher adherence to recommended 
medication and testing regimens for diabetic patients in Florida (no financial outcomes reported). 
In another study, Berg and Wadhwa (2009) find that, in a Medicaid DM program for diabetes 
patients in Puerto Rico, 490 treated individuals spent significantly less in the post-intervention 
period than matched controls. Pharmacy costs and usage was little changed but other medical 
costs decreased to 50 percent of the matched controls. Apparently, much of this reduction in 
expenditures resulted from reduced incidence of inpatient admissions and readmissions 
(emergency department usage actually increased).
52
  For a program in Pennsylvania, Johnson, 
Yin, and Berg (2003) compare 313 members who opted in to the program to non-participants and 
other members of the MMC plan not referred for DM.  Using difference-in-difference methods, 
they found statistically significant reductions in hospital utilization rates for the treated group.  
This resulted in reduced costs of about $370 per person per year with an implied return on 
investment of 131 percent. Zhang et al. (2008) compare the patients of doctors and pharmacists 
who did and did not opt-in to the Virginia Disease State Management (DSM) program. They 
found the program reduced ED, hospital, and physician office visits and lowered the prevalence 
of adverse drug events.  Survey responses indicated quality-of-life indicators decreased more 
slowly as treated individuals aged, relative to the control group. Estimated financial savings were 
just over $20 per patient per year. 
A larger literature examines the effect of various DM programs outside of Medicaid, 
typically in the private sector. This includes some (typically small) randomized trials. Reviews of 
this literature generally conclude that DM programs have positive effects on disease management 
and some health outcomes, but do not find conclusive evidence that DM leads to a net reduction 
                                                     
52
 A few other studies exist, but these are not based on an empirical analysis with a moderate to large 
sample and/or do not use a control group. (Ricketts, III et al. 2004; McCarthy and Mueller 2009; T 
Wilson 2007; Florida Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability 2001, 2004; 
Lind, Kaplan, and Berg 2006) 
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in health care expenditure.
53
 (CBO 2004; Goetzel et al. 2005; Mattke, Seid, and Ma 2007; Ofman 
et al. 2004; Shekelle et al. 2003; Weingarten et al. 2002; McDonald et al. 2007) 
Gertler and Simcoe (2009) examine a DM program that was implemented by a private 
health plan for members with diabetes. The authors, using methods similar to mine, compare 848 
members who opted into the program with members who were eligible for the program but did 
not enroll because they did not opt-in or could not be contacted due to poor quality phone records. 
They ―find evidence that the program led to increased compliance with clinical practice 
guidelines, improvement in patient health, and significant reductions in the total cost of care.‖ 
The DM effect is large: HbA1c test scores fall 20 percent and total medical expenditures fall 65 
percent in the first few quarters after enrollment among patients who did not receive recommend-
ed diabetes screening tests in the baseline period.
 
Lairson et al. (2008) use similar methods to 
study the effect of an enhancement to a DM program in the private sector, although there the 
treatment and control groups were based on insurance provider, with matched patients from other 
managed care plans. Cost savings estimates were small and statistically insignificant. Beaulieu et 
al. (2003, 2006) and Fireman, Bartlett, and Selby (2004; 2005) provide analysis on the cost 
effectiveness of two private sector DM programs, but their chapters also suffer because they do 
not use comparison groups that convincingly serve as a counterfactual.  These papers provide 
insight into how a number of classic issues in health economics (adverse selection, turnover, 
contracting, externalities, etc.) are relevant to studying the impact of DM on program participants, 
insurers, and others.   
CMS recently conducted large, randomized DM demonstration programs for Medicare 
beneficiaries. A review of the programs are provided by Bott et al. (2009). Overall, the programs 
demonstrated modest success, at best: the majority of the 35 programs struggled to increase 
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 Literature reviews are also available for DM programs for particular diseases, including diabetes 
(Knight et al. 2005; Sidorov et al. 2002), cardiovascular diseases (Clarke, Shah, and Sharma 2011; 




health care quality and at the same time maintain budget neutrality (much less financial savings). 
In the Medicare Coordinated Care demonstration, 15 sites throughout the country, each with a 
unique vendor, implemented DM with various program interventions. The results of this 
demonstration were disappointing; analysis of data through the first three years of the program 
found that 13 of the 15 programs did not observe decreases in the number of hospitalizations and 
that none of the programs generated net savings. Only two programs that appeared to improve 
some aspects of care while remaining cost-neutral were allowed to continue; the remaining 
programs were discontinued. (R Brown et al. 2008; Peikes et al. 2008, 2009) Chen et al. (2008) 
evaluated three programs that targeted severely chronically ill patients with disease management 
interventions, coupled with a prescription drug benefit (before Medicare Part-D). All three 
programs were terminated early due to failure to generate enough savings to cover the program 
costs, failure to adhere to CMS protocols, or Hurricane Katrina. Several other demonstration 
programs also report disappointing results with respect to quality improvement and/or the lack of 
financial savings. (Esposito et al. 2008; McCall et al. 2008, 2010; Moreno et al. 2005) Some of 
the programs were discontinued or redesigned due to poor findings in their evaluations. 
My research ultimately relates to the larger literature on cost savings and quality en-
hancement programs in the Medicaid program. It is not clear that contracting with private firms to 
provide health services will result in the dual objectives of reduced costs and increased quality of 
health care services for Medicaid enrollees. A large number of other studies have shown 
significant relationships between various Medicaid program designs, payment structures, costs, 
health care utilization, and health outcomes in other settings. (e.g., J Currie, Gruber, and Fischer 
1995; Duggan 2004; Duggan and Scott Morton 2006; Gruber, Kim, and Mayzlin 1999; Mullen, 
Frank, and Rosenthal 2009; Quast, Sappington, and Shenkman 2008) For an introduction to 
issues related to ―prevention‖ in health care, see Kenkel (2000). 
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3.3 The Georgia Enhanced Care Program 
This chapter examines a specific DM program that was implemented in the state of Geor-
gia in late 2005. I use a proprietary administrative data set to measure the impact of the most 
intensive DM interventions on the highest-risk members in the eligible population. I identify the 
causal impact of these interventions by exploiting an administrative error that postponed the 
introduction of the intended level of DM services for a significant number of individuals. 
3.3.1 Overview 
The state of Georgia has the ninth largest Medicaid population in the United States, with 
1.46 million enrollees in June 2010. (KFF 2011b, p. 4) Beginning in January 2005, Georgia began 
a series of major reforms in the Medicaid program, including shifting the majority (roughly 85 
percent) of enrollees into a Managed Care program. The rest of the population, including all ABD 
adults and children and Katie Beckett program participants, were enrolled in a DM Program that 
supplemented the pre-existing PCCM/FFS program.
54,55
 
The state is divided regionally by county into two regions; each region received its own 
DM program by separate DMO vendors. This chapter exclusively studies the performance of the 
program in the 106 counties in the Southern Region (see Figure 11), which is known as the 
―Georgia Enhanced Care‖ (GEC) Disease Management program. The vender was paid a per-
member-per-month fee (PMPM), about $30, for each member in the eligible population. All of 
the contract fees were at risk if the DMO did not meet its cost savings guarantee targets (80 
                                                     
54
 The GA PCCM program makes the primary care physician (PCP) responsible for locating, 
coordinating, and monitoring all primary care and other medical services on behalf of recipients 
involved in the program. As compensation, they are paid a small ―primary care case management‖ 
(PCCM) fee in addition to the usual fee-for-service (FFS) reimbursements. 
55
 Information on the program in this section taken from Georgia Department of Community Health 
RFP (2005); response to RFP by United HealthCare Services (2005); the related contract between the 
parties (2005) and other documents, personal communication with program staff (Abraham et al. 2007), 
and relevant websites (http://www.georgiaenhancedcare.com, http://dch.georgia.gov). 
56
 To approximate, the payout by the vender for missing the target was calculated by comparing post-
implementation PMPM costs to pre-implementation PMPM costs, where the later was adjusted by 
actuarial estimates of the pre-program growth rate.  
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percent of the fees) and health outcomes benchmarks (20 percent); the key restriction was that the 
DMO vendor guaranteed a five percent reduction in average PMPM costs, net of the fees the state 
paid to the DMO vender.
56
 As program costs were about 5 percent of baseline PMPM costs, the 
DMO was required to generate savings of about $65 PMPM, or a 9.3 percent decrease in PMPM 
claims.
57
 The program was implemented in October 2005 and took a few months to fully ramp-
up. In a typical month, 48,000 to 50,000 individuals were deemed eligible for DM services. 
(Table 15) As is typical for Medicaid programs, there is some variation in the number of eligible 
members from month to month, both from individuals exiting and entering the program or 
temporarily becoming ineligible for short spells. Program membership increased to just over 
60,000 individuals in January 2007 due to changes in the program eligibility criteria during 
contract renewal. (There was a decrease in the number of eligible children in December 2006 due 
to the creation of a separate program for children; children deemed to already be receiving 
substantial DM services remained in the GEC program and the rest were switched into the new 
program). 
In Georgia, the introduction of DM services was part of a much larger set of health care 
reforms for the Medicaid population, which included moving a large number of individuals into a 
Medicaid Managed Care program. This could bias an analysis of the impact of DM using a 
simple pre/post break in the trend of medical expenditures; other concurrent policy changes could 
increase or decrease medical expenditures in addition to the actual effect of DM interventions 
themselves. This implies that pre-2005 trends in health expenditures could be unreliable for 
formulating a counterfactual of what would occurred in the absence of the program. 
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 To approximate, the payout by the vender for missing the target was calculated by comparing post-
implementation PMPM costs to pre-implementation PMPM costs, where the later was adjusted by 
actuarial estimates of the pre-program growth rate.  
57
 For this purpose, the FY2004 baseline was determined to be $624.26 PMPM with a baseline growth 




3.3.2 Variation in treatment and source of empirical identification 
The main source of variation in my data set exists because the population was divided 
into high, moderate, and low risk groups, based on risk stratification algorithms for (i) previous 
diagnosis with specific chronic conditions or by reaching specific ―cutoffs‖ in (ii) health care 
expenditure or (iii) health utilization measures (hospital emergency department visits and 
admissions).
58
 DM interventions for these distinct groups were performed by separate staffs and 
varied significantly in intensity. The data set used in this study includes detailed information on 
staff-enrollee interactions, as discussed below. Although it is possible to construct continuous 
measures of DM interventions (e.g., ―number of phone calls per month‖), I focus on the 
differences in treatment associated to these discrete categorical groups. The intensity of DM 
interventions can be understood as increasing monotonically between the categories. 
All enrollees, including those in the low risk group, received an initial outreach call to 
notify them of the program and ask questions from a short ―initial intake assessment‖ (although 
moderate and high risk members were clearly prioritized, as seen below in Table 21). The 
program also provided a few basic services such as access to a 24-hour, ―1-800‖ phone number 
staffed by a nurse. Mass mailings with educational information were sent to members. Insurance 
claims data and information collected by the program was periodically analyzed and members 
could be upgraded into a higher risk group. These interventions for the low risk group are 
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 According to the company that implemented the program, utilization-based stratification assigned 
enrollees to the high risk group according to the following formula in the initial period (    : 






                                            
                       
   
      
           
   
        
                  
   
       
           
   
In later months, this algorithm was replaced with much more complex predictive modeling strategies. 
These cutoffs create sharp discontinuities in the risk group eligibility criteria, suggesting a regression 
discontinuity model. This approach was pursued by the author. Preliminary analysis suffered from 
weak power due to the small numbers of individuals immediately near the discontinuity and was 
eventually abandoned in favor of the analysis presented below. 
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assumed a priori to have relatively small effect on health expenditures, if any, although my 
identification strategy does not require the assumption of zero effect.  
As described in Table 16, enrollees assigned to the moderate and high risk groups re-
ceived significant, additional attention from the program staff beyond these basic services. The 
moderate risk group received significantly more attention from telephonic care managers (the 
―call center‖), particularly in the form of outbound phone calls for health education, encouraging 
particular health services, and monitoring of their conditions. Education could focus on 
prevention, behavior modification, or compliance with recommended clinical guidelines. Some 
common issues were addressed with ―call scripts,‖ where lower-level staff (i.e. not nurses) would 
make outbound calls to, for example, tell enrollees about resources to assist with smoking 
cessation or remind the patient to have a HbA1c blood test or schedule a visit with their health 
care provider. 
In addition to these types of services, members in the high risk group were individually 
assigned to local care managers who were personally responsible for providing a variety of 
education, coaching, monitoring, and consultations with the patients. In addition to phone calls, 
the care manager could make home visits or accompany patients to appointments with their health 
care providers. By matching patients to care managers (often nurses), the interventions for this 
group were naturally less prescribed by the DMO‘s computer algorithms and more tailored to the 
individual needs of these patients by the care manager (although high risk patients also received 
calls based on ―call scripts‖ from other staff). They could receive medical equipment when 
deemed necessary. The DMO‘s proposal provides the following example on the difference 
between the moderate and high risk interventions:  
… For example, the interventions for “Moderate Risk” asthmatics indi-
cate that we will provide “Routine RN/Educator coaching”, while the 
interventions for “High Risk” asthmatics indicate that they will receive the same 
intervention, along with additional approaches. In reality, the “Routine 
RN/Educator coaching” will differ for these risk strata based on the need of the 
individual. “Moderate Risk” enrollees may receive telephonic coaching on a 
monthly basis; the “High Risk” enrollees are more likely to receive in-person 
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coaching from an RN, who may visit the individual as often as weekly. In addi-
tion, it is common practice for our nurses to accompany individuals to PCP 
appointments to coach them in asking the right questions and requesting appro-
priate support. (United Healthcare Services, Inc. 2005, pp. 4.4-8) 
Many of the interventions were designed to address common issues, particularly common 
diseases including asthma, diabetes, coronary artery disease (CAD), congestive heart failure 
(CHF), chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), and risk factors related to chronic illness 
(e.g., smoking and obesity). However, the high risk group, by nature of being paired with trained 
nurses, could receive idiosyncratic interventions for relatively rare diseases (e.g., hemophilia, 
schizophrenia) and the complexities that arise between co-morbid conditions.  
Although the DM vendor intended to target intensive interventions to all of the most sick-
ly patients, an administrative database programming ―mistake‖ prevented some claims data from 
being transferred to the DMO that was contracted to provide the DM services. As a result, for 
some individuals, incomplete data was used in the risk-stratification algorithms during the first 
months of the program and thus these individuals were categorized into a lower risk group (lower 
than they would have been assigned to in the absence of the mistake) for the first eight months of 
the program. The mistake was corrected in the summer of 2006.
59
 
The individuals affected by this mistake did not receive the ―proper‖ level of DM inter-
ventions, as did their peers, and therefore form an unintended comparison group that can be used 
to measure the program‘s effectiveness using quasi-experimental methods. This unusual event 
provides the basis for an empirical evaluation of the program. Although data analysts and 
program administrators at the DMO were aware this issue existed, and the steps they took to 
rectify the situation, they did not attempt to use this mistake for evaluation purposes. (Abraham et 
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 I assume that the risk stratification algorithms were unchanged between October 2005 and July 
2006.  Although I do not believe there were any major changes unlit late 2006, the possibility of an 
adjustment to the risk stratification algorithm at an earlier date cannot be ruled out (for example, if the 
DMO gave a new directive to a subcontractor). The similarities between the ―treatment‖ and ―control‖ 
groups in Table 20 alleviate this concern.   
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al. 2007) I am the first researcher to study the effect of DM using this idiosyncratic feature of the 
GEC program. 
3.4 Data and summary statistics  
3.4.1 Description 
I use a proprietary administrative data set acquired from the DMO that performed the DM 
program, which includes medical claims records, basic demographic information, program 
eligibility, and information on various program interventions. According to the plan, when a 
member became eligible for the program, the state was to provide the program DMO vendor with 
any Medicaid claims data for the past 24 months (if any claims occurred) and then continue to 
send the vendor monthly updates with new claims activity for as long as the member remained 
eligible for the program. 
I use this claims data, which amounts to 13.2 million claims records for 69,831 individu-
als. Insurance claims include details such as ICD-9 diagnosis and procedure codes, information 
on prescription drugs, billed and paid claim costs, and other details. I tabulated claims records 
into monthly summary data. I also have access to de-identified demographic information such as 
age and gender plus additional data related to the DM program itself, such as the dates the 
individual was eligible for the DM program. 
Finally, I have access to data created by the DMO vendor as they implemented the pro-
gram. I observe what risk group (high, moderate, low) an individual was assigned to when they 
are enrolled in the program and other administrative details. I also have data on DM program 
interventions from the computer software used by program staff, including the dates of any 
completed assessments (27,600 health risk assessments, 6,400 comprehensive assessments, and 
7,000 other assessments). I observe 240,000 tasks performed by case managers, which I classified 
into categories based on their method of contact (phone call, in-person, etc.) and objective 
(assessment, education/training, coordination/referral, etc.). Finally, I have records for 9,600 
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A timeline of program implementation and data coverage is provided in Figure 12. 
Claims data covers the period January 2005 through December 2007 and is limited to include 
only individuals eligible for the program at any time during this period. Thus, nine months of pre-
program ―baseline‖ claims data is available for those who entered the program at the beginning of 
the program in October 2005. By the program‘s design, most adults in this program are 
categorically members of the Medicaid aged, blind, and disabled (ABD) population. 
3.4.2 Sample 
Below I estimate the causal impact of the high and moderate risk interventions by ex-
ploiting the administrative error that postponed the introduction of the intended level of DM 
services for a significant number of individuals. Ideally, I could simply see in the data which 
enrollees (i) actually were selected or (ii) should have been selected into the high or moderate risk 
groups when the program was originally implemented. Unfortunately, the data does not identify 
who was affected by the administrative coding error and I cannot replicate their DM stratification 
algorithms given the data available.
61
 However, I do see the risk group assignment for each 
individual for each month, which can be used to infer which individuals were affected by the 
mistake. After assigned people to risk groups in the initial months of the program, the enrollee 
population‘s risk group status is quite stable from month to month. Then, several thousand 
individuals are upgraded from a low risk group to a higher risk group in June/July of 2006, which 
corresponds to the date that program staff indicate the mistake was fixed. This is followed by 
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 Unfortunately, I do not have access to goals set by staff, but never completed. I do not have records 
of health information mailings. 
61
 The data I have access to is more limited than the data used by the vendor (at some points in time). 
Most importantly, I do not have all the data that was available to the company for the risk-
stratification in October 2005, as I have 9 months of data where the vendor would have had (up to) 24 
months of data. In June 2006, the claims data not originally received by the DMO vendor was mixed 
with the existing data (from program start) and is indistinguishable from my perspective. 
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another period in which assignment to the high and moderate risk groups was relatively more 
stable. (Figure 13) 
Table 17 shows the sample sizes based on being assigned to the high or moderate risk 
groups anytime in the phase-up period of the program (October 2005 – January 2006), plus 
individuals who I infer were affected by the administrative coding error and suddenly ―switched‖ 
into the high or moderate risk group in June and July 2006 from a lower risk category.
62
 The 
primary estimation sample is limited to individuals who were eligible for the program in the 
phase-up period and were therefore eligible for assignment into the high or moderate risk group at 
the discretion of the DMO. For example, some individuals were ineligible for the program for 
some months between October 2005 and June/July 2006 and assigned into the moderate or high-
risk group in June/July 2006. These individuals are not included in the main estimation sample, in 
case there are systematic differences between the majority of individuals (who enter the program 
as expected) and the latecomers who gain DM eligibility at a later date.  
These exclusions leave a primary sample size of 17,349 individuals. Table 18 identifies 
how these individuals were categorized for their original risk group during program startup (i.e., 
through January 2006) and their risk group after the mistake was fixed in the summer of 2006. 
About two-thirds of the individuals were correctly assigned into a higher-risk category during the 
phase up period (9,522 and 2,371 in the moderate and high-risk groups, respectively).  The 
remaining one-third (5,456) were delayed from receiving the more intensive DM interventions 
until the mistake was corrected in the summer of 2006. 
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 In order to alleviate the concern that this group of individuals does not appropriately compare to 
those in the high or moderate risk groups, two additional exclusions were adopted. First, any 
individual who had a major health event just before June or July 2006 was removed from the sample 
to reduce the chance of mis-identification of the reason for being switched into a higher risk group 
(i.e., those switches not due to the administrative error). Major health events are defined to be an 
increase in the individual‘s Chronic Illness and Disability Payment System (CDPS) score of 2.0 or 
more in the previous month or an increase of 3.0 or more in the last two months. Second, the primary 
sample also excludes a few individuals who ―switch‖ into the higher risk groups for one-month and 
then return to their initial classification (a ―false switch‖). 
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3.4.3 Summary statistics 
Table 19 presents summary statistics at baseline for the five groups presented in Table 
18. Comparing the columns in Table 19, one finds support for the claim that observationally 
similar groups of individuals both were and were not classified into the moderate or high risk 
groups in October 2005. Although comparisons between these groups are nuanced, the general 
pattern is that the early-entry and delayed-entry high and moderate risk patients are generally 
similar based on demographic, chronic diagnoses, and baseline expenditure and utilization 
measures. As expected, the individuals that were classified into the high and moderate risk groups 
(initially or after the mistake was fixed) tended to be sicker than those individuals in the low risk 
groups, and their health utilization tended to be much higher. According to the Chronic Illness 
and Disability Payment System (CDPS) disease identification algorithm for all months in the 
data, the vast majority of high and moderate risk patients had five or more different disease-
category diagnoses flags.
63
 As suggested by Lewis (2009), I also calculate hospitalization rates 
and find that the high and moderate risk patients were more likely to visit the hospital and/or 
emergency department for events related to chronic illnesses commonly addressed by DM 
programs. 
I test if these groups are observationally similar, and therefore their baseline characteris-
tics should have led to similar risk categorization. First, for the data presented in Table 19 (Panels 
A and B) I calculate the normalized differences between selected columns for each of the 
variables. Results are presented in Table 20.
64
 As a rule-of-thumb, the normalized difference 
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 This study uses the CDPS + Rx model, software version 5.1 (Gilmer et al. 2008; Kronick et al. 
2000; Gilmer et al. 2001). For a comparison of the CDPS model to other tools, see Winkelman and 
Mehmud (2007) and Weir, Aweh, and Clark (2008). I do not use lagged indicators of claims in the 
models, even though this may increase the model fit (Li et al. 2005), to avoid endogeneity concerns 
and selection prone to suffer from reversion to the mean. Rein (2005) risk stratifies a sample of 
Georgia Medicaid enrollees. 
64
 The normalized difference is given by the formula              
    
   , where   
  is the 
sample variance of    and    is the sample mean for group  . This variable has the advantage over 
the  -statistic because it is not affected by the sample size. 
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should not exceed 0.25 for most variables in the baseline period. (Imbens and Wooldridge 2009, 
p. 24) Broadly speaking, the individuals who are classified into the moderate risk group (initially 
or after the mistake is fixed) are observationally similar, as are the individuals in the high risk 
group. Normalized differences between columns are less than 0.25 in most cases. (Less that 5 
percent are over the cutoff; it is expected that a few variables would be over the cutoff, just by 
chance, given the number of comparisons). 
Second, I run an ordered probit regression to predict the probability of selection into the 
moderate or high risk groups on a large array of baseline indicators: a quadratic polynomial in 
pre-period health expenditures; the number of admissions to hospitals, emergency departments, 
and residential facilities; a large array of chronic disease dummy variables; and dummy variable 
for 10-year age-by-gender bins. The propensity score for selection into these categories is 
graphed as a histogram in Figure 14. Those patients who were delayed entry into the 
high/moderate risk groups have a propensity score distribution that is more similar to those who 
were assigned early into these groups, compared to the individuals that never were assigned to the 
high/moderate risk groups. That is, this propensity scoring exercise indicates substantial common 
support between the groups of individuals who were assigned to the high/moderate risk groups 
originally, and those who were upgraded to the high/moderate risk groups when the mistake was 
fixed. 
Because of the delay in the risk categorization into high/moderate risk groups due to the 
administrative error, the individuals affected by the mistake were subject to significantly different 
disease management intervention patterns. As seen in Table 21, those who were classified in the 
high or moderate groups initially were far more likely to receive significant DM interventions 
between program start-up in October 2005 and July 2006. The DMO vendor preformed 
assessments at much higher rates, and performed a larger number of DM intervention ―tasks‖ 
with the members or for the members who entered these groups during program startup. To 
 
83 
conclude, this section provides supporting evidence that otherwise similar patients did in fact 
receive different DM interventions during this period. 
3.5 Empirical approach 
This chapter seeks to measure the causal impact of the high and moderate intensity inter-
ventions in this Medicaid DM program.
65
 In response to the current policy debate, one relevant 
outcome in this study is ―overall cost savings‖ because the program was justified by the argument 
that enhanced preventive care and patient adherence to evidence-based guidelines would lead to 
reduced costs for the Medicaid program. I also research the impact of DM on other relevant 
outcome variables, such as hospital and prescription drug utilization, to better understand the 
mechanisms and the non-pecuniary benefits of DM. 
Although this data has the advantage of its completeness and transparency with respect to 
program interventions, this data set, by its nature, has limitations that affect the types of questions 
that can be researched, the analysis methods available, and ultimately the interpretation of the 
results. Note that this data set only includes individuals who are enrolled in the DM program at 
some point during the first 26 months of the program. Therefore, I do not have a comparison 
group always left out of the DM program. Instead, the effect of the program must be identified 
based on differences in the timing at which individuals began receiving DM interventions, as the 
data only includes individuals that are (eventually) enrolled in the DM program. 
In particular, I exploit this administrative error that postponed the introduction of the 
intended level of DM services for a significant number of high and moderate risk individuals 
(discussed above). As such, some patients begin receiving high-intensity interventions when the 
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 Obviously, there are many other potential research agendas. For example, there are principle-agent 
conflicts between the state government administrators and the vendor that administered the program or 
the interaction of DM programs with enrollees‘ (or their providers‘) decisions regarding their own 
health care (e.g., the role of information, addiction/self-control, the demand for acute services with 
low marginal costs). 
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program begins, while another group of observationally similar patients only receive the low-
intensity interventions at the beginning of the program. Conceptually, the potential response to 
this delay in treatment may be similar to what I have drawn in Figure 15. In October 2005, an 
individual would begin to receive DM interventions and therefore the outcome variable,    , 
begins to fall as a result of the program. However, if this individual was affected by the 
administrative ―mistake,‖ they would not have received the high- and moderate-intensity 
interventions due to assignment to a lower risk group. As such,     would continue at a higher 
level, until the mistake is fixed in June 2006, whereupon     begins to respond to the DM 
interventions. The crucial element in this case is the length of time a patient has been eligible for 
the program and assigned to receive the more-intensive DM interventions. 
Although the interventions provided to the low risk group are expected to be small, I do 
not explicitly assume they have zero effect. This framework identifies the effect of the GEC 
program‘s more expensive ―high-touch‖ interventions that were provided to the moderate and 
high risk groups. That is, I identify the effect of being ―upgraded‖ to receive moderate or high 
risk group interventions from the basic low risk group. I cannot identify the effect of low-
intensity interventions (relative to no DM), because there is no comparison group in the data who 
receives no DM interventions. I do not have access to data for other potential comparison 
groups.
66
 (In Figure 15, I abstracted away from the impact of low-intensity interventions, which 
may cause     to fall in October 2005 for both cases). Under the assumption that low-intensity 
interventions do not increase medical expenditures or lead to worse health outcomes, my 
estimates form a lower bound estimate of the effect of high-intensity DM interventions relative to 
no DM interventions. 
As with most empirical program evaluations, this chapter approaches the question at hand 
via a potential outcomes framework. Following the literature, I define the treatment effect to 
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 I unsuccessfully tried to obtain data on the Medicaid-Medicare ―dual eligible‖ population in 
Georgia, which was similar to the ABD population but not eligible for the DM program. 
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equal the difference between an outcome,         , for an individual that does         or does 
not         receive treatment from a DM program: 
                   6 
As one never observes     under both regimes, one of the terms in this equation is a counterfac-
tual that must be estimated.
 67
 
3.5.1 Baseline model 
To begin, consider a standard difference-in-difference model of the form, 
                    7 
where     is an outcome variable of interest (e.g., total health expenditure claims), for individual   
in month  . The key variable of interest,     , is a dummy variable that equals one if the 
individual has ever entered the high or moderate risk group during month   or earlier, and equals 
zero otherwise.      remains equal to one for a patient even if he or she was ―graduated‖ into a 
lower risk group (due to proper maintenance of their disease). 
The variable    is an individual-specific fixed-effect that will control for all idiosyncratic, 
time-invariant aspects particular to the individual, including age, gender, and the presence of 
chronic conditions and co-morbidities. The variable    represents a month-specific fixed-effect 
that will control for any changes that influence     for all individuals in the model. The month 
fixed-effect controls for seasonal variation in utilization, inflation in the price of health care, new 
technologies, statewide Medicaid policies, and so on. Furthermore, it controls for any low-
intensity interventions, such as the fact that eligible members were provided access to a 24-hour 
nurse line beginning in October 2004, regardless of their risk group status. Finally,     is an 
idiosyncratic error term with the usual properties. 
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 For an introduction to evaluation methodologies in the context of DM research, see Arnold, Folsom, 
and Bosk (2007), Fitzner et al. (2004), Linden, Adams, and Roberts (2003), Linden (2006), 
MacDowell and Wilson (2002), Mattke et al. (2006), and Wilson (2003). For more on the potential 
outcomes framework, see the exchange between Angrist, Imbens, & Rubin (1996) and Heckman 
(1996), or the overview by Imbens & Wooldridge (2009). 
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The coefficient,  , therefore measures an average response to the introduction of more 
intensive DM services. The key source of identification for the estimate on the effect of the DM 
intervention,   , comes from the timing at which DM interventions are introduced. In this baseline 
specification, this parameter is primarily identified by the initial treatment period, when some 
individuals are properly assigned to the high-risk group, while some of their peers received fewer 
interventions (due to the ―mistake‖ discussed in Section 3.3.2). 
This chapter is the first research on public DM programs I am aware of that controls for 
unobservable characteristics of an individual with individual fixed effects. I argue that observed 
and unobserved characteristics about the individual can have important impacts on the outcomes 
of interest, and that this methodology is therefore superior to propensity-score matching in this 
setting. Propensity-score based methods, which have been used in other studies (e.g., Gertler and 
Simcoe 2007; Linden, Adams, and Roberts 2005; Linden, Berg, and Wadhwa 2007), would rely 
on the assumption that – once adjusting for the estimated propensity of being selected into a 
high/moderate risk groups – remaining covariates are independent of the treatment indicator and 
therefore would not bias outcome estimates. However, that argument is fairly difficult to justify 
here.
68
 Controlling for an individual fixed effect allows me to control for important differences in 
the underlying (observed and unobserved) characteristics of the treated and untreated populations. 
One of the main concerns in this setting is that the high and moderate risk patients will 
exhibit reversion to the mean. Consider the case where an individual has abnormally high 
expenditures in the months before the program began. High expenditures would increase the 
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 Take for example a patient with cancer that also has the chronic condition asthma, which she 
manages appropriately. As the DM program only based risk group assignment on health care 
utilization and chronic illnesses, she could likely be ―matched‖ to another patient with asthma that is 
poorly controlled and therefore generating a large number of hospitalizations, yet these patients would 
be expected to have very different future medical expenditures. In other words, there are a large 
number of individual-specific factors that are not independent of the outcomes of interest variable, yet 
do not necessarily influence the propensity of selection (i.e., unobserved variables plus variables that 
are observed but imperfectly modeled). In practice, propensity score matching yields to estimates of 
similar magnitudes to those presented below. 
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probability of assignment to the high/moderate risk groups, by design. However, if these high-
expenditures were simply a random event, the level of expenditures are likely to return to normal 
(lower) levels, even in the absence of the DM interventions. If the analysis below is not careful, 
estimates could be biased because the treatment group might be more likely to experience a fall in 
expenditures than the untreated group, ceteris paribus. 
The primary way to control for reversion to the mean is to form a counterfactual with 
untreated individuals likely to experience similar levels of mean reversion to the treatment group. 
Thus, in order to exploit this natural experiment, I limit my sample to individuals that either (i) 
actually were selected or (ii) should have been selected into the high or moderate risk groups 
when the program was originally implemented in the empirical specifications. That is, I limit my 
data set to the 17,349 individuals I defined above in Section 3.4.2: individuals originally assigned 
to the high and moderate risk groups and individuals who I infer to have been affected by the 
administrative mistake, but were otherwise eligible for higher-intensity interventions. I drop the 
remainder of individuals – three quarters of the original data set – from the baseline regressions 
because the low-risk individuals are less likely to experience said mean revision and/or outcomes 
for these individuals may have underlying trends that are systematically different than the trends 
for the moderate and high risk individuals. 
As can been seen in Table 18, there were individuals who were kept out of both the high 
and moderate risk groups due to the administrative coding error. Thus, this data can also be used 
to identify the differential effect of the high risk group interventions (on-site providers) above and 
beyond the moderate risk group interventions (telephonic). Thus, I also present results of the 
following form: 
                                        8 
Similar to above,         and         , are dummy variables that equal one if the 
individual has ever entered the moderate or high risk groups, respectively, during or prior to 
month  .         is defined to equal zero when         , equals one, to prevent both terms 
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from equaling one simultaneously. With this contrction,       identifies the impact on     due to 
all DM interventions received in the high risk group and      measures the impact of the 
interventions to individuals in the moderate risk group. The marginal impact of moving from the 
moderate to high risk group is the difference,             . 
It is common that many health outcome variables of interest (potential    ‘s), such as 
health care expenditures or the number of hospitalizations, do not fit linear models particularly 
well. Typically, three issues require additional attention from the econometrician: (i)     is strictly 
defined such that it must be non-negative, (ii) a significant number of observations equal zero, 
and (iii) the distribution of the nonzero observations are highly skewed (long right tail). In the 
literature in health economics, the issues are commonly addressed by using a two-part model. 
Compared to a tobit-type models on a latent censored variable, the two-part model has the 
advantage that it provides parameter estimates that are interesting in their own right: they estimate 
the response of the dependent variable to treatment along the intensive and extensive margins.
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The first part of the model may be a logit model that estimates the probability that     is positive: 
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where     is the vector of all independent variables, similar in form to equations 7 and 8. The 
second part of the model estimates the outcome,    , conditional on a positive observation. It is 
common to remove undesired skewness of health expenditure data by estimating a natural 
logarithm transformation of the dependent variable:
70
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 Results using a random effects tobit model are presented in Appendix C. Results are qualitatively 
similar to the two-part model. 
70
 Manning and coauthors compare the OLS regression on        to generalized linear models and 
propose an algorithm for choosing among the various possible estimators. In cases where   is a 
counting variable, researchers have alternatively used a zero-inflated Poisson model. (Manning 1998; 
Manning and Mullahy 2001; Basu, Manning, and Mullahy 2004) 
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The estimates from equations 9 and 10 are interesting in their own right and are helpful in 
understanding how individuals are effected by DM. 
In addition, the expectation of     can be obtained by the equation 
           
            
             
              
11 
where   is a ―smearing‖ estimate used to transform the estimate from the log scale to the levels 
of     from Manning (1998).
71
 For more on the two-part model, see the discussion in section 
2.4.2, above. 
3.5.2 Effect of DM interventions over time 
In addition to measuring this average effect of the DM interventions across the post-
intervention period, the data allows for more specific time-based analysis of the effect of the 
interventions. Therefore, I also run regressions where I provide dummies for the number of 
months before/after entry into the program for the individuals in the main sample: 
In addition to measuring the average effect of DM across the post-intervention period, it is also 
possible to estimate a profile for the effect of the cumulative DM treatment over time by 
estimating regressions of the following form: 
                                            
  
         
           
12 
Here,          is a dummy variable that equals one   months before/after entering the DM risk 
group. Thus, each         (       parameter estimates the effect of a patient having entered the 
high (moderate) risk group   months prior to or after entering the program, while still controlling 
for both individual and time fixed effects. The parameters corresponding to         and       
are normalized to zero. This allows me to observe the time-profile of the program‘s effects on 
                                                     
71
 The smearing estimate was originally developed by Duan (1983) and updated to account for 
heteroscedasticity by Manning (1998). Manning‘s method is less precise than     
    if, in fact, the 
error is homoscedastic. 
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patient outcomes. As was the case above, these parameters are identified by differences in the 
timing at which (otherwise similar) individuals entered the high or moderate risk groups. 
3.5.3 Effect of DM interventions across the expenditure distribution  
Based on the discussion above, one should expect the impact of DM on health care ex-
penditures and other variables to vary across the distribution of baseline health care expenditures. 
Understanding these distributional effects has important implications for program design and 
welfare considerations. For example, a social planner would choose to give high intensity 
interventions only to patients where the financial cost reduction and social benefit of better health 
are larger than the marginal cost of providing the interventions. 
To identify the distributional impact of the program, I implement the Changes-in-
Changes (CIC) model of Athey and Imbens (2006). As discussed by these authors, this model is 
in many ways a generalization of the models used above that allows one to calculate a 
―difference-in-difference‖ at each quantile of the distribution. This model relies on the 
assumption that the differences between the treated and untreated groups is stable, after 
eliminating a common time trend, and that differences between the two distributions can be 
attributed to the program. This assumption is not unreasonable to the extent that the delay of entry 
into the high or moderate risk groups was not systematically associated with differences in the 
time trends in the outcome variables. 
In this model, we assume that in the absence of the intervention, the outcome variable is a 
function of the unobservable characteristics of individual   and the time period: 
                13 
The distribution of   varies across the treatment and control groups, but not across time     
      . Therefore, the average effect of the program for the treated is given by the expression 




Assuming that           is monotone in   and conditionally independent of    and   , given 
one‘s group,   , Athey and Imbens show that one can identify the full distribution of     , given 
that         (the second period for the treated group): 
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With this data set, the CIC model is implemented by collapsing each individual‘s 
monthly observations into one pre-intervention summary observation and one post-intervention 
observation. So that the pre- and post- observations cover a comparable length of time (and have 
the same expected levels and distributions as if the groups of individuals were identical and there 
was no program), I restrict the data set to the maximum period of time that would allow for there 
to be an equal number of months before and after the program was implemented: January 2005 
through June 2006 (9 months of pre/post data). The data includes the average monthly 
expenditure in these two periods, rounded to the nearest dollar. 
First, the standard CIC model was estimated on several outcome variables of interest. 
Second, I re-estimate the model while controlling for an array of standard covariates such as 
gender, age, and diseases observed in the pre-period. This can be done by first estimating an OLS 
regression of outcomes with group-by-time dummy variables and the control variables. Third, I 
calculate the residuals from this regression (including the four time-by-group effects) and then 
estimate the CIC model with these new ―augmented residuals.‖ (Athey and Imbens 2006) 
3.6 Results 
3.6.1 The effect of intensive DM interventions on medical expenditures and 
other outcomes 
In this section, I present results for the primary variable of interest, net medical expendi-
tures, based on the baseline model outlined in Section 3.5.1. I also use this model to evaluate the 
impact of DM on other measures of interest, such as hospital utilization. 
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Before turning to the formal analysis, I first present graphs with the mean monthly medi-
cal expenditures and mean number of emergency department visits for the high risk group. In 
Figure 16, one sees a pattern that generally follows the conceptual plot discussed above. Although 
the monthly sample estimates display a fair amount of month-to-month variation, both variables 
indicate high and somewhat stable levels of expenditure/emergency department utilization before 
the program is implemented in October 2005. At that point, the group of patients who is treated 
with the high-intensity interventions falls below the other two groups (those who mistakenly 
receive the low or moderate intensity interventions). However, by the time the data ends in 
December 2007, all of these patients have been receiving the DM interventions for at least 18 
months and the medical expenditures/emergency utilization indicators appear below their initial 
levels. To formalize this intuition, I turn to regressions for the remainder of this section of this 
chapter. 
Because nearly all patients in the moderate and high risk groups have some medical ex-
penditures in a given month, I begin my formal analysis by focusing on the intensive margin, 
regressing the natural log of health expenditures (excluding the DM program fees, conditional 
that expenditures are positive) on the DM explanatory variables (discussed in section 3.5.1), 
individual fixed effects, and time fixed effects. Results from the baseline model (equation 1) are 
provided in Table 22, columns 1. This indicates a 4.43 log point decrease (SE 1.0) in net medical 
expenditures from receiving the moderate or high DM interventions. In column 2, I separate the 
effect of high and moderate intensity interventions, and find that nearly all the savings can be 
attributed to the effect of the high-intensity interventions: the high-risk group experienced a 
decrease of 17 log points (SE 1.4) in Medicaid expenditures while the decrease for the moderate 
risk group was small and statistically insignificant.  Thus, my baseline model finds that the high-
intensity interventions did generate significant cost savings while the effect of moderate-intensity 
interventions was indistinguishable from the effect of the services for the low-risk group. 
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The major concept behind DM programs rests on the prediction that DM interventions 
should have large effects among high-cost enrollees with chronic diseases. Thus, theory implies 
that I should expect different treatment effects for those without chronic illnesses. In columns 3 
and 4, I interact the treatment variable(s) with a dummy variable that equals one for anyone with 
a chronic illness. This estimate produces a negative coefficient on      of -9.9 (SE 2.81) log 
points, indicating significant costs savings among the high and moderate risk patients who do not 
have one of these diseases identified by the CDPS algorithm (but potentially another high-cost 
chronic conditions such as hemophilia, sickle cell anemia, schizophrenia and others that are not 
identified with the CDPS algorithm). Those with a chronic disease experienced a more modest 
4.1 log point decrease in total claims (           log points). In columns 5 and 6, I find that, for 
individuals with a ―top-5‖ disease, the high/moderate interventions were associated with a 3.4 log 
point decrease in medial expenditures (             ).  As was the case before, the effect of 
high intensity interventions were much larger than the effect of moderate intensity interventions. 
It is possible to identify the impact of DM for individuals with particular diseases. By 
interacting the DM variable with dummies for each of the ―top-5‖ illnesses, in column 7, I find 
that DM had the largest costs savings among asthmatic patients, with log expenditures decreasing 
14.1 log points               . Asthma is followed by COPD and CAD patients with a 10.9 
and 7.9 log point decrease, respectively. Medicaid expenditures decreased the least for 
individuals with CHF (5.0) and, lastly, diabetes (3.5). Given that the effect of DM is identified 
with the first eight months of the program, the intuition provided by Arora et al. (2008, sec. 3) 
may apply to this case.  The authors compare the expected timing of effects between asthma and 
diabetes,  
For example, in managing asthma, programs can expect to see outcomes 
and savings in a relatively short period of time compared with diabetes, which 
requires behavior change on the member‟s part and, thus, likely will fail to see 
substantial savings in the short term. … Asthma is relatively easy to manage. 
With monitoring, proper use of medications, control of the environment, and 
avoidance of triggers, such as pet dandruff or second-hand smoke, most children 
and families can be relieved of the burden of asthma… Diabetes is a difficult 
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disease to manage, because it requires behavior change by the member. Fur-
thermore, because many of the outcomes of diabetes care management are seen 
much later, when complications (e.g., kidney failure) are avoided, diabetes man-
agement is unlikely to generate cost savings in the short term. (2008, pp. 3:3-4) 
Interestingly, the results in this chapter differ somewhat from my findings in Chapter 2, where 
CHF had larger cost savings and COPD had smaller cost savings, relative to the three other 
diseases. Diabetes was found to have the worst financial outcomes in both studies. 
As a robustness check, column 8 includes low risk patients in addition to the main esti-
mation sample. This approach has the advantage of greatly increasing the size of the data set, but 
the disadvantage that the individuals added to the sample are less comparable to those deemed 
moderate- or high-risk (see Table 19). The average DM effect on health care costs of -3.4 log 
points is only slightly smaller than the specification in column 1. DM for high-risk patients 
continues to drive these results (column 9). Differences between this estimate and those reported 
earlier are rooted in differences in the time trends that exist between the low, moderate, and high 
risk groups. 
Other outcomes: I also estimate the effect of DM two  subcategories of health expendi-
tures (emergency department and prescription drugs) and other health utilization measures using 
the same specification as above (Table 22, columns 1 and 2). One should remember that, in the 
second stage of the two-part model, observations are dropped if the outcome is not positive and 
that individuals are dropped if they do not have at least two months with positive outcomes. In  
Table 23, columns 1 and 2, I present the effect of the high and moderate DM interventions on the 
log of emergency department (ED) expenditures.  One would expect a decrease in ED 
expenditures (conditional on visiting an ED in the month) if, for example, DM reduced the 
prevalence of costly complications (e.g., from co-morbidities interacting with another illness) 
and/or caused patients who repeatedly visit their ED to visit the ED fewer times per month. 
Although the point estimate indicates a 3.7 log point decrease in ED expenditures, conditional on 
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an admission, the results are statistically insignificant.  The standard errors are large because there 
are relatively few admissions in the sample.  
In column 3, DM appears to have no significant change, on the intensive margin, of ex-
penditures for prescription drugs. However, closer inspection in column 4 reveals that there is 
actually a statistically significant increase for moderate risk patients and a statistically significant 
decrease for high risk patients.  
In Table 24, I run OLS regressions for a number of additional dependent variables. As 
seen in Table 24, these DM interventions resulted in a decrease of about 4.4 admission days per 
100 patients (SE 1.5), mostly for the high risk patients. When I identify which types of 
procedures were performed in the hospital, it appears that there was a larger decrease in 
admissions related to asthma than for other diseases. Confirming the results on pharmaceuticals in 
Table 23, there is an increase in the number of prescriptions taken by moderate risk patients and a 
decrease in the number of high risk patients. The last row of Table 24 shows a large decline in the 
number of unique health care providers that a high risk patient saw in a typical month. This could 
be due to more ―centralized‖ care for these patients, or the fact that they are in the hospital less 
frequently. 
The extensive margin: It is also possible to consider the effect of the DM program on an 
individual‘s choice or need to obtain certain types of health care services. Thus, I turn to 
estimating the ―first stage‖ of the two-part model: the extensive margin. It is well known that 
most nonlinear models with fixed effects are confounded by what is known as the ‗incidental 
parameters problem‘ and can lead to biased estimation. (Chamberlain 1984, p. 1256; Lancaster 
2000; Arellano and Honoré 2001, p. 3270; Wooldridge 2002, p. 484) However, I take advantage 
of a peculiar seperability in the log-likelihood function that exists in the specific case of the logit 
model. This allows one to estimate the effect of an independent variable separately from the 
problem of consistently estimating the fixed effect. (Chamberlain 1984; Arellano and Honoré 
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2001; Jones 2000, 6.3.2)
72
  One must use a conditional logit model, where individuals are 
dropped if they do not have at least one month without an event and one month with an event. 
In Table 25, I estimate conditional logit models with individual fixed effects for an array 
of independent binary variables. In columns 1, I find a 86 basis point decrease in the probability 
that an average individual will have a medical insurance claim in a given month. Thus, in addition 
to the second stage effect found above (where DM caused users of medical care to decrease the 
level of their spending), it appears DM actually causes a small number of individuals to switch to 
receiving no health care.  This effect larger for the moderate risk group (column 2), which is the 
group that has, on average, lower health expenditures. If 70 percent of individuals have an 
expenditure in a quarter, and mean expenditures are about $1,500 per person per month for the 
high and moderate risk groups, this indicates that the first-stage effect of the program is nontrivial 
but modest, in the neighborhood of a                     $20 per person per month 
decrease in expenditures.  
The remaining columns in the table repeat the conditional logit analysis, estimating the 
effect of DM on the probability of an ED admissions, an inpatient admission, a prescription drug 
claim, or a physician office visit.  
Columns 3 through 6 show large, statistically significant decreases in the probability of 
emergency department and inpatient admissions after receiving moderate and (especially) high 
intensity interventions. ED admission rates also fell dramatically, with the largest effect found 
among the high-risk group. Furthermore, assignment to receive high or moderate intensity DM 
tends to lower the probability of inpatient admissions by 3.6 and 13.8 percentage points, 
respectively, or 6.1 percentage points on average.  This is a very significant reduction in the 
hospitalization rate, given that the mean hospitalization rate (for the individuals in the regression) 
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 In Appendix C, I discuss an alternative model: a random effects tobit model, which treats health 
expenditures as a censored dependent variable. As seen in the appendix, results with a Tobit model 
yield conclusions similar to the two-part model. 
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is 8.54 percent. These differences between the high and moderate risk groups in the estimated 
effect of DM on ED and inpatient admissions explain much of the difference we observed 
(between the two groups) for total expenditures. Some patients are less likely to fill a prescription 
or visit an outpatient provider.   
Table 26 presents yet another piece of evidence that the DM program is working as in-
tended, by measure the effect of DM on the probability of a ―potentially avoidable‖ 
hospitalization. This variable identifies if the individual had at least one hospital claim during the 
month that is identified, according to the Prevention Quality Indicators (PQI) algorithm from 
AHRQ (2007b), as a hospitalization that could have potentially been avoided if the individual had 
received proper ambulatory health care.
73
 The results indicate that the probability of a potentially 
avoidable admission was reduced by over 6 percentage points and is significant at the 1 percent 
level. Interestingly, the size of the effect is similar between the high- and moderate risks groups. 
The decrease in potentially avoidable hospitalizations explains much, but not all, of the decreases 
in total hospitalizations we observed above in Table 25. 
Quarterly data: In Table 27, I made two changes to the data. First, I aggregate the data to 
the sum of expenditures for each individual in each quarter. This aggregation to person-quarter 
observations can address the concern that the results shown above are subject to random 
fluctuation (―noise‖) from month to month. Second, instead of running the data as a two-stage 
model, I add one dollar to the quarterly sum for each individual in the data before performing the 
log transformation. This allows the individuals with zero expenditure to remain in the regression. 
With quarterly data, there are very few individuals with zero total expenditures in a given quarter. 
These two steps make the results in Table 27 comparable to the primary specification in the study 
by Gertler and Simcoe (2009). I run this specification for the total expenditures, as well as the 
four subcategories of expenditures. 
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In column 1, I find a 40 percent (SE 2.9) decline in total expenditures from being pro-
moted to the high and moderate risk groups and – consistent with the results above – the decline 
is larger for the high risk groups (49.8 percent) than for the moderate risk groups (33.6 percent). 
This effect is large, but is smaller in magnitude than the decline Gertler and Simcoe (2009) found 
for the low self-control diabetics in their study (over 50 log-point decrease in the first quarter of 
the program). In the remaining columns with ED, inpatient, outpatient, and prescription drug 
expenditures, the results show a decrease expenditures from the high and moderate intensity 
interventions. Of note, there is a 23.3 percent (SE 2.5) decline in emergency department 
expenditures for high risk patients.  
3.6.2 The effect of intensive DM interventions over time 
The results that I have discussed thus far estimate an impact of DM that is primarily iden-
tified by the (approximately) first eight months of the program. However, the specification in 
Section 3.5.2 allows us to estimate the time-related path of DM interventions on medical 
expenditures. In Figure 17, Panel A, I plot the coefficient estimates and 95 percent confidence 
intervals from a regression of log(total claims) on an array of dummies indicating months after 
entry into high and moderate groups, with month and individual fixed effects. One can see the 
high-risk interventions lead to a steady decrease in medical expenditures over time, decreasing to 
more than 10 percent below their baseline level of expenditures as the data reaches the maximum 
of 27 post-program months. As expected, the moderate risk group does not experience such a 
large decrease.   
One problem with this graph is that there is some variation in the baseline (per-program) 
months of the data. To verify the magnitude of these declines, in Figure 17, Panel B, I drop the 
dummy variables for all months prior to entry into the high and moderate risk groups. The 
coefficients are therefore normalized such that 0 equals the average pre-program medical 
expenditure for the individual. The post-implementation drop in expenditures appears even larger 
for the high-risk patients and the decrease becomes statistically significant for moderate risk 
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patients. These graphs indicate that the program effect grows over time and is sustained. The 
magnitudes of the effect, as expected, is similar to those in Table 22.  I conclude that the effect of 
DM appears in the first six to twelve months after the individual begins receiving DM 
interventions and these savings appear to be sustained over time (i.e., patients do not ―revert‖ 
back to a high-expenditure regime at some later date). 
3.6.3 The distributional effect of intensive DM interventions 
Finally, I turn to quantile treatment effects of the DM program for those who were treated 
in the high and moderate risk groups. As discussed in Section 3.5.3, I use the Changes-in-
Changes models from of Athey and Imbens (2006) on total medical expenditures (without and 
with control variables) and total inpatient expenditures. The results of this exercise are provided 
in both tabular (Table 28) and graphical format (Figure 18). The table provides bootstrapped 
standard errors. As discussed above, the data was restricted to the months January through 
September 2005 in the pre-period and October 2005 through June 2006 in the post period (9 
months of pre and post data) and converted to two summary pre/post observations. Outcomes in 
these periods are presented as monthly averages to make it comparable to the data presented 
above. 
Decreases in the levels of medical care costs are significantly larger at the right tail of the 
distribution, as seen Figure 18. In the baseline specification without controls, the 90
th
 percentile 
saw a decrease of about $200 per member per month, while the 10
th
 percentile decreased only $80 
per member per month. (These are the percentile of the high and moderate risk patients, not the 
entire pool of eligible members).
74
 The specifications with the logarithm of medical expenditures 
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 For the 95th percentile, there is actually an increase in expenditures, which contrasts with the 
findings from the rest of the distribution. This may be from the fact that the very ―sickest‖ patients are 
―too sick‖ to recover or be influenced by DM. This may also be from the fact that there is a ―stop-
loss‖ provision in the contract between the state of Georgia and the DMO. Claims above and beyond 
$150,000 for an individual in a single year are removed from the financial calculations, leaving the 
DM company with little incentive to move patients below the stop-loss. As similar situation is 
discussed by McInerney (2010) for the case of a worker‘s compensation program. 
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show an opposite slope, with the largest proportional decrease of 18 percentage points at the 5
th
 
percentile. These two results are perfectly consistent with each other, once you take into account 
the highly skewed distribution of medical expenditures. While a decrease of $70 dollars per 
patient is smaller than the $200 decrease at the top of the distribution, this figure represents a 
larger share of the patient‘s expenditures due to the extremely large per-member monthly costs at 
the far right tail of the distribution. Similar results are obtained in the model that controls for 
various indicators, such as age, gender, and diseases. 
For inpatient and emergency department expenditures, the high number of zeros prec-
ludes running this model without the log transformation, and even with the log transformation 
there is less statistical precision. However, we do observe a decrease in inpatient expenditures. 
The decrease in emergency department expenditures is mostly concentrated among the most 
expensive patients, as might have been expected. Outpatient expenditures decline more modestly 
and there is less of a trend (in dollar terms) between the right and left tails of the distribution. 
3.7 Discussion 
The primary limitation of the Georgia data set is that this approach does not allow estima-
tion of the DM program‘s effect compared to no treatment because all individuals in the data 
receive treatment, at least at the low-risk group level. Therefore, I cannot claim to identify the 
total program effect, as the data does not include individuals who were never eligible to receive at 
least basic DM services; that is, I can only identify the effect of being ―upgraded‖ to receive 
moderate or high risk group interventions. My results serve as a lower bound estimate of the full 
effect of the program as long as the ―low‖ intensity interventions do not have an adverse effect 
and increase health care costs (direct program costs aside). Under the assumption that 
interventions for the low risk group had no effect, my estimates would approximate the total 
financial impact of the program. 
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There are no estimates of the marginal cost of increasing the intensity of DM interven-
tions, for a given individual, from the low-risk group interventions to the level of interventions 
given to moderate or high risk group. Therefore, it is not possible to pair the results in this study 
with individual-level, heterogeneous program costs and conduct a return-on-investment analysis 
at the individual level. However, the magnitude of the results can be compared to overall program 
costs with a simple, back-of-the-envelope calculation. 
Note that there are 3.2 low risk patients for every high/moderate risk patient in the pro-
gram. Georgia‘s Medicaid program paid the DMO vendor approximately $30 for DM services, 
regardless of the individual‘s risk group. This study does not measure the financial savings for 
low risk patients that result from the DM interventions they receive (access to a ―1-800‖ phone 
number and a program website, a few educational mailings, data monitoring). However, we can 
speculate that total savings for this group is likely to be limited because (i) they receive fewer 
DM interventions, (ii) this group has much lower costs to begin with, and (iii) the distributional 
analysis indicated that savings from intensive interventions was limited for low-cost patients at 
the left side of the distribution. If one assumes that there was zero financial savings to the 
Medicaid program for the low-risk group, then the program would need at least ($30)(1+3.2) = 
$126 in average savings (per month) from the individuals in the high and moderate risk groups to 
cover total program costs. Given that mean expenditures for the main estimation sample were 
about $1,250 PMPM in the baseline period, this translates to about 10 percent of monthly 
expenditures for the 17,000 that ―should‖ have been assigned to the high and moderate risk 
groups. The main results in this chapter indicate savings at this order of magnitude, at least for the 
high risk group when receiving the high risk interventions. From the changes-in-changes model, 
we see that a decrease of $126 may have occurred for many of the most expensive patients in the 
high/moderate risk groups, but not all of them. (Although, the results with quarterly data in Table 
27 imply substantial savings.)  Of course, the fact that some individuals were mistakenly under-
treated has a negative effect on the realized economic return of the program.  
 
102 
Of course, the financial savings to the state Medicaid program does not represent all the 
benefits to the program. Better management of a chronic disease is likely to increase the private 
utility of the individual and may have indirect benefits such as the labor productivity gains from 
better health (e.g., fewer sick days). 
Theory suggests that there are diminishing returns to providing these high-cost services to 
lower risk (less sick) individuals. However, it should be noted that this is a relatively large DM 
program. This program in Georgia assigned about 25 percent of individuals to the high and 
moderate risk groups, even though it is not uncommon in the industry to limit the intensive DM 
services to less than 10 percent of the eligible population. (Abraham 2008) Thus, it is interesting 
that I find robust cost savings across the entire distribution of high and moderate cost patients in 
this setting. The question, ―What was the effect of low-intensity DM services given to low risk 
patients?‖ is left to future work. 
This chapter does make several improvements upon the existing literature that are worth 
highlighting. First, the main estimation sample consists of over 17,000 individuals who received 
services from this Medicaid DM program, much larger than the 826 individuals in the study by 
Holmes et al. (2008). The GEC program, with 45,000-50,000 eligible members each month is one 
of the largest programs evaluated in the DM literature. My main identification comes from a 
natural experiment where a large sub-sample of approximately 5,500 individuals were delayed 
introduction into the high and moderate risk groups for 9 to 10 months, while about 11,900 
individuals were treated with these interventions. I am the first researcher to study the effect of 
DM using this idiosyncratic feature of the GEC program. Additional research, addressing issues 
far beyond the scope of this chapter, could be conducted in the future. Second, existing work 
almost exclusively focuses on the average effect of DM programs and rarely explores 
heterogeneous treatment effects. This chapter provides interesting evidence showing variation in 
the program effect across diseases and the expenditure distribution. Third, by exploiting an 
administrative error, I am able to use experimental methods to avoid sources of bias that 
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potentially plague the DM program evaluation literature: unobserved variables for patients who 


















Contracts awarded for $7.05 and 
$18.7 million for the north and south 
service regions, respectively. About 
25 percent of individuals in the south 
region were assigned to the "high" 
and "moderate" risk groups. 
$7,052,000 49,483 $12 
$18,726,000 48,400 $32 
 12,100 $129* 
Missouri - Chronic 
Care Improvement 
Program (7/2006) 
Budgeted $3.9 million for FY 2009 
with 280,000 overall, 118,000 
―Disease Management,‖ 9,000 ―Case 
Management‖ enrollees. 
$3,900,000 280,000 $1 
 118,000 $3* 
 9,000 $36* 
Montana - Nurse 
First program 
(1/2004) 
Estimated annual costs for DM 
across all diseases was $1.9 million. 
64,000 enrolled; 6,800 with more 
intensive DM. 
$1,900,000 64,000 $2 





$90.79 PMPM for 850 patients. $77,000 850 $91 
Rhode Island - 
Connect Care 
Choice (8/2007) 
Cost estimate $30 PMPM for 
employing nurse case managers in 
provider offices. 
- - $30 




One report‘s ROI estimate used 
estimate of $13.69 PMPM totaling 
$1.96 million. 
$1,962,000 11,948 $14 





About $5.50 PMPM. 54,000 overall, 
3,500 in ―disease management‖, 520 
in ―care management‖ 
$297,000 54,000 $6 
 3,500 $85* 
 520 $571* 
Numbers in italics calculated as column (1) = (2) × (3). *Total program costs divided by number of individuals 
in the sub-category. 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics for Medicaid enrollees, MEPS 1998-2007 
 















Panel A - Individual-level data             
Individuals (N) 3,086 3,531 2,886 8,008 20,184 2,720 40,415 
Male (percent) 25 57 35 29 49 40 42 
Age at survey exit 41.84 9.29 64.73 34.06 8.60 52.24 23.19 
 
[0.18] [0.07] [0.23] [0.18] [0.02] [0.34] [0.12] 
SSI income (percent) 33.00 7.00 43.00 14.00 3.00 35.00 13.00 
Education (percent) 
          No degree 42.13 9.01 58.45 41.62 7.57 47.32 23.39 
   GED 10.73 0.11 5.02 7.38 0.12 3.49 2.94 
   High school diploma 39.70 0.34 25.81 42.45 0.36 25.29 15.19 
   Bachelor's degree 2.98 0.00 3.47 3.23 0.00 2.57 1.29 
   Graduate degree 0.91 0.00 1.59 0.76 0.00 1.36 0.43 
   Under-16/other/missing 3.56 90.54 5.65 4.56 91.96 19.96 56.76 
Race/Ethnicity (percent) 
          White (not Hispanic) 39.34 27.36 42.00 32.16 24.99 36.32 29.69 
   Black 28.09 33.22 27.44 25.07 24.69 25.63 26.03 
   Hispanic 27.09 34.07 24.81 37.08 45.37 30.81 38.90 
   Asian or Pacific Island 2.30 1.67 3.92 3.77 2.37 5.70 2.91 
   Native American 1.30 0.85 0.66 0.89 0.91 0.48 0.88 
   Other/multiple races 1.88 2.83 1.18 1.04 1.67 1.07 1.59 
Chronic diseases (per 1000) 
          Asthma 545.69 972.81 311.50                148.91 
   COPD 94.94 5.10 147.61                18.24 
   Diabetes 370.06 19.82 509.70                66.39 
   CHF 290.02 11.05 429.66                53.79 
   CAD 130.27 3.96 292.79                31.20 
Insurance 
          Medicaid 
             Percent of months insured 74.42 83.25 78.61 66.88 79.00 74.48 76.29 
 
[0.31] [0.25] [0.91] [0.48] [0.28] [0.6] [0.16] 
  
(18.405) (5.865) (14.124) (9.281) (0.122) 
       Continuously insured (percent) 48.70 59.59 53.08 37.86 51.63 46.91 49.16 
  
(9.622) (6.477) (8.281) (2.625) (2.212) 
    Medicaid and Medicare 
             Percent of months insured           77.21           73.35 10.45 
 
          [0.79]           [0.62] [0.16] 
      Continuously insured (percent)        
 
50.83           45.37 6.68 
(continued on next page) 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics for Medicaid enrollees, MEPS 1998-2007 (continued) 














Panel B - Person-quarter data 
      Person-quarters (N) 23,260 25,376 21,048 59,732 141,124 18,912 289,452 
Medical expenditures (2005 dollars) 
         Total medical expenditures (mean) 1,736.17 411.27 3,242.59 678.91 220.76 1,414.14 751.49 
 
[36.78] [28.24] [36.91] [17.65] [5.99] [56.91] [14.94] 
  
(26.322) (55.825) (40.473) (47.663) (6.401) 
       $0 (percent) 21.50 37.78 8.86 48.65 58.42 29.61 46.14 
      $.01 to $99 (percent) 9.90 20.20 5.11 12.49 18.23 11.14 15.13 
      $100 to $499(percent) 23.51 27.16 17.81 19.96 17.48 23.73 19.76 
      $500 to $999 (percent) 14.03 7.38 16.45 7.04 2.67 12.12 6.52 
      $1,000 to $4,999 (percent) 23.81 6.32 35.76 8.95 2.59 17.06 9.29 
      $5,000 or above (percent) 7.24 1.15 16.01 2.92 0.61 6.34 3.16 
   Expenditures paid by Medicaid 1,227.43 301.25 1,004.62 443.80 158.95 485.15 398.87 
 
[28.15] [28.97] [18.19] [4.42] [5.16] [18.74] [6.42] 
  
(20.482) (6.112) (30.082) (44.467) (20.955) 
       Percent > $0 63.77 52.65 71.91 37.61 33.94 51.23 42.62 
   Expenditures paid by Medicare        1,795.68        704.36    
 
       [37.15]         [35.03]   
      Percent > $0         73.74        48.22    
   Emergency department expenditures 69.78 25.04 64.40 30.34 12.73 28.69 26.83 
 
[1.98] [1.02] [1.03] [0.84] [0.37] [1.18] [0.53] 
      Percent > $0 11.11 6.81 10.00 5.59 3.66 5.35 5.50 
   Hospital inpatient expenditures 660.85 109.40 1,235.17 293.87 79.19 476.83 282.92 
 
[17.02] [14.36] [26.18] [18.03] [4.45] [27.86] [6.43] 
      Percent > $0 6.68 1.81 9.71 4.03 0.94 4.20 2.97 
   Prescribed medicines expenditures 463.68 93.48 742.72 106.90 24.22 280.24 151.64 
 
[15.21] [2.81] [28.75] [1.57] [0.64] [7.19] [4.49] 
      Percent > $0 69.05 44.62 84.81 35.54 19.56 56.81 36.21 
   Outpatient expenditures 111.11 23.53 164.04 45.19 15.00 74.87 44.45 
 
[3.92] [0.65] [20.67] [3.38] [0.32] [4.61] [0.79] 
      Percent > $0 9.79 2.94 11.97 4.46 1.61 6.98 4.08 
   Office-based provider expenditures 303.81 85.37 441.15 140.52 50.08 217.90 131.62 
 
[11.71] [5.03] [23.16] [6.06] [1.38] [10.24] [2.86] 
      Percent > $0 55.10 38.85 70.92 34.05 27.78 50.21 36.84 
   Home health expenditures 81.57 42.97 519.34 33.90 13.49 289.85 80.60 
 
[10] [7.5] [36.6] [3.07] [0.61] [19.86] [3.2] 
      Percent > $0 2.85 0.86 15.94 1.12 0.42 8.11 2.43 
   Dental expenditures 22.92 24.70 21.85 19.15 21.30 21.93 21.37 
 
[1.36] [1.09] [1.24] [0.51] [0.31] [1.3] [0.23] 
      Percent > $0 8.44 12.86 7.16 7.78 10.69 8.03 9.67 
   Other medical expenses 22.45 6.77 53.93 9.04 4.75 23.85 12.06 
 
[2.36] [0.16] [1.71] [0.46] [0.21] [0.9] [0.33] 
      Percent > $0 7.33 3.72 10.48 3.93 2.26 5.80 3.97 
(continued on next page) 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics for Medicaid enrollees, MEPS 1998-2007 (continued) 














Panel B - Person-quarter data (continued) 
     E.D., inpatient, and outpatient events for selected diseases  
(number of events with diagnosis code per quarter per 1,000 patients with the disease)* 




[7.19] [4.52] [7.35]       
  
[4.61] 




[13.67] [15.86] [7.91]       
  
[1.79] 




[3.34] [23.41] [15.01]       
  
[9.93] 




[1.47] [10.4] [3.58]       
  
[2.21] 




[15.4] [24.2] [6.88]        
  
[9.3] 
Medicaid Disease Management Coverage (percent of person-months)** 
      DM program or pilot in state/county 31.93 36.70 35.85 27.77 33.63 30.90 32.54 
   State/county has DM for Medicaid 23.90 31.59     18.46 28.11      22.26 
   State/county has DM for Medicaid*** 13.30 18.04     10.20 16.16      12.66 
   State/county has DM for Dual           2.50           1.20 0.26 
   DM matching disease/insurance 17.47 23.58 1.85                3.61 
   DM matching disease/insurance*** 11.65 16.41 1.71                2.50 
Source: Author's tabulations of MEPS data. Table presents unweighted means (or percentages, where noted) for 
MEPS respondents who receive Medicaid in at least one quarter (1998-2007). Standard errors (in brackets) are 
clustered by MEPS PSU. T-statistics (in parentheses) shown for test that the mean is equal to the mean of 
Medicaid adults with a chronic illness. Columns separate groups by Medicare coverage, aged less than 18 on 
December 31, and presence of a top-5 chronic disease (asthma, COPD, diabetes, CAD, and/or CHF).  The 
categories are mutually exclusive; I cut the sample by (1) having a chronic-illness, then by (2) dual-eligibility, 
then by (3) age group. (i.e., ―Medicaid adults‖ does not include dual eligibles.) *Hospital event rates are 
calculated as mean number of events per 1000 patients. The denominator is patients who are ever diagnosed with 
the disease or provide an affirmative answer to MEPS survey. **Disease Management data, from author's survey 
of Medicaid disease management programs, was merged with MEPS as described in text. Rows marked with 




Table 3: Weighted estimates of DM coverage, MEPS 1998-2007 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
  
Number of individuals matched to a DM program 
for their top-5 disease 
 
Percent of individuals 
with a top-5 disease  
Percent 
of  all 
Medicaid  













1998q1 22,518 0 0 22,518 
 
1.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 
1998q3 31,663 133,770 0 165,433 
 
1.7% 7.2% 0.0% 0.4% 
1998q4 46,645 157,023 0 203,668 
 
2.4% 8.5% 0.0% 0.5% 
1999q1 125,425 193,471 4,591 323,487 
 
4.5% 7.7% 0.2% 0.8% 
1999q2 125,425 225,181 4,591 355,197 
 
4.5% 9.0% 0.2% 0.9% 
1999q3 148,909 225,181 4,591 378,681 
 
5.4% 9.0% 0.2% 1.0% 
1999q4 145,970 211,642 0 357,612 
 
5.3% 8.5% 0.0% 0.9% 
2000q1 200,723 279,030 0 479,753 
 
5.1% 8.4% 0.0% 1.2% 
2000q2 299,256 267,497 0 566,753 
 
7.6% 8.0% 0.0% 1.4% 
2000q3 299,256 267,497 0 566,753 
 
7.6% 8.0% 0.0% 1.4% 
2000q4 315,328 305,026 0 620,354 
 
8.0% 9.1% 0.0% 1.5% 
2001q1 283,172 351,616 4,879 639,667 
 
6.6% 9.2% 0.1% 1.5% 
2001q2 310,483 342,635 4,879 657,997 
 
7.3% 9.0% 0.1% 1.5% 
2001q3 320,387 341,404 4,879 666,670 
 
7.5% 9.0% 0.1% 1.5% 
2001q4 261,739 316,503 4,879 583,121 
 
6.1% 8.3% 0.1% 1.3% 
2002q1 377,086 440,000 5,256 822,342 
 
7.7% 11.2% 0.1% 1.8% 
2002q2 389,163 549,516 1,753 940,432 
 
8.0% 14.0% 0.0% 2.0% 
2002q3 415,513 665,190 1,753 1,082,456 
 
8.5% 17.0% 0.0% 2.3% 
2002q4 522,927 659,509 79,834 1,262,270 
 
10.7% 16.8% 2.1% 2.7% 
2003q1 616,526 715,519 84,856 1,416,901 
 
12.4% 18.1% 2.1% 2.9% 
2003q2 619,718 758,543 107,951 1,486,212 
 
12.5% 19.1% 2.7% 3.0% 
2003q3 696,109 776,749 101,406 1,574,264 
 
14.0% 19.6% 2.5% 3.2% 
2003q4 697,312 763,388 96,221 1,556,921 
 
14.0% 19.3% 2.4% 3.2% 
2004q1 774,456 698,862 108,841 1,582,159 
 
15.1% 17.2% 2.6% 3.1% 
2004q2 742,326 727,153 121,642 1,591,121 
 
14.5% 17.9% 3.0% 3.1% 
2004q3 867,296 773,024 131,546 1,771,866 
 
16.9% 19.0% 3.2% 3.5% 
2004q4 971,680 957,376 92,222 2,021,278 
 
19.0% 23.5% 2.2% 4.0% 
2005q1 1,458,587 1,295,515 170,768 2,924,870 
 
28.4% 30.5% 3.9% 5.6% 
2005q2 1,502,030 1,323,694 163,429 2,989,153 
 
29.2% 31.1% 3.7% 5.7% 
2005q3 1,589,040 1,379,086 166,346 3,134,472 
 
30.9% 32.4% 3.8% 6.0% 
2005q4 1,498,182 1,503,211 164,568 3,165,961 
 
29.1% 35.4% 3.7% 6.0% 
2006q1 1,312,255 1,748,468 101,905 3,162,628 
 
28.0% 38.9% 2.4% 6.1% 
2006q2 1,444,931 1,804,262 109,399 3,358,592 
 
30.9% 40.1% 2.5% 6.4% 
2006q3 1,399,786 1,772,637 105,830 3,278,253 
 
29.9% 39.4% 2.4% 6.3% 
2006q4 1,271,745 1,745,100 105,830 3,122,675 
 
27.2% 38.8% 2.4% 6.0% 
2007q1 1,606,518 1,755,551 113,200 3,475,269 
 
34.2% 44.9% 2.7% 6.8% 
2007q2 1,615,744 1,743,875 78,739 3,438,358 
 
34.4% 44.6% 1.8% 6.7% 
2007q3 1,943,250 1,913,895 86,606 3,943,751 
 
41.4% 49.0% 2.0% 7.7% 
2007q4 1,787,473 1,890,496 78,619 3,756,588   38.0% 48.4% 1.8% 7.3% 
Source: Author's tabulations of MEPS data. Disease Management data, from author's survey of Medicaid disease 
management programs, was merged with MEPS as described in text. Columns 1 to 4 present estimates of the 
weighted number of people who are matched to a DM program using my      coverage variable (see text for 
details).  In the columns 5 to 7, I divide this by the number of individuals (in the respective) category who have a 
top-5 chronic condition. In column 8, I divide column 4 by the estimated number of people with Medicaid in the 




Table 4: Effect of Medicaid DM on quarterly health expenditures 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent variable  Total medical expenditures  Medical expenditures paid by Medicaid 
Panel A: Marginal effect from stage 1 of two-part model 
Marginal effect 0.0148* 0.0146* 0.0119 0.00459 0.0503*** 0.0488*** 0.0457*** 0.0396*** 
  [0.00875] [0.00882] [0.00890] [0.00997] [0.00867] [0.00875] [0.00887] [0.00968] 
ATET, stage 1 0.0111 0.0110 0.0089 0.0035 0.0429 0.0416 0.0388 0.0341 
Panel B: Marginal effect from stage 2 of two-part model 
Marginal effect -86.69 -99.79 -79.80 -163.1*** -8.520 -30.33 -4.296 -58.39 
  [60.02] [60.98] [52.16] [57.68] [54.46] [55.55] [44.68] [53.61] 
ATET, stage 2 -132.75 -157.00 -130.6 -266.90 -12.72 -47.16 -6.86 -90.76 
Panel C: Implied marginal effect in two-part model 
Marginal effect -33.46 -40.98 -32.95 -86.63  34.77 24.81 31.65 6.91  
ATET -97.29 -117.21 -98.08 -215.71 31.82 5.66 33.16 -34.38 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year * quarter FE Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes   Yes 
Panel FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State time trends   Yes     
 
Yes     
State * year FE     Yes       Yes   
Year FE      Yes       Yes   
Quarter of year FE     Yes       Yes   
DM Definition 
   
Strict  
   
Strict 
N of obs., stage 1 289,452 289,452 289,452 289,452 289,452 289,452 289,452 289,452 
N of individuals, stage 1 40,419 40,419 40,419 40,419 40,419 40,419 40,419 40,419 
N of obs., stage 2 155,901 155,901 155,901 155,901 123,371 123,371 123,371 123,371 
N of individuals, stage 2 36,618 36,618 36,618 36,618 33,730 33,730 33,730 33,730 
Notes: Panels A and B present marginal effects of DM on expenditures from two separate GLM regressions calculated as (i) the marginal effect (at the mean of the other 
independent variables) and (ii) the average treatment effect for the treated observations (ATET). The DM independent variable equals one if an observation is matched to 
a DM program in the individual‘s state/county based on their chronic disease(s) and insurance, and zero otherwise. In panel A, the regression estimates the effect of DM 
on                    using a Bernoulli distribution and a probit link function. In panel B, the regression estimates the effect of DM on                       using 
a gamma distribution and a log link function. Robust standard errors (in brackets) are based on exchangeable within-individual correlation structure. In addition to fixed 
effects, these models include dummies for gender; age; highest education completed; race/ethnicity; diagnosis/reporting of asthma, COPD, diabetes, chronic heart failure, 
and/or coronary arty disease; and insurance coverage by Medicaid and/or Medicare in the quarter. The data consists of all available quarterly observations for individuals 
in the MEPS, 1998-2007, who receive Medicaid in at least one quarter. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. 
 
Bootstrapped standard errors, after 125 iterations, for column 1 are [32.39] for the stage-1 ATET, [0.00703] for the stage-2 ATET, [87.59] for the combined marginal 
effect, and [72.41] for the combined ATET.  
 
Regression coefficients and marginal effects for all control variables are provided in Appendix Table B1 for columns 1, 3, 5, and 7. 
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Table 5: Effect of Medicaid DM on quarterly health expenditures, with disease-time 
controls 
  (1) (2)† (3)† (4) 
Dependent variable Total medical expenditures 
Panel A: Marginal effect from stage 1 of two-part model 
Marginal effect 0.000627 0.00260 0.00198 0.00395 
  [0.00945] [0.00953] [0.00950] [0.00953] 
ATET, stage 1 0.000464 0.00192 0.00147 0.00293 
Panel B: Marginal effect from stage 2 of two-part model 
Marginal effect -133.60** -91.32* -110.09* -105.29* 
  [65.17] [52.33] [56.43] [56.87] 
ATET, stage 2 -218.25 -146.50 -178.20 -171.20 
Panel C: Implied marginal effect in two-part model 
Marginal effect -74.44 -48.74 -59.88 -55.20 
ATET -182.1 -120.78 -147.61 -140.15 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year * quarter FE Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Panel FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Disease * insurance FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Disease time trends Yes 
   Year FE 
 
Yes 
  Qtr of Year FE 
 
Yes 
  Disease * year * quarter FE 
 
Yes 
  Disease * year FE 
  
Yes Yes 
Disease * qtr of year FE 
  
Yes Yes 
Insurance * year FE 
   
Yes 
N of obs., stage 1 289,452 289,452 289,452 289,452 
N of individuals, stage 1 40,419 40,419 40,419 40,419 
N of obs., stage 2 155,901 155,901 155,901 155,901 
N of individuals, stage 2 36,618 36,618 36,618 36,618 
Notes: Panels A and B present marginal effects of DM on expenditures from two separate GLM regressions 
calculated as (i) the marginal effect (at the mean of the other independent variables) and (ii) the average 
treatment effect for the treated observations (ATET). The DM independent variable equals one if an observation 
is matched to a DM program in the individual‘s state/county based on their chronic disease(s) and insurance, and 
zero otherwise. In panel A, the regression estimates the effect of DM on                    using a Bernoulli 
distribution and a probit link function. In panel B, the regression estimates the effect of DM on           
            using a gamma distribution and a log link function. Robust standard errors (in brackets) are based on 
exchangeable within-individual correlation structure. In addition to fixed effects, these models include dummies 
for gender; age; highest education completed; race/ethnicity; diagnosis/reporting of asthma, COPD, diabetes, 
chronic heart failure, and/or coronary arty disease; and insurance coverage by Medicaid and/or Medicare in the 
quarter. The data consists of all available quarterly observations for individuals in the MEPS, 1998-2007, who 




Table 6: Effect of Medicaid DM on quarterly health expenditures, with alternative data samples 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Dependent variable Total medical expenditures 
Panel A: Marginal effect from stage 1 of two-part model  
Marginal effect 0.0216* 0.00499 -0.0105 0.0139 -0.000912 0.0216* .00585 -.00320 .0106 
  [0.0128] [0.0121] [0.0137] [0.00942] [0.00731] [0.0128] [.00836] [.00944] [.00852] 
ATET, stage 1 0.0131 0.00369 -0.00776 0.0105 -0.000993 0.0131 .00477 -.00263 .00865 
Panel B: Marginal effect from stage 2 of two-part model  
Marginal effect -94.79 -51.61 -140.81*** -20.82 -135.85 -94.79 -173.84** -234.11*** -138.33* 
  [106.1] [51.73] [48.72] [49.73] [111.38] [106.14] [80.10] [72.87] [76.53] 
ATET, stage 2 -133.4 -85.39 -246.29 -32.15 -122.87 -133.42 -216.90 -301.43 -169.59 
Panel C: Implied marginal effect in two-part model  
Marginal effect -28.96 -27.25 -96.11 1.18 -111.89 -28.96 -113.20 -166.79 -82.54 
ATET -92.94 -70.18 -218.75 -16.25 -101.93 -92.94 -176.54 -253.58 -133.08 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year * quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Disease * insurance FE 
 
  
    
Yes Yes Yes 
Disease * year FE 
        
Yes 
Disease * qtr of year FE 
        
Yes 
Insurance * year FE 




































    
Strict  
N of obs., stage 1 122,972 140,480 140,480 226,132 69,684 122,972 479,376 479,376 479,376 
N of individuals, stage 1 17,353 19,867 19,867 31,599 9,503 17,353 66,423 66,423 66,423 
N of obs., stage 2 81,634 81,451 81,451 126,242 53,230 81,634 308,812 308,812 308,812 
N of individuals, stage 2 15,873 18,178 18,178 28,922 9,286 15,873 61,884 61,884 61,884 
Notes: Panels A and B present marginal effects of DM on expenditures from two separate GLM regressions calculated as (i) the marginal effect (at the mean of the other 
independent variables) and (ii) the average treatment effect for the treated observations (ATET). The DM independent variable equals one if an observation is matched to 
a DM program in the individual‘s state/county based on their chronic disease(s) and insurance, and zero otherwise.        for non-Medicaid observations. In panel A, 
the regression estimates the effect of DM on                    using a Bernoulli distribution and a probit link function. In panel B, the regression estimates the effect 
of DM on                       using a gamma distribution and a log link function. Robust standard errors (in brackets) are based on exchangeable within-individual 
correlation structure. In addition to fixed effects, these models include dummies for gender; age; highest education completed; race/ethnicity; diagnosis/reporting of 
asthma, COPD, diabetes, chronic heart failure, and/or coronary arty disease; and insurance coverage by Medicaid and/or Medicare in the quarter. The data consists of 




Table 7: Effect of Medicaid DM on quarterly health expenditures, additional robustness checks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Model OLS (regression coefficients)  GLM (marginal effect at mean) 
Dependent Variable                                                                                
DM  -56.48 0.0348*** -98.49 .01275 -82.63 -.0002658 .0066172* 
 [68.77] [0.00728] [92.21] [.01114] [67.34] [.00136] [.00381] 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year * quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MEPS survey weights    Yes Yes   
GLM link function    Probit Log Probit Probit 
GLM error distribution    Bernoulli Gamma Bernoulli Bernoulli 
N of obs. 289,452 289,452 289,452 289,452 289,452 289,452 289,452 
N of individuals 40,419 40,419 40,419 40,419 40,419 40,419 40,419 
Notes: This table presents the effects of DM on total medical expenditures (   ). The DM independent variable equals one if an observation is matched to a DM program 
in the individual‘s state/county based on their chronic disease(s) and insurance, and zero otherwise. Columns (1) and (2) present regression coefficients (and roust 
standard errors, clustered by individual, in brackets) from a simple OLS regression. Columns (4) thru (7) present the marginal effect (at the mean of the other independent 
variables) from a GLM model. Robust standard errors (in brackets) are based on exchangeable within-individual correlation structure and the link functions and error 
distributions are indicated in the table. In addition to fixed effects, all regressions include dummies for gender; age; highest education completed; race/ethnicity; 
diagnosis/reporting of asthma, COPD, diabetes, chronic heart failure, and/or coronary arty disease; and insurance coverage by Medicaid and/or Medicare in the quarter. 




Table 8: Effect of Medicaid DM on quarterly health expenditures, OLS models with additional arrays of fixed effects as control variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
DM -56.48 -127.2 -76.77 -80.74 -65.38 -94.94 -93.99 -90.47 -109.2 69.22 
 [68.77] [85.41] [70.00] [70.37] [73.34] [75.65] [74.57] [73.21] [72.52] [122.4] 
State FE Yes Yes   Yes      
State-year FE   Yes     Yes   
State-year-quarter FE    Yes  Yes Yes    
Disease-insurance FE     Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Disease-year-quarter FE     Yes Yes Yes    
Disease-year FE         Yes  
Disease-quarter of year FE        Yes  
Insurance-year-quarter FE      Yes    
Disease-insurance-year FE       Yes  Yes 
State-insurance-year FE         Yes Yes 
State-disease-year FE          Yes 
Year-quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample  
Contin. 
enrolled         
N of obs. 289,452 140,480 289,452 289,452 289,452 289,452 289,452 289,452 289,452 289,452 
N of individuals 40,419 19867 40,419 40,419 40,419 40,419 40,419 40,419 40,419 40,419 
Notes: This table presents OLS regression coefficients for the effect of DM on total medical expenditures. The DM independent variable equals one if an observation is 
matched to a DM program in the individual‘s state/county based on their chronic disease(s) and insurance, and  zero otherwise. Robust standard errors (in brackets) are 
clustered at the individual level. In addition to fixed effects (shown), all regressions include dummies for gender; age; highest education completed; race/ethnicity; 
diagnosis/reporting of asthma, COPD, diabetes, chronic heart failure, and/or coronary arty disease; and insurance coverage by Medicaid and/or Medicare in the quarter. 





Table 9: Effect of Medicaid DM on quarterly health expenditures, by DM target disease 
 (1) (2)† (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable Total medical expenditures 
Panel A: Marginal effect from stage 1 of two-part model 
DM 0.104*** 0.102*** 0.103*** 0.0924** 
 [0.0393] [0.0383] [0.0380] [.0371] 
Asthma DM -0.116*** -0.111*** -0.113*** -.102 
 [0.0426] [0.0416] [0.0413] [.0489] 
COPD DM 0.0342 0.0266 0.0281  .0387 
 [0.0806] [0.0770] [0.0765] [.0735] 
Diabetes DM -0.0593 -0.0593 -0.0614 -.0576 
 [0.0464] [0.0460] [0.0456] [.0516] 
CHF DM -0.0397 -0.0370 -0.0365 -.0508 
 [0.0423] [0.0413] [0.0409] [.0463] 
CAD DM -0.0966 -0.0860 -0.0881 -.0993 
 [0.0617] [0.0635] [0.0621] [.0681] 
Panel B: Marginal effect from stage 2 of two-part model 
DM -255.99** -260.28 -277.6** -329.53** 
 [108.75] [95.73] [109.4] [142.85] 
Asthma DM 97.75 170.76 176.1 160.33 
 [176.3] [152.16] [181.0] [236.78] 
COPD DM 222.35 320.54 146.3 205.70 
 [301.35] [307.96] [293.3] [414.06] 
Diabetes DM 330.09 352.56 367.0* 387.31 
 [206.17] [175.29] [217.4] [272.85] 
CHF DM 13.90 31.91 28.91 48.97 
 [114.9] [111.13] [115.6] [147.91] 
CAD DM 56.64 45.51 78.68 123.22 
 [202.15] [182.31] [201.4] [257.84] 
Panel C: Implied marginal effect in two-part model 
DM -37.46 -43.05 -51.78 -109.84   
Asthma DM -63.66 -16.79 -15.56 -20.46 
COPD DM 159.79 207.22 110.7 192.83 
Diabetes DM 125.02 138.30 144.0 194.89 
CHF DM -32.69 -19.47 -20.77 -31.57 
CAD DM -66.68 -61.50 -45.17 -42.44 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year * quarter FE Yes  Yes Yes 
Panel FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Disease * insurance FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Disease time trends Yes    
Year FE  Yes   
Qtr of Year FE  Yes   
Disease * year * quarter 
FE  Yes   
Disease * year FE   Yes Yes 
Disease * qtr of year FE   Yes Yes 




N of obs., stage 1 289,452 289,452 289,452 479,376 
N of individuals, stage 1 40,419 40,419 40,419 66,423 
N of obs., stage 2 155,901 155,901 155,901 308,812 
N of individuals, stage 2 36,618 36,618 36,618 61,884 
Notes: Panels A and B present marginal effects of DM (at the mean) on expenditures from two separate GLM 
regressions. The DM independent variable equals one if an observation is matched to a DM program in the individual‘s 
state/county based on their chronic disease(s) and insurance, and zero otherwise. The ―X DM‖ variable equals one if 
this match between the individual‘s disease and a program‘s target disease was for disease ―X‖ (―DM‖ equals one 
whenever one of the disease-specific variables equal one). Aside from fixed effects (shown above) and data sample, the 
models and control variables are the same as in Table 4. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. †Convergence in stage-2 with 
lower precision. 
 
Net treatment effects for each of the diseases are plotted in Figure 9. 
 
 
Table 10: Effect of Medicaid DM on quarterly health expenditures on dual eligibles and 
comorbid enrollees 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent Variable Total medical expenditures  
Panel A: Marginal effect from stage 1 of two-part model  
DM * Comorbidity 0.0135 †  -0.0268 †    
 [0.0319]   [.0327]     
DM  0.00937 0.01533*  0.00287 [0.00220] 0.0149* 0.00231 







  [0.0171]       
DM ≥2 diseases    -0.00920   -0.0348   
   [0.0366]   [0.0364]   
DM * Dual-eligible        † † 
         
Panel B: Marginal effect from stage 2 of two-part model  
DM * Comorbidity 19.71 †  0.71 †    
 [113.2]   [97.60]     
DM  -118.8* -109.95*  -125.67** -127.15** -90.31 -120.58** 
  [67.87] [60.18]  [63.94] [58.99] [61.99] [58.42] 
Comorbidity  -58.50       
  [85.02]       
DM ≥2 diseases    181.68   197.97   
   [169.20]   [151.41]   
DM * Dual-eligible        † † 
         
Panel C: Implied marginal effect in two-part model  
DM * Comorbidity 24.79 †  -26.80 †    
DM  -56.89 -45.89  -67.71 -69.22 -35.31 -65.44 
Comorbidity  -124.1       
DM ≥2 diseases    92.32   75.92   
DM * Dual-eligible        † † 
ATET, stage 1 0.00414 0.0101† -0.00269‡ -0.00817 -0.00867† -0.0103‡ -0.00428† -0.00486 
ATET, stage 2 69.63 487.4† 603.7‡ 2.70 432.18† 678.26‡ 313.04† 763.66 
ATET 78.03 491.0† 565.20‡ -21.90 382.41† 611.76‡ 285.26† 717.09 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year * quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE for comorbid     Yes Yes Yes   
Disease * insurance FE    Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Disease-Year FE    Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Disease-Qtr of Year FE    Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
N of obs., stage 1 289,452 289,452 289,452 289,452 289,452 289,452 289,452 289,452 
N of ind., stage 1 40,419 40,419 40,419 40,419 40,419 40,419 40,419 40,419 
N of obs., stage 2 155,901 155,901 155,901 155,901 155,901 155,901 155,901 155,901 
N of ind., stage 2 36,618 36,618 36,618 36,618 36,618 36,618 36,618 36,618 
Notes: Panels A and B present marginal effects of DM (at the mean) on expenditures from two separate GLM 
regressions. The DM independent variable equals one if an observation is matched to a DM program in the 
individual‘s state/county based on their chronic disease(s) and insurance, and zero otherwise. Aside from fixed 
effects (shown above) and data sample, the models and control variables are the same as in Table 4. ***p<0.01, 
**p<0.05, *p<0.10.  
†For interaction- term treatment variable, average incremental effects on the treated calculated according to the 
formula in footnote 35.  ‡ATET for the ―DM ≥2 diseases‖ variable. 
 
 
Table 11: Effect of Medicaid DM on quarterly health expenditures (all payers), by type of service 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
























Panel A: Marginal effect from stage 1 of two-part model 
Marginal effect 0.00505 0.0270*** 0.00184 -0.00118 0.00190 0.00288** 0.00180 0.00369** 
  [0.00732] [0.00849] [0.00239] [0.00130] [0.00203] [0.00137] [0.00388] [0.00188] 
ATET, stage 1 0.00498 0.0239 0.00304 -0.00246 0.00318 0.00667 0.00206 0.00595 
Panel B: Marginal effect from stage 2 of two-part model 
Marginal effect -19.95 7.01 18.75 -241.6 33.25 1,040** 3.38 6.76 
  [15.44] [9.167] [31.15] [769.7] [125.2] [494.8] [12.94] [24.61] 
ATET, stage 2 -26.35 13.17 18.72 -210.2 35.29 834.9 3.47 6.44 
Panel C: Implied marginal effect in two-part model 
Marginal effect -5.75 8.96 1.74 -14.64 2.69 15.51 0.64 1.07 
ATET -13.36 17.91 3.45 -30.80 5.69 40.89 0.82 2.14 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year * quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N of obs., stage 1 289,452 289,452 289,452 289,452 289,452 289,452 289,452 289,452 
N of individuals, stage 1 40,419 40,419 40,419 40,419 40,419 40,419 40,419 40,419 
N of obs., stage 2 106,647 104,811 15,929 8,592 11,809 7,032 27,989 11,482 
N of individuals, stage 2 32,474 28,195 11,121 6,482 6,935 2,079 15,436 8,339 
Notes: Panels A and B present marginal effects of DM on expenditures from two separate GLM regressions calculated as (i) the marginal effect (at the mean of the other 
independent variables) and (ii) the average treatment effect for the treated observations (ATET). The DM independent variable equals one if an observation is matched to 
a DM program in the individual‘s state/county based on their chronic disease(s) and insurance, and zero otherwise.  In panel A, the regression estimates the effect of DM 
on                    using a Bernoulli distribution and a probit link function. In panel B, the regression estimates the effect of DM on                       using 
a gamma distribution and a log link function. Robust standard errors (in brackets) are based on exchangeable within-individual correlation structure. In addition to fixed 
effects, these models include dummies for gender; age; highest education completed; race/ethnicity; diagnosis/reporting of asthma, COPD, diabetes, chronic heart failure, 
and/or coronary arty disease; and insurance coverage by Medicaid and/or Medicare in the quarter. The data consists of all available quarterly observations for individuals 
in the MEPS, 1998-2007, who receive Medicaid in at least one quarter. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. 
 
This analysis is replicated with the strict DM definition in Appendix Table B2. 
 
 
Table 12: Effect of Medicaid DM on quarterly health expenditures paid by Medicaid, by type of service 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
























Panel A: Marginal effect from stage 1 of two-part model 
Marginal effect 0.0145** 0.0540*** 0.00142 -0.000215 0.00164 0.00256** 0.00109 0.00170 
  [0.00640] [0.00748] [0.00182] [0.00104] [0.00144] [0.00114] [0.00280] [0.00114] 
ATET, stage 1 0.0172 0.0648 0.00303 -0.000552 0.00370 0.00780 0.00163 0.00404 
Panel B: Marginal effect from stage 2 of two-part model 
Marginal effect 8.92 8.82 27.15 528.0 6.37 1,317*** 3.90 -2.68 
  [11.79] [9.584] [22.66] [512.6] [65.66] [481.0] [9.882] [24.06] 
ATET, stage 2 12.63 16.15 33.54 700.5 7.65 1,111 4.40 -2.89 
Panel C: Implied marginal effect in two-part model 
Marginal effect 5.17 12.72 1.30 6.05 1.014 12.37 0.37 0.32 
ATET 11.37 32.45 4.32 27.91 2.90 47.68 0.72 0.97 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year * quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N of obs., stage 1 289,452 289,452 289,452 289,452 289,452 289,452 289,452 289,452 
N of individuals, stage 1 40,419 40,419 40,419 40,419 40,419 40,419 40,419 40,419 
N of obs., stage 2 79,491 73,674 12,193 7,036 8,613 4,911 20,748 6,929 
N of individuals, stage 2 27,727 23,340 8,843 5,499 5,354 1,566 12,252 5,400 
Notes: Panels A and B present marginal effects of DM on expenditures from two separate GLM regressions calculated as (i) the marginal effect (at the mean of the other 
independent variables) and (ii) the average treatment effect for the treated observations (ATET). The DM independent variable equals one if an observation is matched to 
a DM program in the individual‘s state/county based on their chronic disease(s) and insurance, and zero otherwise. In panel A, the regression estimates the effect of DM 
on                    using a Bernoulli distribution and a probit link function. In panel B, the regression estimates the effect of DM on                       using 
a gamma distribution and a log link function. Robust standard errors (in brackets) are based on exchangeable within-individual correlation structure. In addition to fixed 
effects, these models include dummies for gender; age; highest education completed; race/ethnicity; diagnosis/reporting of asthma, COPD, diabetes, chronic heart failure, 
and/or coronary arty disease; and insurance coverage by Medicaid and/or Medicare in the quarter. The data consists of all available quarterly observations for individuals 
in the MEPS, 1998-2007, who receive Medicaid in at least one quarter. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. 
 
 This analysis is replicated with the strict DM definition in Appendix Table B3. 
 
 
Table 13: Effect of Medicaid DM on the number of medical events 



































Panel A: Marginal effect from stage 1 of two-part model  
Marginal effect 0.00568 0.0270*** 0.00182 -0.00114 0.00162*** 0.00150 -.00143 0.000350 -0.000767 
  [0.00736] [0.00849] [0.00247] [0.00133] [0.000530] [0.00276] [.00176] [0.00254] [0.00275] 
ATET, stage 1 0.00550 0.0239 0.00296 -0.00237 0.00955 0.00154 -.00208 0.000368 -0.000794 
Panel B: Marginal effect from stage 2 of two-part model  
Marginal effect -0.0323 0.186** 0.0314 0.00240 0.0916 0.0916 .152 -0.116 -0.199** 
  [0.0958] [0.0786] [0.0283] [0.0245] [0.117] [0.117] [.124] [0.0884] [0.0933] 
ATET, stage 2 -0.0373 0.262 0.0317 0.00236 0.0781 0.0781 .122 -0.112 -0.195 
Panel C: Implied marginal effect in two-part model  
Marginal effect 0.00130 0.171 0.00381 -0.00126 0.00289 0.00532 .00101 -0.00172 -0.00490 
ATET -0.00690 0.293 0.00701 -0.00261 0.0178 0.00552 .00195 -0.00195 -0.00522 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year * quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Disease * insurance FE   
    
Yes 








DM Definition   




N of obs., stage 1 289,452 289,452 289,452 289,452 289,452 69,684 259,608 44,424 44,424 
N of individuals, stage 1 40,419 40,419 40,419 40,419 40,419 9,503 35,507 6,018 6,018 
N of obs., stage 2 111,288 104,811 17,044 8,720 2,884 2,884 8,140 1,184 1,184 
N of individuals, stage 2 33,067 28,195 11,683 6,555 1,794 1,794 5,229 777 777 
Notes: Panels A and B present marginal effects of DM on the number of events from two separate GLM regressions calculated as (i) the marginal effect (at the mean of 
the other independent variables) and (ii) the average treatment effect for the treated observations (ATET). The DM independent variable equals one if an observation is 
matched to a DM program in the individual‘s state/county based on their chronic disease(s) and insurance, and zero otherwise.  In panel A, the regression estimates the 
effect of DM on                    using a Bernoulli distribution and a probit link function. In panel B, the regression estimates the effect of DM on           
            using a negative binomial distribution and a log link function. Robust standard errors (in brackets) are based on exchangeable within-individual correlation 
structure. In addition to fixed effects, these models include dummies for gender; age; highest education completed; race/ethnicity; diagnosis/reporting of asthma, COPD, 
diabetes, chronic heart failure, and/or coronary arty disease (the ―top-5‖ diseases); and insurance coverage by Medicaid and/or Medicare in the quarter. The data consists 
of quarterly observations for individuals in the MEPS, 1998-2007. In columns (1) through (8), the data is limited to those who receive Medicaid in at least one quarter 
(and meet the criteria in the table‘s ―Data Sample‖ row, if applicable). Column (9) adds to this data sample any individual with a top-5 chronic disease, regardless of 
insurance. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. 
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Table 14: Effect of Medicaid DM on quarterly health expenditures for individuals with 
variation in DM coverage during MEPS survey 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Conditional logit  OLS 
Model                            
Dependent Variable        Total medical expenditures 
      0.0464  0.0683*  
 [0.0649]  [0.0409]  
month DM begins,           -0.0499  0.132** 
  [0.105]  [0.0588] 
1 month after DM begins,           0.297**  0.0382 
  [0.115]  [0.0638] 
2 months after DM begins,           0.192  0.0828 
  [0.127]  [0.0707] 
3 months after DM begins,           0.296**  0.0918 
  [0.141]  [0.0806] 
4 months after DM begins,           -0.0324  0.0672 
  [0.175]  [0.0984] 
5 months after DM begins,           0.517**  0.0981 
  [0.219]  [0.124] 
6 months after DM begins,           -0.156  0.306* 
  [0.282]  [0.177] 
Year * quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N of obs. 209,020 209,020 155,901 155,901 
N of individuals 28,789 28,789 36,618 36,618 
Notes: Table presents regression coefficients for the effect of DM on quarterly total medical expenditures, 
controlling for individual fixed effects. In columns (1) and (3), the DM independent variable equals one if an 
observation is matched to a DM program in the individual‘s state/county based on their chronic disease(s) and 
insurance, and zero otherwise. In columns (2) and (4), the dummy variables identify the number of months since 
DM was introduced to the individual; the coefficients reflect the change in expenditures relative to the period 
before the introduction of DM. Robust standard errors (in brackets). The data consists of all available quarterly 
observations for individuals in the MEPS, 1998-2007, who receive Medicaid in at least one quarter. This base 
sample is composed of 289,452 individuals. There are 10,348 observations for people who experience variation 
in DM while they are in the MEPS. The conditional logit model excludes individuals for whom quarterly 
expenditures are always zero or always positive during the survey and the OLS model excludes observations 
with zero expenditures. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. 
 
The coefficients from columns (2) and (4) are plotted in Figure 10. 
 
120 
Table 15: GEC program eligibility October 2005 through December 2006 
 











GEC In GEC 
Not In 
GEC 
Before Oct-05 - - - - 69,831 - 69,831 
Oct-05 47,655 - - - 22,176 47,655 22,176 
Nov-05 2 0 47,594 61 22,174 47,596 22,235 
Dec-05 1 0 43,142 4,454 22,234 43,143 26,688 
Jan-06 2,682 2,690 42,253 890 21,316 47,625 22,206 
Feb-06 636 366 46,760 865 21,204 47,762 22,069 
Mar-06 944 179 46,702 1,060 20,946 47,825 22,006 
Apr-06 744 237 46,946 879 21,025 47,927 21,904 
May-06 130 37 46,362 1,565 21,737 46,529 23,302 
Jun-06 1,993 975 45,453 1,076 20,334 48,421 21,410 
Jul-06 2,924 341 47,067 1,354 18,145 50,332 19,499 
Aug-06 791 316 48,408 1,924 18,392 49,515 20,316 
Sep-06 915 906 47,491 2,024 18,495 49,312 20,519 
Oct-06 830 974 48,248 1,064 18,715 50,052 19,779 
Nov-06 759 312 48,958 1,094 18,708 50,029 19,802 
Dec-06 128 88 43,551 6,478 19,586 43,767 26,064 
Jan-07 6,602 11,465 42,714 1,053 7,997 60,781 9,050 
Feb-07 470 390 60,071 710 8,190 60,931 8,900 
Mar-07 491 324 60,500 431 8,085 61,315 8,516 
Apr-07 416 297 60,845 470 7,803 61,558 8,273 
May-07 247 210 60,968 590 7,816 61,425 8,406 
Jun-07 250 268 60,757 668 7,888 61,275 8,556 
Jul-07 43 307 61,062 213 8,206 61,412 8,419 
Aug-07 14 204 60,538 874 8,201 60,756 9,075 
Sep-07 15 457 60,349 407 8,603 60,821 9,010 
Oct-07 19 319 60,504 317 8,672 60,842 8,989 
Nov-07 12 200 60,310 532 8,777 60,522 9,309 
Dec-07 10 274 60,400 122 9,025 60,684 9,147 
Notes: Author's calculations for 69,831 individuals listed in the GEC program‘s eligibility files, October 2005 
through December 2007. 
 
121 
Table 16: GEC program DM interventions, by risk group 
Risk Level Intervention 
Low  Ongoing claims monitoring and risk stratification 
 Non-clinical staff "Welcome Call," health history and periodic health review 
calls to monitor status 
 Initial Intake Assessment 
 Access to 24-hour ―1-800‖  nurse phone line, program web site; some health 
information materials by mail 
Moderate All low-intensity interventions as well as: 
 Interventions by telephonic nurse care managers 
 1-2 phone calls each month to physician‘s office or the patient with visits to 
the home or hospital as needed for education, personal coaching and 
monitoring 
 Reporting of vital signs and symptoms to the case/disease manager and 
appropriate nurse follow-up 
 Educational mailing 
High All low and moderate-intensity interventions as well as: 
 Individually assigned locally based nurse care managers for interventions, 
monitoring, and ongoing care 
 One or more home visits each quarter or more than 2 phone calls to the 
physician‘s office or the member each month, for education, personal 
coaching and monitoring 
 Personalized training in managing chronic disease 
Source: Georgia Department of Community Health RFP (2005); response to RFP by United HealthCare Services 
(2005); the related contract between the parties (2005), and personal communication with program staff 
(Abraham et al. 2007). 
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Table 17: Selection of primary estimation sample: number of individuals in data and 
estimation sample 
Sample selection process for baseline specifications N 
Initial Sample 69,884 
- Low risk category 
   (October 2005 to January 2006 -and- June to July 2006) - 39,468 
- Ineligible 
   (October 2005 to January 2006 -or- June to July 2006) - 12,619 
- Major health event April-June 2006 (or "false switch") -448 




Table 18: Selection of primary estimation sample: number of individuals by risk group 
assignment in pre/post period 
Initial Risk 
Group  
Risk group after  
switch (June/July 2006)  
(by Jan. 2006) No Switch Moderate High Total 
Low/Other  x  2,507  1,663 4,170 
Moderate 9,522  x  1,286 10,808 
High 2,371  x   x  2,371 
Ineligible x x x x 
Total 11,893 2,507 2,949 17,349 




Table 19: GEC program summary statistics 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Initial risk group  

















Panel A: Individual-level characteristics 
Number of individuals 2,371 1,388 1,286 9,522 1,713 34,060 19,457 69,797 
Percent female 65.8% 65.7% 69.0% 62.2% 59.3% 50.7% 50.7% 53.6% 
Percent under 18 years 18.9% 17.6% 6.5% 7.5% 11.9% 34.0% 28.9% 27.1% 
Mean age 36.8 35.0 40.7 45.8 42.7 31.9 33.9 35.0 
 
[0.38] [0.46] [0.39] [0.16] [0.41] [0.11] [0.15] [0.07] 
Percent with chronic condition 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 98.7% 74.5% 92.3% 
Mean number of chronic  14.9 15.2 16.8 13.1 12.9 9.1 7.1 9.6 
conditions [0.10] [0.11] [0.12] [0.05] [0.11] [0.03] [0.04] [0.02] 
Percent with:  
        1 chronic condition 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.7% 4.6% 1.6% 
2 to 4 chronic conditions 1.6% 0.1% 0.2% 3.4% 2.9% 16.6% 10.3% 11.6% 
5+ chronic conditions 98.4% 99.9% 99.8% 96.5% 97.1% 81.4% 59.6% 79.1% 
Percent with one or more "top-
5" conditions 72.3% 70.3% 83.8% 78.9% 80.7% 42.1% 39.1% 49.6% 
Percent with other high-cost 
condition 78.5% 74.4% 96.6% 78.0% 71.2% 53.0% 45.0% 56.7% 
Panel B: Baseline period health outcomes – January to September 2005 
Mean monthly health  1,765 1,677 1,915 1,062 759.6 550.1 1,257 868.7 
expend. ($) [58.94] [108.7] [66.04] [22.88] [25.63] [9.30] [44.31] [10.3] 
Percent with expend. > 0 98.9% 98.5% 99.4% 99.0% 97.6% 97.6% 94.5% 97.5% 
Mean monthly E.D.  247.6 178 328.3 109.1 61.19 30.96 124.1 80.3 
expend. ($) [2.34] [17.35] [6.52] [22.68] [9.60] [22.93] [9.12] [2.50] 
Admission days, per month 0.58 0.76 0.71 0.25 0.18 0.12 0.47 0.25 
 
[0.036] [0.075] [0.037] [0.010] [0.020] [0.006] [0.026] [0.006] 
Inpatient/E.R. events per 1000 patients, per month 
Asthma 8.61 12.41 16.96 8.24 11.64 3.76 8.02 6.19 
COPD 3.91 3.86 9.60 5.21 2.78 0.86 2.14 2.32 
Diabetes 6.07 5.13 14.91 9.05 8.05 1.44 5.28 4.20 
CAD 4.67 2.66 7.43 7.44 7.00 0.95 4.54 3.19 
Heart Failure 4.27 4.30 10.14 7.82 5.10 0.95 5.77 3.47 
Mean no. of unique  2.81 2.02 3.63 3.55 2.53 1.41 1.33 1.95 
prescriptions [0.059] [0.063] [0.087] [0.031] [0.068] [0.012] [0.024] [0.011] 
Mean no. of unique  3.18 2.84 3.34 2.04 1.84 1.57 2.38 1.93 
providers [0.046] [0.050] [0.055] [0.015] [0.032] [0.007] [0.023] [0.007] 
(Table continued on next page) 
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Table 19: GEC program summary statistics (continued) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Initial risk group  

















Panel C: Initial treatment period health outcomes – October 2005 to June 2006 
Mean monthly health  1,318 1,102 1,743 960.4 817.1 386.9 1,386 748.7 
expend. ($) [40.42] [43.62] [61.67] [16.96] [23.61] [5.41] [41.01] [8.91] 
Percent with expend. > 0 80.2% 81.7% 89.4% 84.5% 83.1% 58.1% 80.3% 68.9% 
Mean monthly E.D.  178.6 161.7 283.7 92.9 91.2 27.2 133.1 72.5 
expend. ($) [1.66] [16.14] [5.34] [19.13] [12.83] [18.24] [7.74] [2.10] 
Admission days, per month 0.35 0.30 0.49 0.18 0.15 0.06 0.59 0.20 
 
[0.029] [0.023] [0.026] [0.008] [0.011] [0.003] [0.024] [0.005] 
Inpatient/E.R. events per 1000 patients, per month 
Asthma 8.20 14.18 13.56 7.54 9.42 2.46 6.67 4.92 
COPD 4.05 4.75 9.50 4.00 2.94 0.72 3.14 2.13 
Diabetes 6.02 4.18 10.97 7.89 6.41 1.13 4.95 3.48 
CAD 2.60 3.60 4.84 4.93 6.42 0.88 4.32 2.50 
Heart Failure 3.28 6.28 12.97 7.21 6.74 0.70 7.83 3.65 
Mean no. of prescriptions  3.33 2.64 4.37 4.33 3.57 1.63 1.40 2.20 
 
[0.068] [0.074] [0.103] [0.036] [0.074] [0.013] [0.021] [0.011] 
Mean no. of unique  2.93 2.85 3.47 2.24 2.19 1.41 2.22 1.84 
providers [0.047] [0.048] [0.054] [0.016] [0.031] [0.006] [0.019] [0.006] 
Panel D: Later treatment period health outcomes – July 2006 to December 2007 
Mean monthly health  897.8 735.2 1,406 818.1 626.7 292.6 426.5 461.5 
expend. ($) [31.43] [31.17] [54.88] [14.60] [19.67] [3.76] [9.76] [4.32] 
Percent with expend. > 0 64.0% 65.9% 76.9% 70.5% 68.6% 45.0% 33.7% 47.5% 
Mean monthly E.D.  111.1 102.1 231.1 84.82 55.89 21.39 48.76 47.39 
expend. ($) [8.99] [12.07] [17.37] [4.24] [5.90] [1.02] [2.30] [1.14] 
Admission days, per  0.27 0.19 0.47 0.21 0.13 0.06 0.14 0.12 
month [0.019] [0.017] [0.030] [0.009] [0.011] [0.002] [0.005] [0.002] 
Inpatient/E.R. events per 1000 patients, per month 
Asthma 5.65 6.96 11.33 5.35 4.28 1.71 2.26 2.85 
COPD 3.70 4.35 6.91 3.56 2.41 0.63 1.51 1.63 
Diabetes 5.19 2.38 8.93 6.83 4.86 0.90 1.86 2.41 
CAD 2.41 2.78 4.91 4.93 3.93 0.86 1.69 1.90 
Heart Failure 2.93 2.50 6.73 6.57 3.59 0.66 2.43 2.27 
Mean no. of prescriptions  2.77 2.43 4.02 3.77 3.34 1.40 1.06 1.79 
 
[0.068] [0.077] [0.105] [0.038] [0.078] [0.013] [0.014] [0.010] 
Mean no. of unique  1.92 1.83 2.46 1.59 1.43 0.84 0.89 1.06 
providers [0.042] [0.043] [0.053] [0.015] [0.029] [0.006] [0.010] [0.005] 
Table provides summary statistics on demographic and health outcomes. Columns indicate the patient‘s 
classification into High, Moderate, and Low risk categories by January 2005, and if they were reclassified in July 
2006 when the administrative error (described in the text) was fixed. Total medical expenditures exclude DM 
program fees. Standard errors in brackets. 
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Table 20: Normalized differences between columns in summary statistics Table 19 
Comparison between groups:  
Switch  




Mod. to High  
vs.  
Initially High  
Switch  
Low to Mod. 
vs.  
Initially Mod.  
(columns) (2) – (1) (3) - (1) (5) - (4) 
Panel A: Individual Characteristics    
Percent Female -0.001 0.048 -0.043 
Percent under 18 years -0.024 -0.258 0.105 
Age -0.074 0.165 -0.135 
Percent with a chronic condition* 0 0 0.014 
Mean number of chronic conditions 0.048 0.269 -0.028 
Percent with:    
 1 chronic condition -0.021 -0.021 -0.001 
2 to 4 chronic conditions -0.109 -0.107 -0.023 
5 or more chronic conditions 0.110 0.109 0.024 
Percent with one or more ―top-5‖ conditions -0.031 0.195 0.032 
Percent with other high-cost condition -0.069 0.373 -0.111 
Panel B: Baseline health outcomes - January to September 2005 
Mean monthly health expend. ($) -0.018 0.040 -0.123 
Percent with positive expenditures -0.041 0.068 -0.105 
Mean E.R. expend. ($) -0.058 0.069 -0.065 
Admission days, per month 0.055 0.058 -0.060 
Inpatient/E.R. events per 1000 patients, per month   
Asthma 0.033 0.082 0.036 
COPD -0.001 0.085 -0.050 
Diabetes -0.015 0.092 -0.012 
CAD -0.046 0.050 -0.006 
Heart Failure 0.001 0.078 -0.036 
Mean number of unique prescriptions -0.209 0.192 -0.246 
Mean number of unique providers -0.115 0.057 -0.098 
Table provides normalized differences between selected columns in Panels A and B of Table 19. Differences 
with an absolute value greater than 0.25 are in bold. *All individuals ever assigned to the high risk group have at 
least one chronic condition. 
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Table 21: GEC program DM interventions in the initial treatment period, October 2005 to 
June 2006 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Initial risk group  

















Percent with:        
Initial intake  
assessment 
73.4% 35.2% 46.2% 27.2% 18.3% 23.2% 6.9% 23.4% 
Comprehensive 
assessment  
44.0% 12.5% 34.1% 17.0% 4.9% 0.6% 1.2% 6.0% 
Mean number of tasks*         
Total completed  5.33 2.71 4.81 2.49 1.06 1.01 0.25 1.39 
 [0.173] [0.141] [0.218] [0.056] [0.086] [0.014] [0.012] [0.016] 
Task via field visit 0.05 0.01 0.18 0.09 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 
 [0.010] [0.004] [0.017] [0.004] [0.002] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] 
Task with provider 0.46 0.25 0.44 0.22 0.11 0.08 0.02 0.12 
 [0.027] [0.020] [0.031] [0.007] [0.013] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] 
Completed non- 3.14 1.38 2.81 1.46 0.60 0.53 0.16 0.78 
  assessment calls [0.108] [0.085] [0.141] [0.035] [0.052] [0.009] [0.009] [0.010] 
Education and  0.97 0.48 1.25 0.69 0.31 0.29 0.09 0.37 
  training tasks [0.041] [0.036] [0.067] [0.019] [0.029] [0.006] [0.006] [0.005] 
Coordination tasks  0.68 0.32 0.44 0.22 0.11 0.10 0.02 0.14 
  and referrals [0.038] [0.031] [0.042] [0.009] [0.017] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] 
Table provides summary statistics on selected disease management interventions, where the columns indicate the 
patient‘s classification into High, Moderate, and Low risk categories by January 2005, and if they were 
reclassified in July 2006 when the administrative error (described in the text) was fixed. Standard errors in 
brackets. *Excludes attempted contacts (e.g., no answer to a telephone call). 
 
 
Table 22: Intensive margin OLS estimates of the effect of DM on log(Total Medical Expenditures) 















(0.0275) (0.00651)  















DM x (―top-5‖ chronic disease) 
   
0.0815*** 
   
 
     
(0.0179) 
































DM High x (―top-5‖ chronic disease) 






































DM Mod x (―top-5‖ chronic disease) 








DM x (CHF) 








DM x (CAD) 








DM x (Diabetes) 








DM x (Ashtma) 








DM x (COPD) 
      
0.0217*   




Individual Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Observations 453,490 453,490 453,490 453,490 453,490 453,490 453,490 1,215,509 1,215,509 
Number of individuals 17,297 17,297 17,297 17,297 17,297 17,297 17,297 60,233 60,233 
Average T 26.2 26.2 26.2 26.2 26.2 26.2 26.2 20.2 20.2 
All models include unreported individual and month fixed effects and report robust standard errors, clustered at the individual level, in parentheses. The variable DM 
equals one if the individual has ever been classified as high or moderate risk before or during the month. The variables DM Mod and DM High equal one if the individual 
has ever been classified as moderate or high risk before or during the month, respectively, with the exception that DM Mod always equals zero when DM High equals 
one. Total medical expenditures do not include DM program fees. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
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Table 23: Intensive margin OLS estimates of the effect of DM on health expenditures, by 
type of service 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
























Individual Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Month Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 8,614 8,614  404,424 404,424 
N 4,361 4,361  17,173 17,173 
Average T 1.98 1.98  23.55 23.55 
All models include unreported individual and month fixed effects and report robust standard errors, clustered at 
the individual level, in parentheses. The variable DM equals one if the individual has ever been classified as high 
or moderate risk before or during the month. The variables DM Mod and DM High equal one if the individual 
has ever been classified as moderate or high risk before or during the month, respectively, with the exception that 
DM Mod always equals zero when DM High equals one. Total medical expenditures do not include DM program 





Table 24: OLS estimates of the effect of DM on other outcomes 
Dependent Variable  DM  DM High DM Mod  Obs. N Avg. T 
Number of Days 






























(0.001)  557,605 17,349 32.1 
Hosp/ED Admissions 






(0.001)  557,605 17,349 32.1 







(0.026)  563,184 17,349 32.5 







(0.022)  557,605 17,349 32.1 
Each row corresponds to two regressions, of the same form as columns (1) and (2) of Table 7. All models include 
unreported individual month fixed effects and report robust standard errors, clustered at the individual level, in 
parentheses. The variable DM equals one if the individual has ever been classified as high or moderate risk 
before or during the month.  The variables DM Mod and DM High equal one if the individual has ever been 
classified as moderate or high risk before or during the month, respectively, with the exception that DM Mod 
always equals zero when DM High equals one. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
 
 
Table 25: Extensive margin estimates of the effect of DM on health utilization 
 
(1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8)  (9) (10) 
Dependent 
































































Individual FE  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Month FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 432,035 432,035  532,561  532,561   259,365  259,365    479,156  479,156   556,454  556,454  
N  12,984 12,984  15,689  15,689    7,659   7,659   14,276  14,276   16,383  16,383  
Mean of dependent 
variable 
0.693 0.693  0.221 0.221  0.0854 0.0854  0.643 0.643  0.475 0.475 
Table provides the marginal effect for discrete change in the dummy variable from 0 to 1, evaluated at the mean of Z. Total medical expenditures do not include DM 
program fees. In all columns, the model is a conditional logit regression with individual and month fixed effects.  The sample was limited to individuals who had a least 
one observation with and without the observed outcome. Standard errors, clustered at the individual level, in parenthesis.  ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
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Table 26: Estimates of the effect of DM on the probability of a “potentially avoidable” 
hospitalization 
 
(1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Dependent 
Variable 
Pr( Potentially avoidable  
hospitalization related  
to chronic condition )  





























Individual FE  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Month FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 367,819  367,819   410,511  410,511  
N  10,724   10,724    11,987  11,987  
Mean of dependent 
variable 
0.205 0.205  0.205 0.205 
Table provides the marginal effect for discrete change in the dummy variable from 0 to 1, evaluated at the mean 
of Z. In all columns, the model is a conditional logit regression with individual and month fixed effects. 
Potentially avoidable hospitalizations were identified by the PQI algorithm from AHRQ (2007b). The sample 
was limited to individuals who had a least one observation with and without the observed outcome. Standard 
errors, clustered at the individual level, in parenthesis. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
 
 
Table 27: OLS estimates of the effect of DM on health expenditures, with quarterly data 
 




Expenditures + $1)  
log(Emergency Dept. 
Expenditures + $1)  
log(Inpatient  
Expenditures + $1)  
log(Outpatient  
Expenditures + $1)  
log(Pharmacy  
































































Constant 7.224 7.224  0.401 0.400  0.075 0.075  5.645 5.644  5.776 5.776 
 
(0.015)*** (0.015)***  (0.013)*** (0.013)***  (0.006)*** (0.006)***  (0.016)*** (0.016)***  (0.015)*** (0.015)*** 
Observations 197,400 197,400  197,400 197,400  197,400 197,400  197,400 197,400  197,400 197,400 
N  17,349 17,349  17,349 17,349  17,349 17,349  17,349 17,349  17,349 17,349 
Mean of Y 6.26 6.26  0.34 0.34  0.07 0.07  4.85 4.85  5.09 5.09 
This table uses aggregated data, with one observation per quarter per individual.  All models include unreported individual quarter fixed effects and report robust standard 
errors, clustered at the individual level, in parentheses.  The variable DM equals one if the individual has ever been classified as high or moderate risk before or during the 
quarter.  The variables DM Mod and DM High equal one if the individual has ever been classified as moderate or high risk before or during the quarter, respectively, with 
the exception that DM Mod always equals zero when DM High equals one. Total medical expenditures do not include DM program fees. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
 
132 
Table 28: Estimates of the effect of DM across the distribution of health care costs 
Dependent      Quantile 
Variable Mean 
 
5% 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 95% 
All medical expenditures 
     Dollars 
  




(7.6531) (8.9286) (16.0714) (27.2959) (52.2959) (105.867) (223.725) 
Log(dollars) -0.0443 
 




(0.0515) (0.0418) (0.0342) (0.0324) (0.0367) (0.0365) (0.0587) 
All medical expenditures, with control variables 
  Dollars 
  
-57 -70 -89 -153 -174 -112 329 
   
(14.5408) (9.949) (15.051) (28.0612) (48.7245) (103.827) (191.582) 
Log(dollars) -0.0464 
 




(0.063) (0.0383) (0.0332) (0.0319) (0.0367) (0.0395) (0.0505) 
Inpatient expenditures 
    Log(dollars) -0.3888 
 




(0.4434) (0.5523) (0.527) (0.3533) (0.3426) (0.2773) (0.2592) 
Emergency department expenditures 
      Log(dollars) -0.0551 
 




(0.4546) (0.1306) (0.1661) (0.0995) (0.1704) (0.2719) (0.2939) 
Outpatient expenditures 
       Log(dollars) -0.0465 
 
-0.136 -0.127 -0.085 -0.059 -0.014 0.002 0.133 
  (0.0229)   (0.0342) (0.0255) (0.0224) (0.0276) (0.0367) (0.0469) (0.0709) 
Table presents the estimate of the effect of treatment on the treated group in a Changes-in-Changes model.  
Bootstrapped standard errors are in parenthesis.  The data was restricted to the average health care expenditure 
for each individual during January through September 2005 in the pre-period and October 2005 through June 
2006 in the post period (9 months of pre and post data).  The data was restricted to individuals assigned to the 
high and moderate risk groups in the program start up period, or were reclassified in July 2006 when the 
administrative error (described in the text) was fixed.  Total medical expenditures do not include DM program 
fees. 
 





Figure 1: The increase of states with Medicaid Disease Management, 1991-2008 
Panel A: Number of states with Medicaid Disease Management 
 
Panel B: Weighted percent of states with Medicaid Disease Management 
 
Source: Tabulations from author‘s survey of Medicaid disease management programs. Panel A presents the 
number of states with a program/pilot. Panel B depicts the percent of states with a Medicaid Disease 
Management program or pilot program, where each state is weighted by its total number of Medicaid enrollees in 
2007 (state enrollment data from KFF 2011a). 
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Figure 2: Total federal outlays on the Medicaid program, FY 1962-2016 
 





Figure 3: Medicaid enrollees and payments, FY 1985-2005 
 
Source: Author‘s calculations, base on SSA (2011, p. Table 8.E2). Expenditures adjusted to January 2005 dollars 
using the CPI-U. 
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Figure 4: Diseases commonly targeted by Medicaid Disease Management programs 
 






Figure 5: Cumulative number of states who have implemented a Medicaid Disease 
Management program or pilot program 
 
Source: Tabulations from author‘s survey of Medicaid disease management programs.  The dark-shaded bars 
represent states that have ever implemented a full program at any point prior to the year on the horizontal axis; 
the light-shaded bars add states that have implemented a pilot program.  The top panel graphs the cumulative 
number of states who implemented a program and the bottom panel graphs the change from the previous year.  In 
the bottom panel, states are counted twice if they first had a pilot program and later a full program. 
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Figure 6: States that have implemented a Medicaid Disease Management program 
Panel A:  States that implemented at least one Medicaid DM Program, 1991 through 1999 
 
Panel B:  States that implemented at least one Medicaid DM Program, 1991 through 2008 
 
Source: Tabulations from author‘s survey of Medicaid disease management programs. The dark-shaded regions 
identify states that implemented a full DM program during the period; the light=shaded regions indicate pilot 
programs. Alaska and Hawaii did not implement a DM program or pilot. 
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Figure 7: Percent of chronically ill Medicaid recipients who have DM in their state, MEPS 
1998-2007 
 
Source: Author's tabulations using DM program information merged with MEPS (1998-2007). Plot of the 
(unweighted) percent of individuals in MEPS with Medicaid insurance and a chronic disease (asthma, COPD, 
diabetes, CAD, or CHF) who live in a state/county (solid line) with a DM program that matches their insurance 




Figure 8: Weighted estimates of the number of individuals with DM coverage, MEPS 1998-
2007 
 
Source: Author's tabulations of MEPS data. Disease Management data, from author's survey of 
Medicaid disease management programs, was merged with MEPS as described in text. Figure 
plots estimates of the weighted number of people who are matched to a DM program using my 
     coverage variable (see text for details). Observations are weighted using the MEPS survey 
weights. This is a plot of columns 1, 2, and 3 in Table 3. 
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Figure 9: Net effect of Medicaid Disease Management on quarterly health expenditures, by 
DM target disease 
 
Notes: This figure plots coefficients from Panels B and C of Table 9. For disease ―X‖, the height of the bar 
equals the sum of the marginal effects for the variables ―DM‖ and ―X DM.‖ For example, the first blue bar in the 
Panel C is                      dollars, corresponding to the two-part model marginal effect for DN for 
asthma (only) patients, taken from Column 1, Panel C of Table 9. 
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Figure 10: Effect of Medicaid DM on quarterly health expenditures for individuals with 
variation in DM coverage during MEPS survey 
 
Notes: This figure plots the regression coefficients and 95 percent confidence intervals from Table 14, column 2 






Figure 11: Map of the administrative regions of the GEC program 
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Figure 13: Changes in risk group assignment before/after June 2006 
 
Source: Author‘s tabulations from GEC administrative data. 
 
Oct 2005 
Program Active (26m+) 
Data (36m) 
Dec 2007 
―Mistake‖ causes some individuals 
to receive fewer interventions (9m) 
June/July 2006 Jan 2005 
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Figure 14: Propensity score of selection into GEC program moderate and high risk groups 
Panel A: Probability of selection into high risk 
group 
Panel B: Probability of selection into moderate 
risk group 
 
Notes: Histograms of propensity scores from an ordered probit regression of selection into the moderate or high 
risk groups on the following variables: a quadratic polynomial in pre-period health expenditures; the number of 
admissions to hospitals, emergency departments, and residential facilities; a large array of chronic disease 
dummy variables; and dummy variables for 10-year age groups interacted with gender.  Rows separate 
individuals who were never assigned to the high [moderate] risk group (―excluded‖), those who were assigned to 
a high [moderate] risk group ―early‖ (in October 2005), and those who were delayed entry into this group but 





Figure 15: Conceptual graph of the potential effect of DM on medical expenditures 
 
Notes: This graph shows a potential response to DM program interventions for a representative individual in the 
case that he or she was initially (1) assigned to the high or moderate risk groups as ―intended‖ or (2) assigned to 
a lower risk category by ―mistake.‖ The graph abstracts away from typical month-to-month variation, the effect 




Figure 16: Mean medical expenditures and number of emergency department visits for 
high-risk patients 
Panel A: Average expenditures (Jan 2005 dollars, PMPM) 
 
Panel B: Emergency Department visits, per 1000 per month 
 
Notes: Plot of simple averages, where each line indicates the patient‘s classification into the high-risk categories 
by January 2005, and if they were reclassified in July 2006 when the administrative error (described in the text) 
was fixed.  Total medical expenditures do not include DM program fees.  Emergency department visits indicates 
the number of unique days in a month a patient is newly admitted to an emergency department. 
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Figure 17: The effect of high and moderate-intensity DM interventions 
Panel A Panel B 
 
Notes: This graph plots coefficient estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals from a single regression of 
ln(total claims) on an array of dummies indicating months after entry into high and moderate groups, with month 
and individual fixed effects.  Confidence interval is based on robust standard errors, clustered at the individual 
level. The coefficients are normalized to 0 in the month they enter the risk group in Panel A; in Panel B, the 
coefficients are fixed at 0 in all pre-program months. See text for details. 
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Figure 18: Estimates of the effect of DM across the distribution of health care costs 
Panel A: Expenditures Panel B: log(Expenditures) 
 
Panel C: Expenditures, with controls Panel D: log(Expenditures), with controls 
 
Panel E: log(Inpatient medical expenditures) Panel F: log(Emergency dept. expenditures) 
 
Notes: These graphs present the information reported in Table 28, the estimates of the effect of treatment on the 
treated in a Changes-in-Changes model. Each panel corresponds to one of the rows in the table. The horizontal 





Appendix A: Medicaid Disease Management program database  
I compile a data set to describe the history of Medicaid DM programs for all 50 states 
plus the District of Columbia that have been implemented through 2008. For each program, I 
track the beginning and end dates of the program and group programs into broad categories based 
on program characteristics (e.g., full program or pilot program; statewide or limited regions; in-
house, DMO, or hybrid). I also note how the program defines its target population: limiting or 
expanding eligibility according to disease diagnosis(es), past utilization, geographical limitations, 
categorical eligibility restrictions (e.g., the SSI/ABD population) or other factors. The programs 
are listed in Appendix Table A1, with the dates of activity, classification, and diseases targeted. 
States are listed in chronological order by the date of their first DM program or pilot. 
Information on Medicaid DM programs was collected from a variety of sources. Al-
though I am not aware of any references that describe all Medicaid DM programs that have been 
implemented, a number of sources discuss one or more Medicaid DM programs. The starting 
point for my research was the intersection of all programs discussed in the following documents: 
 Abraham (2008) 
 APS Healthcare (2009) 
 Arora, Boehm, Chimento, Moldawer, and 
Tsien (2008) 
 Bella, Shearer, LLanos, and Somers 
(2008) 
 Brown and Matthews (2008) 
 Coffey et al. (2004; 2006) 
 Costich (2007) 
 Faulkner (2003) 
 Flowers (2007) 
 Gillespie and Rossiter (2003) 
 The Health Strategies Consultancy 
(2004ab) 
 Healthcare Financial Management 
Association (2003) 
 Kaye (2005) 
 Kuo (2004) 
 Lambert, Gale, Bird and Hartley (2001) 
 National Association of State Medicaid 
Directors (2006, 2007) 
 National Conference of State Legislatures 
(2003, 2007ab) 
 National Governors Association Center 
for Best Practices (2004, 2006) 
 Owens (2006) 
 Rosenbaum, Markus, Scheer, and Harty 
(2008) 
 Rosenman (2006) 
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 Saunders (2009) 
 Schwartz, and Mollica (2007) 
 Smith, V. et al. (2002; 2003; 2003; 2004; 
2004; 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008) 
 Wheatley (2001, 2002) 
 Williams (2004) 
In addition, these documents were supplemented with other information, gleaned state-
by-state, from over 250 sources. These include state Medicaid offices and websites (and other 
government agencies), program status updates and evaluations, DMO companies, press releases 
or newspaper articles, personal communication with relevant parties, etc. For each state, I also 
used the state‘s Medicaid program website, which often included web pages on DM programs 
(when present) and other aspects of the Medicaid program. Finally, I also used documents from 
the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (www.cms.gov), such the list of waiver programs 
and other initiatives. A full list references can be provided upon request. 
My definition of DM has remained broad enough to reflect the evolution in DM program 
design over the last few decades, although several types of programs are specifically not 
included: 
 First, I exclude programs that did not target Medicaid patients in particular, such as broad 
public health education campaigns that included Medicaid patients. 
 Second, programs that were implemented by Medicaid Managed Care (MMC) plans were 
excluded because (i) these programs do not financially cost/benefit Medicaid through any 
mechanism other than the capitated rate the government pays for each enrollee and (ii) the 
inability to collect consistent, comprehensive information on the internal structure of MMC 
plans throughout the sample period.
75
 
 Third, I restrict the data to programs that are designed to improve the health care of targeted 
individuals beyond usual care and do not track the broad evolution in Medicaid. For example, 
a number of states switched from a Fee-for-Service system to a ―gatekeeper‖ Primary Care 
                                                     
75
 For information on disease management within MMC, see Kaye (2005). 
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Case Management (PCCM) system for their Medicaid enrollees, although this is not tracked 
as DM, per se. 
 Forth, I exclude some types of recent programs that target quality improvements in health 
care, but use substantially different tools than the standard components of DM such as patient 
education, care coordination, and so on. For example, I exclude initiatives that would be 
classified as ―Pay for Performance‖ (financial incentives to medical providers for improved 
health outcomes). 
In some cases, these distinctions required subjective judgment (especially earlier years); I 
generally followed the existing literature, including programs referred to as ―disease manage-
ment‖ by other researchers and excluding programs that were not. In the chapter, I refer to a 
subset of programs meeting a more strict definition of ―disease management.‖ This group 
identifies the ―traditional,‖ telephonic-oriented programs targeted at subgroups of the population 
who are high-risk, typically outsourced to a third-party DM provider. This strict definition rules 
out (1) programs that feature relatively less-intensive interventions, (2) programs that are 
exclusively pharmaceutical-management programs, (3) programs that interact exclusively with 
health providers (not patients), (4) pilot programs with low enrollment, and (5) a few other 
programs on a case-by-case basis. 
To provide one example of a program that does not meet the strict definition, the West 
Virginia Health Initiatives Project (WVHIP) is a diabetes program that is referred to as a ―disease 
management program‖ by several sources. (Wheatley 2001; CSG and Costich 2007; MK Owens 
2006; SS Brown and Matthews 2003; Coffey, Matthews, and McDermott 2004) The program 
included training for medical providers and staff, reimbursement to Medicaid providers for 
additional diabetic care services and education, and reports (―registries‖) for the providers listing 
their patients‘ hospital/ED activity and cost profiles. Thus, the program had no direct interaction 
with the patients and thus does not meet my ―strict‖ definition of DM, although I include it in my 
broad list of DM programs (because of its inclusion as DM by the literature). 
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The process discussed above identified DM programs or pilots programs in 41 states, 
with the first program in 1991. In most remaining states (Arizona, Delaware, the District of 
Columbia, Hawaii, Kentucky, New Mexico, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Wisconsin), I did not 
identify a DM program that fit these criteria, although it was clear that at least some Medicaid 
patients receive DM-type services through their Medicaid Managed Care plans. Alaska, the 
remaining state, did not appear to have any DM program. 
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Appendix Table A1: List of Medicaid DM Programs 
States are listed in chronological order by the date of first DM program or pilot 
















































Maryland Diabetes Care Program 6/1991-
6/1997 
Program In-house Statewide   Y       





Pilot In-house Limited 
Regions 
Y         
 Expansion of VHOP 10/1997-
9/2001 
Program RX Statewide Y  Y Y  Y Y  Y 
 Healthy Returns 6/2004-
1/2006 
Pilot DMO Limited 
Regions 
   Y Y     






10/1996-* Program DMO Statewide      Y    
 Essential Care 12/2003-* Pilot DMO Statewide Y  Y     Y  
 PCC Site-Based Care 
Management Pilot 
Program 
6/2005-* Pilot DMO Limited 
Regions 
      Y   





Program DMO Statewide Y  Y Y   Y   
 Positive Healthcare 
Disease Management - 
Florida 
9/1999-* Program DMO Statewide          




Program DMO Statewide Y  Y Y  Y Y  Y 




Program DMO Statewide Y Y Y    Y  Y 
 Healthier Florida 1/2007-* Program DMO Statewide Y Y Y Y   Y  Y 
 Hemophilia 1/2007-* Program DMO Statewide         Y 
 Dual Eligible 
Demonstration 
1/2008-* Pilot DMO Limited 
Regions 





Program RX Statewide Y  Y    Y   
 DM Program 4/2003-
10/2007 
Program DMO Statewide Y  Y    Y  Y 
North 
Carolina 





Program In-house Limited 
Regions 
Y         
   '' 7/2002-* Program In-house Statewide Y         
 Community Care of 
North Carolina 
(Diabetes) 
7/2002-* Program In-house Statewide   Y       
 Community Care of 
North Carolina (CHF) 
9/2004-
6/2006 
Program In-house Statewide    Y      
(continued on next page) 
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Appendix Table A1: List of Medicaid DM Programs (continued) 
States are listed in chronological order by the date of first DM program or pilot 





















































Community Care of 
North Carolina 
(COPD) 
7/2006-* Pilot In-house Limited 
Regions 
 Y        




4/2006-* Pilot In-house Limited 
Regions 
       Y  
 Community Care of 
North Carolina (Heart 
Failure) 
7/2006-* Program In-house Statewide    Y      
 HIV/AIDS Case 
Manager Program 
7/2007-* Program  Statewide          
Utah Hemophilia program 6/1998-
1/2004 
Program DMO Statewide         Y 
Texas Medicaid Diabetes 




Pilot In-house Limited 
Regions 
  Y       





Pilot In-house Limited 
Regions 
Y         
 Texas Medicaid 
Enhanced Care 
Program 
11/2004-* Program DMO Statewide Y Y Y Y Y    Y 
 Integrated Care 
Management program 
2/2008-* Program DMO Limited 
Regions 





Pilot In-house Statewide   Y       





Program DMO Statewide Y Y Y Y     Y 
 Chronic Disease 
Management Program 






Program In-house Statewide        Y Y 
 Pain Management 
program 
1/2001-* Program In-house Statewide       Y   
 HIV/AIDS program 7/2002-* Program DMO Statewide          
 Diabetes Program 8/2003-
11/2005 
Program In-house Statewide   Y      Y 
 MaineCare Care 
Management Program  
8/2006-
7/2007 
Pilot DMO Limited 
Regions 
       Y  
   '' 7/2007-* Program DMO Limited 
Regions 
       Y Y 
(continued on next page) 
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Appendix Table A1: List of Medicaid DM Programs (continued) 
States are listed in chronological order by the date of first DM program or pilot 


















































Michigan Diabetes Self 
Management Program 
5/2000-* Program In-house Statewide   Y       
West 
Virginia 





Program In-house Limited 
Regions 
  Y       
   '' 7/2001-* Program In-house Statewide   Y       
Rhode 
Island 
Connect CARRE Care 
Management and 
Wellness Program 
11/2001-* Program Hybrid Statewide Y Y Y Y  Y    
 Connect Care Choice 8/2007-* Program In-house Statewide Y Y Y Y  Y   Y 
Arkansas Arkansas Diabetes 
Prevention & Control 
Program 
10/2002-* Pilot DMO Limited 
Regions 
  Y       





2/2003-* Pilot DMO Statewide       Y   
Idaho Medicaid Asthma 
Medical Management 
Program 
1/2002-* Program In-house Statewide Y         
 Medicaid Diabetes 
Medical Management 
Program 
1/2002-* Program In-house Limited 
Regions 
  Y       
 Pay for Performance 
pilot: diabetes 
6/2006-* Pilot In-house Limited 
Regions 
  Y       
Louisiana DM Demonstration 11/2002-
11/2005 
Pilot DMO Limited 
Regions 
  Y Y Y     
 Asthma HELP 4/2005-
8/2005 
Pilot DMO Limited 
Regions 
Y         
   '' 1/2006-* Program DMO Statewide Y        Y 
Missouri Get Well program 2/2002-
6/2006 
Program DMO Statewide Y Y Y Y     Y 
 Chronic Care 
Improvement Program 
7/2006-* Program DMO Statewide Y Y Y Y Y Y Y  Y 
Oregon DM Program 10/2002-
10/2007 
Program DMO Statewide Y Y Y Y Y   Y Y 





Program DMO Limited 
Regions 
  Y Y    Y Y 
   '' 6/2004-
11/2007 
Program DMO Statewide Y       Y Y 
(continued on next page) 
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Appendix Table A1: List of Medicaid DM Programs (continued) 
States are listed in chronological order by the date of first DM program or pilot 




















































Care Select 11/2007-* Program DMO Limited 
Regions 
Y Y Y Y Y    Y 
 Care Select  3/2008-* Program DMO Statewide Y Y Y Y Y    Y 





Pilot DMO Limited 
Regions 
  Y       
 Iowa Medicaid Care 
Management (IMCM) 
7/2005-* Pilot DMO Statewide Y  Y Y      
Alabama Patient 1st In-Home 
Monitoring Program 
10/2004-* Program Hybrid Statewide   Y    Y  Y 
 Medicaid 




2/2008-* Pilot Hybrid Limited 
Regions 
Y  Y       
Colorado Asthma Management 
Program 
11/2004-* Pilot DMO Statewide Y        Y 




Pilot DMO Limited 
Regions 
Y Y Y   Y Y   
 Diabetes Disease 
Management Program 
2/2005-* Program DMO Statewide   Y      Y 
 Chronic Obstructive 
Pulmonary Disease 
(COPD) Program 
11/2007-* Pilot DMO Statewide  Y        
 Congestive Heart 
Failure (CHF) 
Program 
7/2007-* Pilot DMO Statewide    Y      
 High-Risk Pregnancy 
Program (a.k.a. High-
Risk Obstetrics) 
11/2007-* Pilot DMO Statewide       Y   
 Telehealth Program for 
Chronic Conditions 
(CHF, COPD and 
Diabetes) 
7/2007-* Pilot DMO Statewide  Y Y Y      
 Weight Management 
Program 
2/2008-* Pilot DMO Statewide       Y   
Montana Nurse First program 1/2004-* Program DMO Statewide Y  Y Y   Y  Y 




Program DMO Limited 
Regions 
Y Y Y Y   Y  Y 
(continued on next page) 
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Appendix Table A1: List of Medicaid DM Programs (continued) 
States are listed in chronological order by the date of first DM program or pilot 


























































Program In-house Statewide        Y  
 Health Management 
Program 













Pilot In-house Limited 
Regions 
  Y       
 California Disease 
Management Pilot 
7/2007-* Pilot DMO Limited 
Regions 
Y Y Y Y Y    Y 
Georgia Georgia Enhanced 
Care 
10/2005-* Program DMO Statewide Y Y Y Y Y Y Y  Y 
 Georgia Medicaid 
Management Program 
(GAMMP)  











Pilot DMO Limited 
Regions 
  Y Y      
 New Hampshire 
Medicaid Health 
Management Program 
3/2005-* Program DMO Statewide Y Y Y Y Y    Y 
 GraniteCare Enhanced 
Care Coordination 
Pilot Program 
7/2007-* Program DMO Statewide Y Y Y Y     Y 
Pennsyl-
vania 
ACCESS Plus 3/2005-* Program DMO Statewide Y Y Y Y Y  Y  Y 
Illinois Your Healthcare Plus 6/2006-* Program DMO Statewide Y Y Y Y Y Y Y  Y 
Kansas Enhanced Care 
Management Program 
3/2006-* Pilot DMO Limited 
Regions 





1/2006-* Pilot DMO Statewide        Y Y 
New 
York 




7/2006-* Pilot DMO Limited 
Regions 
Y Y Y Y Y Y   Y 
Vermont Care Coordination 
Program 
6/2006-* Program In-house Limited 
Regions 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
 Chronic Care 
Management Program 
7/2007-* Program DMO Statewide Y Y Y Y Y Y Y  Y 
 (continued on next page) 
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Appendix Table A1: List of Medicaid DM Programs (continued) 
States are listed in chronological order by the date of first DM program or pilot 






















































1/2007-* Program DMO Statewide Y         
 Disease Management 
Project 





3/2007-* Pilot DMO Limited 
Regions 
Y Y Y Y      
North 
Dakota 





8/2007-* Program DMO Limited 
Regions 
Y Y Y Y Y  Y  Y 
Nebraska Enhanced Care 
Coordination Program 
9/2008-* Program DMO Statewide        Y Y 
Nevada Care Management 1/2008-* Program DMO Statewide       Y  Y 
Source: Programs from author‘s survey of Medicaid disease management programs. 
*End-date top-coded to 2008q4 
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Appendix B: Supplementary results from the Medical Expenditure 
Panel Survey 
Appendix Table B1: GLM coefficients and marginal effects for all control variables in 
Table 4 (selected columns) 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
Dependent Variable Total Expenditures  Medicaid Expenditures 
Corresponding Regression Table 4, Column 1  Table 4, Column 5 


















DM 0.0375* 0.0148*  -0.0882 -86.69  0.129*** 0.0503***  -0.0113 -8.520 
 
[0.0223] [0.00875]  [0.0631] [60.02]  [0.0220] [0.00867]  [0.0725] [54.46] 
Insured by Medicare 0.157*** 0.0614***  0.285*** 318.3***  -1.227*** -0.367***  -0.872*** -523.9*** 
 
[0.0319] [0.0123]  [0.0677] [82.11]  [0.0319] [0.00627]  [0.0971] [48.15] 
Insured as Dual Eligible 0.222*** 0.0858***  0.254*** 282.7***  1.437*** 0.508***  0.699*** 672.1*** 
 
[0.0275] [0.0104]  [0.0492] [59.90]  [0.0286] [0.00723]  [0.0807] [98.98] 
Insured by Neither  -0.561*** -0.221***  -0.175*** -167.9***  -1.487*** -0.434***  0.102 81.32 
 
[0.00854] [0.00329]  [0.0676] [60.01]  [0.0119] [0.00225]  [0.221] [185.1] 
Diagnosis of Asthma 0.454*** 0.171***  0.193*** 208.9***  0.408*** 0.160***  0.185** 147.8** 
 
[0.0126] [0.00450]  [0.0610] [71.15]  [0.0120] [0.00473]  [0.0750] [64.55] 
Diagnosis of COPD 0.170*** 0.0660***  0.318*** 378.9***  0.139*** 0.0542***  0.255*** 217.9** 
 
[0.0441] [0.0167]  [0.0759] [104.8]  [0.0361] [0.0143]  [0.0898] [86.41] 
Diagnosis of Diabetes 0.643*** 0.231***  0.461*** 568.0***  0.499*** 0.197***  0.402*** 357.6*** 
 
[0.0244] [0.00756]  [0.0405] [60.43]  [0.0197] [0.00768]  [0.0439] [45.81] 
Diagnosis of CHF 0.311*** 0.118***  0.296*** 342.9***  0.229*** 0.0899***  0.177*** 144.5*** 
 
[0.0278] [0.0101]  [0.0501] [65.56]  [0.0232] [0.00923]  [0.0563] [49.31] 
Diagnosis of CAD 0.214*** 0.0827***  0.341*** 408.1***  0.178*** 0.0699***  0.294*** 254.9*** 
 
[0.0375] [0.0141]  [0.0596] [82.67]  [0.0300] [0.0119]  [0.0697] [68.61] 
Male -0.129*** -0.0510***  0.1000** 103.4**  -0.131*** -0.0504***  0.0557 42.49 
 [0.00830] [0.00328]  [0.0403] [43.02]  [0.00840] [0.00321]  [0.0459] [35.66] 
Age <10 -0.684*** -0.267***  0.252** 271.4**  -0.424*** -0.159***  0.154 120.2 
 [0.0345] [0.0130]  [0.104] [119.3]  [0.0307] [0.0112]  [0.111] [90.06] 
Age 10-19 -0.744*** -0.290***  0.0440 45.58  -0.558*** -0.203***  -0.0726 -53.87 
 [0.0337] [0.0125]  [0.0877] [92.03]  [0.0298] [0.0101]  [0.0940] [68.42] 
Age 20-29 -0.536*** -0.211***  0.00590 6.050  -0.326*** -0.120***  0.145* 116.9* 
 [0.0333] [0.0126]  [0.0665] [68.25]  [0.0293] [0.0101]  [0.0794] [67.89] 
Age 30-39 -0.456*** -0.180***  0.0341 35.35  -0.256*** -0.0952***  0.0427 32.96 
 [0.0336] [0.0130]  [0.0698] [73.35]  [0.0296] [0.0105]  [0.0817] [64.17] 
Age 40-49 -0.242*** -0.0962***  0.170** 186.8**  -0.0566* -0.0217*  0.152* 123.3 
 [0.0342] [0.0136]  [0.0713] [84.13]  [0.0298] [0.0113]  [0.0884] [76.30] 
Age 50-59 0.0769** 0.0301**  0.159*** 174.1**  0.169*** 0.0662***  0.181** 148.5** 
 [0.0359] [0.0140]  [0.0607] [70.95]  [0.0302] [0.0120]  [0.0743] [65.65] 
Age 70-79 -0.0671* -0.0266*  -0.111** -108.4**  -0.123*** -0.0465***  -0.105 -75.81 
 [0.0402] [0.0160]  [0.0534] [49.43]  [0.0314] [0.0117]  [0.0704] [48.52] 
Age 80-89 0.121** 0.0473**  0.0504 52.70  0.0205 0.00792  0.119 95.59 
 [0.0492] [0.0189]  [0.0599] [64.28]  [0.0378] [0.0146]  [0.0788] [67.03] 
Age ≥90 -0.0545 -0.0216  0.505 671.6  0.179 0.0701  0.765 870.0 
 [0.137] [0.0543]  [0.323] [547.5]  [0.114] [0.0453]  [0.524] [853.1] 
Education = No degree -0.154*** -0.0609***  -0.0359 -36.38  -0.0182 -0.00700  0.0355 27.15 
 [0.0158] [0.00627]  [0.0350] [35.22]  [0.0151] [0.00580]  [0.0402] [30.93] 
Education = GED -0.0587** -0.0232**  -0.150*** -143.2***  0.0259 0.0100  -0.105* -75.52** 
 [0.0276] [0.0110]  [0.0502] [44.91]  [0.0270] [0.0105]  [0.0544] [37.59] 
Education = Bachelor's 0.0711* 0.0279*  -0.0477 -47.66  -0.104*** -0.0393***  -0.0424 -31.50 
 [0.0426] [0.0166]  [0.0937] [91.46]  [0.0399] [0.0149]  [0.125] [91.01] 
Education = Graduate 0.0462 0.0181  -0.140 -134.0  -0.0549 -0.0210  -0.0917 -66.44 
 [0.0726] [0.0284]  [0.170] [151.2]  [0.0703] [0.0267]  [0.178] [123.3] 
Education = Other/Ukn 0.0276 0.0109  0.105 113.0  0.0215 0.00831  0.176* 145.6* 
 [0.0380] [0.0149]  [0.0707] [79.95]  [0.0358] [0.0139]  [0.0946] [85.05] 
Education = NA/Under-16 -0.0761*** -0.0300***  -1.079*** -1,105***  -0.0120 -0.00464  -0.897*** -688.3*** 
 [0.0213] [0.00838]  [0.0790] [85.99]  [0.0212] [0.00817]  [0.0785] [63.22] 
Race/Ethn. = Black -0.319*** -0.126***  -0.201*** -195.2***  -0.233*** -0.0883***  -0.165*** -119.9*** 
 [0.0116] [0.00460]  [0.0405] [38.13]  [0.0116] [0.00429]  [0.0466] [33.00] 
Race/Ethn. = Hispanic -0.223*** -0.0882***  -0.211*** -208.9***  -0.133*** -0.0510***  -0.177** -130.6** 
 [0.0118] [0.00468]  [0.0625] [59.67]  [0.0119] [0.00454]  [0.0770] [55.27] 
Race/Ethn. = Asian/PI -0.409*** -0.162***  -0.470*** -388.3***  -0.321*** -0.117***  -0.586*** -341.2*** 
 [0.0261] [0.0101]  [0.114] [75.59]  [0.0260] [0.00883]  [0.101] [45.47] 
Race/Ethn. = Native Am. -0.182*** -0.0723***  -0.0297 -29.88  -0.111** -0.0420**  -0.0511 -37.79 
 [0.0446] [0.0178]  [0.104] [102.8]  [0.0450] [0.0168]  [0.125] [90.40] 
Race/Ethn. = Other -0.0672** -0.0266**  -0.0529 -52.71  -0.0697** -0.0266**  -0.123 -88.02 
 [0.0304] [0.0121]  [0.0923] [89.81]  [0.0304] [0.0115]  [0.0924] [62.61] 
State FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year * quarter FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Panel FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
(continued on next page) 
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Appendix Table B1 (continued) 
  (9) (10)  (11) (12)  (13) (14)  (15) (16) 
Dependent Variable Total Expenditures  Medicaid Expenditures 
Corresponding Regression Table 4, Column 3  Table 4, Column 7 


















DM 0.0301 0.0119  -0.0835 -79.80  0.117*** 0.0457***  -0.00590 -4.296 
 
[0.0227] [0.00890]  [0.0565] [52.16]  [0.0225] [0.00887]  [0.0615] [44.68] 
Insured by Medicare 0.157*** 0.0613***  0.319*** 349.6***  -1.235*** -0.369***  -0.838*** -488.8*** 
 
[0.0320] [0.0123]  [0.0629] [76.22]  [0.0319] [0.00644]  [0.104] [50.23] 
Insured as Dual Eligible 0.224*** 0.0865***  0.242*** 261.1***  1.446*** 0.510***  0.690*** 636.1*** 
 
[0.0275] [0.0104]  [0.0476] [55.91]  [0.0286] [0.00737]  [0.0889] [104.5] 
Insured by Neither  -0.565*** -0.223***  -0.187*** -172.8***  -1.493*** -0.435***  0.0680 51.28 
 
[0.00857] [0.00332]  [0.0644] [54.95]  [0.0119] [0.00292]  [0.229] [178.8] 
Diagnosis of Asthma 0.455*** 0.172***  0.181*** 189.3***  0.411*** 0.162***  0.165*** 126.7*** 
 
[0.0126] [0.00458]  [0.0425] [47.40]  [0.0121] [0.00483]  [0.0488] [39.67] 
Diagnosis of COPD 0.169*** 0.0657***  0.327*** 380.1***  0.143*** 0.0561***  0.270*** 224.5*** 
 
[0.0443] [0.0168]  [0.0717] [97.37]  [0.0362] [0.0143]  [0.0862] [81.36] 
Diagnosis of Diabetes 0.645*** 0.231***  0.477*** 574.0***  0.500*** 0.197***  0.407*** 349.8*** 
 
[0.0245] [0.00766]  [0.0411] [60.96]  [0.0198] [0.00776]  [0.0418] [42.44] 
Diagnosis of CHF 0.314*** 0.120***  0.295*** 331.7***  0.231*** 0.0909***  0.171*** 134.3*** 
 
[0.0279] [0.0102]  [0.0478] [60.77]  [0.0233] [0.00929]  [0.0532] [44.65] 
Diagnosis of CAD 0.210*** 0.0812***  0.347*** 403.7***  0.180*** 0.0707***  0.304*** 254.9*** 
 
[0.0377] [0.0142]  [0.0579] [78.76]  [0.0302] [0.0120]  [0.0666] [64.02] 
Male -0.129*** -0.0511***  0.0822** 82.34**  -0.131*** -0.0505***  0.0372 27.25 
 [0.00831] [0.00330]  [0.0353] [36.15]  [0.00841] [0.00322]  [0.0389] [28.84] 
Age <10 -0.684*** -0.267***  0.231** 240.8**  -0.426*** -0.160***  0.128 95.54 
 [0.0345] [0.0131]  [0.0936] [103.0]  [0.0307] [0.0112]  [0.103] [79.57] 
Age 10-19 -0.745*** -0.290***  0.0628 63.42  -0.559*** -0.204***  -0.0421 -30.34 
 [0.0337] [0.0125]  [0.0785] [80.77]  [0.0298] [0.0101]  [0.0888] [63.25] 
Age 20-29 -0.539*** -0.212***  0.0132 13.21  -0.328*** -0.120***  0.149** 115.6* 
 [0.0333] [0.0127]  [0.0632] [63.35]  [0.0294] [0.0102]  [0.0750] [62.02] 
Age 30-39 -0.457*** -0.181***  0.0308 30.97  -0.258*** -0.0957***  0.0430 31.98 
 [0.0337] [0.0130]  [0.0668] [68.03]  [0.0297] [0.0105]  [0.0788] [59.65] 
Age 40-49 -0.245*** -0.0975***  0.172** 183.7**  -0.0588** -0.0225**  0.158* 123.1* 
 [0.0342] [0.0136]  [0.0677] [77.81]  [0.0298] [0.0113]  [0.0843] [70.57] 
Age 50-59 0.0742** 0.0291**  0.162*** 172.4***  0.167*** 0.0652***  0.181** 142.7** 
 [0.0360] [0.0140]  [0.0584] [66.49]  [0.0303] [0.0120]  [0.0710] [60.49] 
Age 70-79 -0.0699* -0.0277*  -0.140*** -130.7***  -0.125*** -0.0473***  -0.134** -92.13** 
 [0.0400] [0.0159]  [0.0526] [46.25]  [0.0314] [0.0116]  [0.0669] [43.46] 
Age 80-89 0.116** 0.0452**  0.0256 25.72  0.0166 0.00639  0.0993 75.99 
 [0.0492] [0.0190]  [0.0583] [59.22]  [0.0379] [0.0147]  [0.0752] [60.29] 
Age ≥90 -0.0378 -0.0150  0.475 602.6  0.193* 0.0757*  0.669 693.8 
 [0.132] [0.0525]  [0.335] [534.8]  [0.114] [0.0453]  [0.562] [800.4] 
Education = No degree -0.156*** -0.0617***  -0.0325 -32.04  -0.0192 -0.00739  0.0418 30.79 
 [0.0158] [0.00630]  [0.0337] [32.97]  [0.0152] [0.00582]  [0.0388] [28.87] 
Education = GED -0.0614** -0.0243**  -0.122** -114.8***  0.0247 0.00955  -0.0842 -59.11 
 [0.0278] [0.0110]  [0.0489] [43.46]  [0.0270] [0.0105]  [0.0532] [35.98] 
Education = Bachelor's 0.0628 0.0246  -0.0211 -20.74  -0.108*** -0.0411***  -0.0157 -11.37 
 [0.0429] [0.0167]  [0.0891] [86.59]  [0.0402] [0.0150]  [0.123] [88.21] 
Education = Graduate 0.0528 0.0207  -0.101 -95.73  -0.0480 -0.0184  -0.110 -76.20 
 [0.0710] [0.0277]  [0.179] [160.2]  [0.0700] [0.0266]  [0.174] [113.8] 
Education = Other/Ukn 0.0245 0.00964  0.103 107.0  0.0220 0.00851  0.158* 124.3* 
 [0.0379] [0.0149]  [0.0668] [73.13]  [0.0362] [0.0140]  [0.0857] [72.87] 
Education = NA/Under-16 -0.0807*** -0.0318***  -1.108*** -1,102***  -0.0151 -0.00584  -0.927*** -686.1*** 
 [0.0213] [0.00839]  [0.0689] [75.36]  [0.0212] [0.00819]  [0.0748] [60.13] 
Race/Ethn. = Black -0.316*** -0.125***  -0.189*** -179.2***  -0.228*** -0.0864***  -0.147*** -103.5*** 
 [0.0117] [0.00465]  [0.0374] [34.35]  [0.0117] [0.00435]  [0.0423] [29.11] 
Race/Ethn. = Hispanic -0.221*** -0.0873***  -0.224*** -214.9***  -0.130*** -0.0500***  -0.198*** -141.0*** 
 [0.0119] [0.00474]  [0.0512] [47.84]  [0.0120] [0.00458]  [0.0596] [41.43] 
Race/Ethn. = Asian/PI -0.411*** -0.163***  -0.531*** -414.6***  -0.324*** -0.118***  -0.601*** -334.5*** 
 [0.0264] [0.0102]  [0.0835] [51.93]  [0.0262] [0.00888]  [0.0857] [37.65] 
Race/Ethn. = Native Am. -0.187*** -0.0743***  0.0114 11.33  -0.112** -0.0424**  -0.0177 -12.80 
 [0.0454] [0.0181]  [0.105] [105.4]  [0.0460] [0.0171]  [0.127] [90.99] 
Race/Ethn. = Other -0.0623** -0.0247**  -0.00567 -5.607  -0.0683** -0.0261**  -0.0839 -58.87 
 [0.0307] [0.0122]  [0.0865] [85.38]  [0.0306] [0.0116]  [0.0830] [56.06] 
State * year FE  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
State FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Panel FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year FE  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Quarter of year FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Notes: Table presents GLM regression coefficients and marginal effects (calculated at the mean of the independent variables) for selected two-part 
models in Table 4. In addition to the variables shown, state, year-quarter, and panel fixed effects and a constant are included in the model but not 
reported. The left-out group is composed of white non-Hispanic 60 to 69-year-old females with a high-school education in panel 10 in 2005q1 who are in 
insured by Medicaid (only) and do not have a top-5 chronic disease. The data consists of all available quarterly observations for individuals in the MEPS, 
1998-2007, who receive Medicaid in at least one quarter. Robust standard errors (in brackets) are based on exchangeable within-individual correlation 
structure.  ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 
 
 
Appendix Table B2: Effect of Medicaid DM on quarterly health expenditures (all payers) using strict DM definition, by type of service 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 






















Panel A: Marginal effect from stage 1 of two-part model 
Marginal effect 0.00143 0.0196** -0.000924 -0.00220 0.000142 0.000965 0.00234 0.00306 
  [0.00830] [0.00959] [0.00260] [0.00134] [0.00223] [0.00131] [0.00438] [0.00216] 
ATET, stage 1 0.00141 0.0174 -0.00153 -0.00465 0.000241 0.00247 0.00267 0.00497 
Panel B: Marginal effect from stage 2 of two-part model 
Marginal effect -11.47 2.69 1.05 -369.1 72.06 749.4 5.25 18.56 
  [16.19] [10.23] [36.37] [973.3] [164.4] [538.9] [14.52] [29.82] 
ATET, stage 2 -15.56 5.32 1.09 -339.2 74.85 599.9 5.59 18.76 
Panel C: Implied marginal effect in two-part model 
Marginal effect -3.72 5.66 -0.37 -25.75 2.12 8.21 0.91 1.28 
ATET -8.39 10.00 -0.65 -56.99 5.14 24.78 1.22 2.94 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year * quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
DM Definition Strict Strict Strict Strict Strict Strict Strict Strict 
N of obs., stage 1 289,452 289,452 289,452 289,452 289,452 289,452 289,452 289,452 
N of individuals, stage 1 40,419 40,419 40,419 40,419 40,419 40,419 40,419 40,419 
N of obs., stage 2 106,647 104,811 15,929 8,592 11,809 7,032 27,989 11,482 
N of individuals, stage 2 32,474 28,195 11,121 6,482 6,935 2,079 15,436 8,339 
Notes: This table repeats the analysis in Table 11 with the strict definition of DM. Panels A and B present marginal effects of DM on expenditures from two separate 
GLM regressions calculated as (i) the marginal effect (at the mean of the other independent variables) and (ii) the average treatment effect for the treated observations 
(ATET). The DM independent variable equals one if an observation is matched to a DM program in the individual‘s state/county based on their chronic disease(s) and 
insurance, and zero otherwise. In panel A, the regression estimates the effect of DM on                    using a Bernoulli distribution and a probit link function. In 
panel B, the regression estimates the effect of DM on                       using a gamma distribution and a log link function. Robust standard errors (in brackets) are 
based on exchangeable within-individual correlation structure. In addition to fixed effects, these models include dummies for gender; age; highest education completed; 
race/ethnicity; diagnosis/reporting of asthma, COPD, diabetes, chronic heart failure, and/or coronary arty disease; and insurance coverage by Medicaid and/or Medicare 




Appendix Table B3: Effect of Medicaid DM on quarterly health expenditures paid by Medicaid using strict DM definition, by type of 
service 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 






















Panel A: Marginal effect from stage 1 of two-part model 
Marginal effect 0.0119* 0.0477*** -0.00009 -0.000781 0.000864 0.000944 0.00272 0.00177 
  [0.00721] [0.00839] [0.00200] [0.00110] [0.00159] [1.30e11] [0.00318] [0.00131] 
ATET, stage 1 0.0142 0.0575 -0.000200 -0.00204 0.00195 0.00296 0.00402 0.00418 
Panel B: Marginal effect from stage 2 of two-part model 
Marginal effect 5.67 4.04 7.73 616.1 -48.17 928.5* 13.86 25.14 
  [13.13] [10.48] [25.91] [675.2] [66.76] [495.0] [13.34] [31.79] 
ATET, stage 2 8.27 7.73 9.97 849.6 -54.97 806.9 16.01 28.11 
Panel C: Implied marginal effect in two-part model 
Marginal effect 3.86 10.54 0.22 4.79 -0.34 7.11 1.14 0.73 
ATET 8.42 25.27 0.83 24.30 -1.67 27.93 2.33 3.01 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year * quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
DM Definition Strict Strict Strict Strict Strict Strict Strict Strict 
N of obs., stage 1 289,452 289,452 289,452 289,452 289,452 289,452 289,452 289,452 
N of individuals, stage 1 40,419 40,419 40,419 40,419 40,419 40,419 40,419 40,419 
N of obs., stage 2 79,491 73,674 12,193 7,036 8,613 4,911 20,748 6,929 
N of individuals, stage 2 27,727 23,340 8,843 5,499 5,354 1566 12,252 5,400 
Notes: This table repeats the analysis in Table 12 with the strict definition of DM. Panels A and B present marginal effects of DM on expenditures from two separate 
GLM regressions calculated as (i) the marginal effect (at the mean of the other independent variables) and (ii) the average treatment effect for the treated observations 
(ATET). The DM independent variable equals one if an observation is matched to a DM program in the individual‘s state/county based on  their chronic disease(s) and 
insurance, and zero otherwise. In panel A, the regression estimates the effect of DM on                    using a Bernoulli distribution and a probit link function. In 
panel B, the regression estimates the effect of DM on                       using a gamma distribution and a log link function. Robust standard errors (in brackets) are 
based on exchangeable within-individual correlation structure. In addition to fixed effects, these models include dummies for gender; age; highest education completed; 
race/ethnicity; diagnosis/reporting of asthma, COPD, diabetes, chronic heart failure, and/or coronary arty disease; and insurance coverage by Medicaid and/or Medicare 




Appendix Table B4: Effect of Medicaid DM on quarterly health expenditures paid by Medicaid, by service type, with alternative samples 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 






















Panel A: Marginal effect from stage 1 of two-part model 
Marginal effect 0.00736 0.00771 0.000860 2.77e-05 -0.00134 0.00218 0.00328 0.00316 
  [0.00799] [0.00934] [0.00246] [0.00172] [0.00276] [0.00134] [0.00473] [0.00246] 
ATET, stage 1 0.00681 0.00626 0.00140 4.51e-05 -0.00166 0.00524 0.00322 0.00395 
Panel B: Marginal effect from stage 2 of two-part model 
Marginal effect -21.69 4.53 5.86 -1,353.31 23.21 468.69 0.04 23.29 
  [20.67] [11.81] [38.46] [858.8] [144.9] [370.0] [19.70] [31.68] 
ATET, stage 2 -21.29 6.15 4.94 -1,050.31 18.83 487.36 0.03 16.42 
Panel C: Implied marginal effect in two-part model 
Marginal effect -6.97 4.84 0.77 -31.59 -0.51 8.56 0.90 1.91 
ATET -10.07 6.66 1.23 -55.97 -0.32 27.00 0.65 2.31 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year * quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Disease * insurance FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
DM Definition Regular Regular Regular Regular Regular Regular Regular Regular 
N of obs., stage 1 479,376 479,376 479,376 479,376 479,376 479,376 479,376 479,376 
N of individuals, stage 1 66,423 66,423 66,423 66,423 66,423 66,423 66,423 66,423 
N of obs., stage 2 214,780 237,451 26,317 16,988 30,512 10,951 60,808 25,909 
N of individuals, stage 2 56,269 52,092 18,695 12,500 16,435 3,709 28,785 18,482 
Notes: This table repeats analysis in Table 4 Column 6, but disaggregates medical expenditures by type of service (as in Table 11).  The data consists of quarterly 
observations for individuals in the MEPS, 1998-2007, who (1) receive Medicaid in at least one quarter and/or (2) have one of the top-5 chronic diseases. Panels A and B 
present marginal effects of DM on expenditures from two separate GLM regressions calculated as (i) the marginal effect (at the mean of the other independent variables) 
and (ii) the average treatment effect for the treated observations (ATET). The DM independent variable equals one if an observation is matched to a DM program in the 
individual‘s state/county based on their chronic disease(s) and insurance, and zero otherwise. In panel A, the regression estimates the effect of DM on        
            using a Bernoulli distribution and a probit link function. In panel B, the regression estimates the effect of DM on                       using a gamma 
distribution and a log link function. Robust standard errors (in brackets) are based on exchangeable within-individual correlation structure. In addition to fixed effects, 
these models include dummies for gender; age; highest education completed; race/ethnicity; diagnosis/reporting of asthma, COPD, diabetes, chronic heart failure, and/or 
coronary arty disease; and insurance coverage by Medicaid and/or Medicare in the quarter. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. 
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Appendix C: Alternative model specification – the tobit model  
This chapter provides results for both Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 using an alternative mod-
eling approach: the tobit model.  Whereas the results in the main text of this dissertation rely on 
the well-known ―two-part model‖ that is commonly recommended in health economics, this 
appendix reproduces the main results under the assumption that health care expenditures can be 
modeled using a latent variable,   , that depends on the model covariates: 
   
           C-1 
where              
   across observations and the vector of covariates,    , are the same as in 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3.  Observed health expenditures,    , is censored at $0 as follows: 
             
   
                 
 
C-2 
This formulation dates back to Tobin (1958) and can be solved with maximum likelihood. Given 
the skewness of total expenditures in both chapters, I also run models on the natural logarithm of 
expenditures, with the dependent variable censored at           ).  To account for potential 
heteroskedasticity, I calculate robust standard errors, clustered at the individual level. 
Tobit model results for Chapter 2 
The results of the tobit model estimation are presented in Appendix Table C1.  Here, the 
data sample and covariates are comparable to the two-part models presented in Table 4 (columns 
1, 3, 5, and 7).  The coefficient indicates a positive, but statistically insignificant, effect of DM on 
the latent variable,    
 , of $123.93 (SE 93.05). The latent variable refers to a theoretical ―optimal‖ 
level of health expenditures, which is censored at zero because patients who have negative 
demand for health care cannot actually have negative expenditure. With the natural logarithm of 
expenditures as the dependent variable, the results also indicate a positive effect of DM on health 
spending. Results are similar with state-year interaction effects added as control variables. 
As can been seen in equation C-1, the tobit model does not allow for different mechan-
isms to drive (1) the decision to consume health care expenditures and (2) the level of 
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expenditures conditional on a positive utilization.  That is, there is not a separate ―stage 1‖ and 
―stage 2‖ effect. DM here only has an effect on the probability of expenditures because the effect 
of DM may shift some individuals‘ latent demand for health care above/below the $0 cutoff.  In 
row (c), we see an 80 basis point increase in the probability of positive expenditures when the 
individual is matched to a DM program.  By definition, this effect must be in the same direction 
as the effect of DM on the latent variable,    
 , and the observed variable,    . 
In Appendix Table C2, I demonstrate that these differences between the two-part model 
(e.g., Table 4) and the tobit model could result solely from different distributional assumptions on 
the error term.  That is, the fact that DM has a positive effect on expenditures in the tobit model 
(where the two-part model finds a negative effect) appears to be the result of the normality 
assumption in the tobit model, not the differences between how the models handle ―censoring‖ at 
zero.  In Appendix Table C2, I demonstrate how the results for the two-part model differ if, 
instead of a gamma distribution, I assume either a Poisson distribution or a Gaussian (normal) 
distribution. This table shows that the effect of DM is close to zero and statistically insignificant 
under the Poisson distribution assumption.  The third column indicates that the effect of DM is 
positive – and very similar to the tobit model – under the assumption of normality. The similarity 
of the results between the tobit model and the two-part model under normality appear to reconcile 
the difference between the models.  In the text, I used a Park test with my data and argued that the 
gamma distribution best fits total expenditure data in the MEPS for the two-part model (following 
Manning and Mullahy 2001).  It has been shown elsewhere that the tobit estimator,   , is 
inconsistent if the error term is nonnormal (e.g., Cameron and Trivedi 2005, p. 538; Wooldridge 
2002, p. 533), a finding that casts doubt onto the results of the tobit model in Appendix Table C1. 
Tobit model results for Chapter 3 
For Chapter 3, the two-part model estimates relied on individual fixed effects to control 
for all idiosyncratic, time-invariant aspects particular to the individual, including age, gender, and 
the presence of chronic conditions and co-morbidities. A  parametric tobit model with fixed 
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effects suffers from the classic incidental parameters problem as long as the number of periods is 
fixed. (Chamberlain 1984, p. 1256; Lancaster 2000; Arellano and Honoré 2001, p. 3270; 
Wooldridge 2002, p. 484)
76
  As a substitute, I use a random effect tobit model (as implemented in 
Stata 11.2). This requires the fairly strong assumption that the random effect has a normal 
distribution.
77
   
Results are presented in Appendix Table C3.  The regression coefficient for the DM vari-
able (see equation 7, p. 85) for the logarithm of dollars is -0.759 and is statistically significant at 
the 99 percent level.  That is, the model indicates that DM  interventions lower medical 
expenditures. In column 2, we see that the effect is larger for high-intensity interventions than it is 
for the moderate-intensity interventions. Regressions with total medical expenditures (i.e., not 
       transformed) indicate that the high-risk interventions decrease spending $196 (   
 ) and 
moderate-intensity decrease spending $41, or about $76 on average. These findings are 
qualitatively consistent with the results presented in section 3.6.1.  
                                                     
76
 For a nonparametric estimator for tobit regression with fixed effects, see Honore (1992). 
77
 I do not expect to find a large discrepancy between the two-part model and the tobit model because 
the error term is assumed to be normally distributed in both cases. 
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Appendix Table C1: Effect of Medicaid DM on quarterly health expenditures using tobit 
model, MEPS 1998-2007 




log( Total medical 
expend. ) 
(a)      regression coefficient 123.93 92.90 0.5769*** 0.5480*** 
 
[93.05] [96.23] [0.1268] [0.13068] 
(b)    
   
    Marg. effect on    
  45.80 34.21 0.3750*** 0.3561***
 
[34.72] [35.68] [0.0840] [.0868] 
ATET on    
  60.47 45.42 0.4468 0.4249 
(c)       
      
    Marg. effect on       
     0.00799 0.005989 0.0271*** .02592***
 
[0.00602] [0.0062] [0.0059] [0.00614] 
ATET on       
     0.00799 [0.005992] 0.0250 0.01960 
(d)          
      
    Marg. effect on          
     36.82 27.54 0.2629*** 0.2497***
 
[27.81] [28.65] [0.0589] [0.0609] 
ATET on          
     45.146 33.90 0.3332 0.3172 
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-quarter FE Yes 
 
Yes 















N of obs. 289,452 289,452 289,452 289,452 
N of individuals 40,419 40,419 40,419 40,419 
Notes: Tobit model regression coefficients, marginal effects (at the mean), and ATET for the effect of DM on 
total medical expenditures. The model accounts for left-censoring at    (columns 1-2) and            (columns 
3-4). Covariates are comparable to Table 4 (columns 1, 3, 5, and 7). In addition to fixed effects, these models 
include dummies for gender; age; highest education completed; race/ethnicity; diagnosis/reporting of asthma, 
COPD, diabetes, chronic heart failure, and/or coronary arty disease; and insurance coverage by Medicaid and/or 
Medicare in the quarter. The data consists of all available quarterly observations for individuals in the MEPS, 
1998-2007, who receive Medicaid in at least one quarter. Robust standard errors, clustered at the individual level 
(in brackets) ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. 
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Appendix Table C2: Effect of Medicaid DM on quarterly health expenditures, alterative 
two-part model distribution assumptions 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable Total medical expenditures 
Panel A: Marginal effect from stage 1 of two-part model 
Marginal effect 0.0148* 0.0148* 0.0148* 
  [0.00875] [0.00875] [0.00875] 
ATET, stage 1 0.0111 0.0111 0.0111 
Panel B: Marginal effect from stage 2 of two-part model 
Marginal effect -86.69 0.48 45.46 
  [60.02] 61.81 [71.99] 
ATET, stage 2 -132.75 0.52 79.15 
Panel C: Implied marginal effect in two-part model 
Marginal effect -33.46 15.13 35.36 
ATET -97.29 12.77 75.30 
State FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year * quarter FE Yes Yes Yes 
Panel FE Yes Yes Yes 
GLM link function, stage 1 Probit Probit Probit 
GLM error distribution, stage 1 Bernoulli Bernoulli Bernoulli 
GLM link function, stage 2 Log Log Log 
GLM error distribution, stage 2 Gamma Poisson Gaussian  
N of obs., stage 1 289,452 289,452 289,452 
N of individuals, stage 1 40,419 40,419 40,419 
N of obs., stage 2 155,901 155,901 155,901 
N of individuals, stage 2 36,618 36,618 36,618 
Notes: Table construction, GLM models, covariates, and data sample are identical to Table 4 (column 1), except 
that the distribution assumption for stage-2 of the model is substituted with a Poisson or Gaussian distribution in 
columns 2 and 3, respectively. Robust standard errors (in brackets) are based on exchangeable within-individual 
correlation structure ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10. 
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Appendix Table C3: Effect of Medicaid DM on monthly health expenditures in the GEC 
program, using a random effect tobit model 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable 
log( Total medical 
expend. )  
Total medical 
expenditures 
(a) Regression coefficient      
DM -0.759***  -125.9***  
 
[0.0300]  [20.91]  
DM Mod  -0.712***  -68.07*** 
 
 [0.0306]  [21.24] 
DM High  -0.927***  -331.3*** 
 
 [0.0363]  [25.03] 
(b) ATET on    
      
DM -0.674  -76.03  
DM Mod  -0.634  -41.49 
DM High  -0.817  -196.3 
(c) ATET on       
         
DM -0.0243  -0.0141  
DM Mod  -0.0223  -0.0076 
DM High  -0.0309  -0.0373 
(d) ATET on          
         
DM -0.530  -53.49  
DM Mod  -0.501  -29.17 
DM High  -0.638  -138.4 
Individual random effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month dummy variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N of obs. 587,070 587,070 587,070 587,070 
N of uncensored obs. 453,490 453,490 453,490 453,490 
N of individuals 17,349 17,349 17,349 17,349 
Notes: Tobit model regression coefficients and ATET for the effect of DM on Medicaid expenditures. The model 
accounts for left-censoring at            (columns 1-2) and     (columns 3-4). All regressions include month-
of-year dummy variables and individual random effects (normal distribution). Standard errors (in brackets) 





Abraham, A. 2008. Personal Communication Regarding Medicaid Disease Management 
Programs with Vice President of Programs & Health Strategies, AmeriChoice MSO In-
terview by K. Kranker. February 25. 
Abraham, A., S. Einbinder, A. Lundy, S. Prakriya, C. Skeoch, E. Smith, and K. Wong. 2007. 
Series of Multiple Interviews About Georgia Enhanced Care Program Design and Ad-
ministrative Data with AmeriChoice Employees, (Multiple Interviews, Beginning in 
February 2007) Interview by K. Kranker. 
Afifi, A.A., D.E. Morisky, G.F. Kominski, and J.B. Kotlerman. 2007. ―Impact of Disease 
Management on Health Care Utilization: Evidence from the ‗Florida: A Healthy State 
(FAHS)‘ Medicaid Program.‖ Preventive Medicine 44(6): 547-553. 
doi:10.1016/j.ypmed.2007.02.002. 
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ). 2007a. ―National Healthcare Quality 
Report 2007‖. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Available at: 
www.ahrq.gov/qual/measurix.htm. 
———. 2007b. Prevention Quality Indicators (PQI) for SAS. Healthcare Cost and Utilization 
Project (HCUP). Rockville, MD: Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), 
Version 3.2, March. 
———. 2010. ―National Healthcare Quality Report‖. AHRQ Publication No. 10-0003. U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, March. Available at: 
www.ahrq.gov/qual/measurix.htm. 
Ai, C., and E.C. Norton. 2003. ―Interaction Terms in Logit and Probit Models.‖ Economics 
Letters 80(1): 123-129. doi:10.1016/S0165-1765(03)00032-6. 
Anderson, G.F. 2004. ―Chronic Conditions: Making the Case for Ongoing Care (September 2004 
Update)‖. Baltimore, MD: Partnership for Solutions, Johns Hopkins University, Septem-
ber. Available at: 
http://www.rwjf.org/files/research/Chronic%20Conditions%20Chartbook%209-2004.ppt. 
Angrist, J.D., G.W. Imbens, and D.B. Rubin. 1996. ―Identification of Causal Effects Using 
Instrumental Variables.‖ Journal of the American Statistical Association 91(434): 444-
455. 
APS Healthcare. 2009. APS Total Health Management for Medicaid Recipients. March 10. 
Available at: www.colorado.gov, cached at www.google.com. 
Arellano, M., and B. Honoré. 2001. ―Panel Data Models: Some Recent Developments.‖ In 
Handbook of Econometrics, edited by J.J. Heckman and E.E. Leamer, vol. 5, pp.3229-
3296. Amsterdam: North-Holland. 
Arnold, S.B., A. Folsom, and E. Bosk. 2007. ―Monitoring and Evaluating Medicaid Fee-for-
Service Care Management Programs: A User‘s Guide‖. AHRQ Publication No. 08-0012. 
 
170 
Rockville, MD: Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, November. Available at: 
http://www.ahrq.gov/qual/medicaidffs/. 
Arora, R., J. Boehm, L. Chimento, L. Moldawer, and C. Tsien. 2008. ―Designing and 
Implementing Medicaid Disease and Care Management Programs: A User‘s Guide‖. 
(Prepared by The Lewin Group under Contract No. 290-04-0011.) AHRQ Publication 
No. 07-0063. Rockville, MD: Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), 
March. Available at: http://www.ahrq.gov/qual/medicaidmgmt/. 
Athey, S., and G.W. Imbens. 2006. ―Identification and Inference in Nonlinear Difference-in-
Differences Models.‖ Econometrica 74(2): 431-497. 
Basu, A., W.G. Manning, and J. Mullahy. 2004. ―Comparing Alternative Models: Log Vs Cox 
Proportional Hazard?‖ Health Economics 13(8): 749-765. 
Beaulieu, N., D.M. Cutler, K. Ho, D. Horrigan, and G. Isham. 2003. ―The Business Case for 
Diabetes Disease Management at for Managed Care Organizations‖. Report Number 610. 
The Commonwealth Fund, April. Available at: www.cmwf.org. 
Beaulieu, N., D.M. Cutler, K. Ho, G. Isham, T. Lindquist, A. Nelson, and P. O‘Connor. 2006. 
―The Business Case for Diabetes Disease Management for Managed Care Organiza-
tions.‖ Frontiers in Health Policy Research 9(1). 
Bella, M. 2003. ―Evaluating Coordination of Care in Medicaid: Improving Quality and Clinical 
Outcomes‖. Serial No. 108–57. Testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives, 
Subcommittee on Health of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, October 15. 
Available at: http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_house_hearings&docid=f:89962.pdf. 
———. 2005. Disease Management as a Vehicle for Getting Value in Medicaid presented at the 
Medicaid Commission Meeting, October 27. Available at: 
http://aspe.hhs.gov/medicaid/oct/meetingoct.html. 
Bella, M., C. Shearer, K. LLanos, and S.A. Somers. 2008. ―Purchasing Strategies to Improve 
Care Management for Complex Populations: A National Scan of State Purchasers‖. Ham-
ilton, NJ: Center for Health Care Strategies, March. Available at: 
www.chcs.org/publications3960/publications_show.htm?doc_id=674878. 
Berg, G.D., and S. Wadhwa. 2009. ―Diabetes Disease Management Results in Hispanic Medicaid 
Patients.‖ Journal of Health Care for the Poor and Underserved 20(2): 432-443. 
Bigelow, J.H., K. Fonkych, C. Fung, and J. Wang. 2008. ―Analysis of Healthcare Interventions 
That Change Patient Trajectories‖. MG-408-HLTH. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Health, 
June. Available at: www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG408/. 
Blough, D.K., C.W. Madden, and M.C. Hornbrook. 1999. ―Modeling Risk Using Generalized 
Linear Models.‖ Journal of Health Economics 18(2): 153-171. 
Bott, D.M., M.C. Kapp, L.B. Johnson, and L.M. Magno. 2009. ―Disease Management For 




Brown, R., D. Peikes, A. Chen, and J. Schore. 2008. ―15-Site Randomized Trial of Coordinated 
Care in Medicare FFS.‖ Health Care Financing Review 30(1): 5-26. 
Brown, S.S., and T.L. Matthews. 2003. ―State Official‘s Guide to Chronic Illness‖. Lexington, 
KY: The Council of State Governments. Available at: 
www.csg.org/pubs/Documents/SOG03ChronicIllness.pdf. 
Burgess, T. 2004. ―A New Direction for Georgia Medicaid‖. Georgia Department of Community 
Health. Available at: http://dch.georgia.gov/. 
Burns, M.E. 2009. ―Medicaid Managed Care and Cost Containment in the Adult Disabled 
Population.‖ Medical Care 47(10): 1069-1076. doi:10.1097/MLR.0b013e3181a80fef. 
Cameron, A.C., and P.K. Trivedi. 2005. Microeconometrics: Methods and Applications. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Cebul, R.D., J.B. Rebitzer, L.J. Taylor, and M.E. Votruba. 2008. ―Organizational Fragmentation 
and Care Quality in the U.S. Healthcare System.‖ Journal of Economic Perspectives 
22(4): 93-113. doi:10.1257/jep.22.4.93. 
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. 2004. ―Letter to State Medicaid Directors‖. SMDL 
#04-002. Baltimore, Maryland: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Febru-
ary 25. Available at: www.cms.hhs.gov/smdl/downloads/smd022504.pdf. 
———. 2005. ―Medicaid Program General Information: Technical Summary‖. Services, U.S. 
Department of Health and Human, December 14. Available at: 
www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicaidGenInfo/03_TechnicalSummary.asp. 
———. 2006. ―Strategic Action Plan for 2006-2009: Achieving a Transformed and Modernized 
Health Care System for the 21st Century‖. U.S. Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices, October 16. Available at: www.cms.hhs.gov/MissionVisionGoals/. 
———. 2011. ―National Health Expenditures: Projections.‖ National Health Expenditures. 
Baltimore: Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. Available at: 
https://www.cms.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/03_NationalHealthAccountsProjected.
asp. 
Chamberlain, G. 1984. ―Panel Data.‖ In Handbook of Econometrics, edited by Z. Griliches and 
M.D. Intriligator, vol. 2, pp.1247-1318. Amsterdam: North-Holland. 
Chen, A., R. Brown, D. Esposito, J. Schore, and R. Shapiro. 2008. ―Report to Congress on the 
Evaluation of Medicare Disease Management Programs‖. MPR Reference No. 8914-762. 
Princeton: Mathematica Policy Research, Inc., February 14. Available at: 
www.mathematica-mpr.com/publications/PDFs/rptcongress_Diseasemgmt.pdf. 
Clarke, M., A. Shah, and U. Sharma. 2011. ―Systematic Review of Studies on Telemonitoring of 
Patients with Congestive Heart Failure: A Meta-analysis.‖ Journal of Telemedicine and 
Telecare 17(1): 7-14. doi:10.1258/jtt.2010.100113. 
Coffey, R.M., K. Ho, D.M. Adamson, T.L. Matthews, and J. Sewell. 2006. ―Asthma Care Quality 
Improvement: A Resource Guide for State Action‖. AHRQ Publication No. 06-0012-1. 
 
172 
Rockville, MD: Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), April. Available 
at: www.ahrq.gov/qual/asthmacare/. 
Coffey, R.M., T.L. Matthews, and K. McDermott. 2004. ―Diabetes Care Quality Improvement: A 
Resource Guide for State Action‖. (Prepared by The Medstat Group, Inc. and The Coun-
cil of State Governments under Contract No. 290-00-0004). AHRQ Pub. No. 04-0072. 
Rockville, MD: Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), September. 
Available at: www.ahrq.gov/qual/diabqual/diabqguide.htm. 
Cohen, J.W., S.B. Cohen, and J.S. Banthin. 2009. ―The Medical Expenditure Panel Survey: A 
National Information Resource to Support Healthcare Cost Research and Inform Policy 
and Practice.‖ Medical Care 47(7 Suppl 1): S44-50. 
doi:10.1097/MLR.0b013e3181a23e3a. 
Cohen, S.B. 2003. ―Design Strategies and Innovations in the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey.‖ 
Medical Care 41(7): III5-III12. 
Coleman, K., S. Mattke, P.J. Perrault, and E.H. Wagner. 2010. ―Untangling Practice Redesign 
from Disease Management: How Do We Best Care for the Chronically Ill?‖ Annual Re-
view of Public Health 30(1): 385-408. doi:10.1146/annurev.publhealth.031308.100249. 
Congressional Budget Office. 2004. ―An Analysis of the Literature on Disease Management 
Programs‖. October 13. Available at: http://cbo.gov/ftpdocs/59xx/doc5909/10-13-
DiseaseMngmnt.pdf. 
———. 2010. ―H.R. 4872, Reconciliation Act of 2010 (Final Health Care Legislation)‖. March 
20. Available at: http://cbo.gov/doc.cfm?index=11379. 
Costich, J.F. 2007. ―Rural Medicaid Disease Management: Afterthought or Strategic Aim?‖ 
Lexington, KY: The Council of State Governments, August. Available at: 
www.csg.org/pubs/Documents/0812-RuralMedicaidReport.pdf. 
Currie, J. 2000. ―Child Health in Developed Countries.‖ In Handbook of Health Economics, 
edited by J.C. Anthony and J.P. Newhouse, vol. 1, pp.1053-1090. Amsterdam: North-
Holland. 
Currie, J., and J. Fahr. 2005. ―Medicaid Managed Care: Effects on Children‘s Medicaid Coverage 
and Utilization.‖ Journal of Public Economics 89(1): 85-108. 
Currie, J., and J. Gruber. 1996. ―Saving Babies: The Efficacy and Cost of Recent Changes in the 
Medicaid Eligibility of Pregnant Women.‖ Journal of Political Economy 104(6): 1263-
1296. 
———. 2001. ―Public Health Insurance and Medical Treatment: The Equalizing Impact of the 
Medicaid Expansions.‖ Journal of Public Economics 82(1): 63-89. 
Currie, J., J. Gruber, and M. Fischer. 1995. ―Physician Payments and Infant Mortality: Evidence 
from Medicaid Fee Policy.‖ The American Economic Review 85(2): 106-111. 
Dafny, L., and J. Gruber. 2005. ―Public Insurance and Child Hospitalizations: Access and 
Efficiency Effects.‖ Journal of Public Economics 89(1): 109-129. 
 
173 
Deb, P., W.G. Manning, and E.C. Norton. 2010. ―Modeling Health Care Costs and Counts‖. 
ASHE Minicouse. Cornell University, June. Available at: 
http://harrisschool.uchicago.edu/faculty/web-pages/willard-manning.asp. 
DMAA: The Care Continuum Alliance. 2007. ―DMAA Definition of Disease Management.‖ 
[accessed on: March 24, 2008]. . Available at: www.dmaa.org/dm_definition.asp. 
Duan, N. 1983. ―Smearing Estimate: A Nonparametric Retransformation Method.‖ Journal of the 
American Statistical Association 78(383): 605-610. 
Duan, N., W.G. Manning, C.N. Morris, and J.P. Newhouse. 1983. ―A Comparison of Alternative 
Models for the Demand for Medical Care.‖ Journal of Business & Economic Statistics 
1(2): 115-126. 
———. 1984. ―Choosing Between the Sample-Selection Model and the Multi-Part Model.‖ 
Journal of Business & Economic Statistics 2(3): 283-289. 
Duggan, M. 2004. ―Does Contracting Out Increase the Efficiency of Government Programs? 
Evidence from Medicaid HMOs.‖ Journal of Public Economics 88(12): 2549-2572. 
Duggan, M., and F.M. Scott Morton. 2006. ―The Distortionary Effects of Government 
Procurement: Evidence from Medicaid Prescription Drug Purchasing.‖ Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 121(1): 1-30. doi:10.1162/qjec.2006.121.1.1. 
Duncan, I., M. Lodh, G.D. Berg, and D. Mattingly. 2008. ―Understanding Patient Risk and Its 
Impact on Chronic and Non-Chronic Member Trends.‖ Population Health Management 
11(5): 261-267. 
Esposito, D., A.D. Bagchi, J.M. Verdier, D.S. Bencio, and M.S. Kim. 2009. ―Medicaid 
Beneficiaries with Congestive Heart Failure: Association of Medication Adherence with 
Healthcare Use and Costs.‖ The American Journal of Managed Care 15(7): 437-445. 
Esposito, D., R. Brown, A. Chen, J. Schore, and R. Shapiro. 2008. ―Impacts of a Disease 
Management Program for Dually Eligible Beneficiaries.‖ Health Care Financing Review 
30(1): 27-46. 
Esposito, D., E.F. Taylor, K. Andrews, and M. Gold. 2007. ―Evaluation of the Medicaid Value 
Program: Health Supports for Consumers with Chronic Conditions‖. MPR Reference No. 
6175-400. Washington, D.C.: Mathematica Policy Research, Inc., August 14. Available 
at: http://www.mathematica-mpr.com/publications/pdfs/MVPhealthsupports.pdf. 
Esposito, D., E.F. Taylor, and M. Gold. 2009. ―Using Qualitative and Quantitative Methods to 
Evaluate Small-Scale Disease Management Pilot Programs.‖ Population Health Man-
agement 12: 3-15. 
Ezzati-Rice, T.M., F. Rohde, and J. Greenblatt. 2008. ―Sample Design of the Medical 
Expenditure Panel Survey Household Component, 1998–2007‖. Rockville, MD: Agency 




Fairbrother, G.L., H.P. Emerson, and L. Partridge. 2007. ―How Stable Is Medicaid Coverage For 
Children?‖ Health Affairs 26(2): 520 -528. doi:10.1377/hlthaff.26.2.520. 
Farah, J.R., K. Kamali, J. Harner, I.G. Duncan, and T.C. Messer. 2008. ―Random Fluctuations 
and Validity in Measuring Disease Management Effectiveness for Small Populations.‖ 
Population Health Management 11: 307-316. 
Faulkner, L. 2003. ―Disease Management: The New Tool for Cost Containment and Quality 
Care.‖ NGA Center for Best Practices Issue Brief. Washington, D.C.: National Governors 
Association, March 13. Available at: 
www.nga.org/Files/pdf/031403DISEASEMGMT.pdf. 
Fireman, B. 2005. ―Disease Management: The Authors Respond.‖ Health Affairs 24(2): 567. 
Fireman, B., J. Bartlett, and J. Selby. 2004. ―Can Disease Management Reduce Health Care Costs 
By Improving Quality?‖ Health Affairs 23(6): 63-75. 
Fitzner, K., J. Sidorov, D. Fetterolf, D. Wennberg, E. Eisenberg, M. Cousins, J. Hoffman, J. 
Haughton, W. Charlton, D. Krause, A. Woolf, K. Mcdonough, W. Todd, K. Fox, D. 
Plocher, I. Juster, M. Stiefel, V. Villagra, and I. Duncan. 2004. ―Principles for Assessing 
Disease Management Outcomes.‖ Disease Management 7(3): 191-201. 
doi:10.1089/dis.2004.7.191. 
Fleishman, J.A., and J.W. Cohen. 2010. ―Using Information on Clinical Conditions to Predict 
High-Cost Patients.‖ Health Services Research 45(2): 532–552. 
Florida Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability. 2001. ―Medicaid 
Disease Management Initiative Sluggish, Cost Savings Not Determined, Design Changes 
Needed‖. Report No. 01-27. Florida state legislature. Available at: 
http://www.oppaga.state.fl.us/reports/pdf/0127rpt.pdf. 
———. 2004. ―Medicaid Disease Management Initiative Has Not Yet Met Cost-Savings and 
Health Outcomes Expectations‖. Report No. 04-34. Florida state legislature. Available at: 
http://www.oppaga.state.fl.us/reports/pdf/0434rpt.pdf. 
Flowers, L. 2007. ―Disease Management in Fee-for-Service Medicaid Programs‖. Issue Brief 
#81. Washington, D.C.: AARP Public Policy Institute, March. Available at: 
www.aarp.org/research/health/medicaid/. 
Foote, S.M. 2003. ―Population-Based Disease Management Under Fee-For-Service Medicare.‖ 
Health Affairs W3: 342-356. doi:10.1377/hlthaff.w3.342. 
Georgia Department of Community Health. 2005. ―Request for Proposals for Disease 
Management Services for Medicaid Aged, Blind and Disabled Members‖. Request for 
Proposals RFP No. 41900-001-0000000025. Georgia, April 2. Available at: 
http://ssl.doas.state.ga.us/PRSapp/PR_bid_notice.jsp?bid_op=054190041900-001-
0000000025. 




Georgia Department of Community Health, and  (AmeriChoice) United Healthcare Services, Inc. 
2005. ―Executed Contracts #0658 Disease Management Program Between the Georgia 
Department of Community Health and United Healthcare Services, Inc.‖ Contract. Geor-
gia, August 17. 
Gertler, P.J., and T.S. Simcoe. 2007. Disease Management. Working Paper (early draft of Gertler 
and Simcoe 2009), April. 
———. 2009. Disease Management: Helping Patients (Who Don‘t) Help Themselves. Working 
Paper. April. Available at: http://people.bu.edu/tsimcoe/. 
Gillespie, J.L., and L.F. Rossiter. 2003. ―Medicaid Disease Management Programs: Findings 
from Three Leading US State Programs.‖ Disease Management & Health Outcomes 
11(6): 345-361. 
Gilmer, T. 2010. ―Hospital Readmissions Among Medicaid Beneficiaries with Disabilities: 
Identifying Targets of Opportunity‖. Hamilton, NJ: Center for Health Care Strategies, 
December. Available at: 
http://www.chcs.org/publications3960/publications_show.htm?doc_id=1261200. 
Gilmer, T., R. Kronick, P. Fishman, and T.G. Ganiats. 2001. ―The Medicaid Rx Model: 
Pharmacy-Based Risk Adjustment for Public Programs.‖ Medical Care 39(11): 1188-
1202. 
———. 2008. Chronic Illness and Disability Payment System (CDPS). University of California, 
San Diego, Software version 5.1, November 24. 
Goetzel, R.Z., R.J. Ozminkowski, V.G. Villagra, and J. Duffy. 2005. ―Return on Investment in 
Disease Management: A Review.‖ Health Care Financing Review 26(4): 1-19. 
Gonseth, J., P. Guallar-Castillón, J.R. Banegas, and F. Rodríguez-Artalejo. 2004. ―The 
Effectiveness of Disease Management Programmes in Reducing Hospital Re-admission 
in Older Patients with Heart Failure: A Systematic Review and Meta-analysis of Pub-
lished Reports.‖ European Heart Journal 25(18): 1570 -1595. 
doi:10.1016/j.ehj.2004.04.022. 
Gruber, J. 2000. ―Medicaid‖. NBER Working Paper 7829 NBER Working Paper #7829. National 
Bureau of Economic Research. Available at: www.nber.org/papers/w7829. 
Gruber, J., J. Kim, and D. Mayzlin. 1999. ―Physician Fees and Procedure Intensity: The Case of 
Cesarean Delivery.‖ Journal of Health Economics 18(4): 473-490. 
Health Strategies Consultancy, T. 2004a. ―Disease Management in Medicaid‖. Washington, D.C.: 
The Health Strategies Consultancy, LLC (Avalere Health), September. Available at: 
www.avalerehealth.net/research/docs/Medicaid_Disease_Management.pdf. 
———. 2004b. ―Disease Management in Medicaid: 2004‖. California HealthCare Foundation, 
December. Available at: www.chcf.org/topics/medi-cal/index.cfm?itemID=108102. 
Healthcare Financial Management Association. 2003. ―Disease Management: Patient 
Management in Disguise - State Policy Watch.‖ hfm Magazine. 
 
176 
Heckman, J.J. 1996. ―Identification of Causal Effects Using Instrumental Variables: Comment.‖ 
Journal of the American Statistical Association 91(434): 459-462. 
Holmes, A.M., R.D. Ackermann, A.J. Zillich, B.P. Katz, S.M. Downs, and T.S. Inui. 2008. ―The 
Net Fiscal Impact Of A Chronic Disease Management Program: Indiana Medicaid.‖ 
Health Affairs 27(3): 855. 
Honore, B.E. 1992. ―Trimmed Lad and Least Squares Estimation of Truncated and Censored 
Regression Models with Fixed Effects.‖ Econometrica 60(3): 533-565. 
Imbens, G.W., and J.M. Wooldridge. 2009. ―Recent Developments in the Econometrics of 
Program Evaluation.‖ Journal of Economic Literature 47(1): 5-86. 
Institute of Medicine (IOM), C. on Q. of H.C. in A. 2001. ―Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New 
Health System for the 21st Century‖. Washington, DC: National Academy Press. Availa-
ble at: www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=10027. 
Johnson, A., M. Yin, and G. Berg. 2003. ―Utilization and Financial Outcomes of an Asthma 
Disease Management Program Delivered to Medicaid Members: Results of a Three-
group Comparison Study.‖ Disease Management & Health Outcomes 11(7): 455-465. 
Jones, A.M. 2000. ―Health Econometrics.‖ In Handbook of Health Economics, edited by J.C. 
Anthony and J.P. Newhouse, vol. 1, pp.265-344. Amsterdam: North-Holland. 
Juster, I.A., S.N. Rosenberg, D. Senapati, and M.R. Shah. 2009. ―‗Dial-an-ROI?‘ Changing Basic 
Variables Impacts Cost Trends in Single-Population Pre-Post (‗DMAA Type‘) Savings 
Analysis.‖ Population Health Management 12: 17-24. 
Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF), T.H.J. 2009. ―Top 5% of Enrollees Accounted for More Than 
Half of Medicaid Spending in 2004. (Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Unin-
sured/Urban Institute Estimates Based on MSIS 2004 Data.).‖ Kaiser Slides. March 13. 
Available at: http://facts.kff.org/chart.aspx?ch=471. 
———. 2011a. ―Statehealthfacts.org. ‗Total Medicaid Enrollment, FY2007.‘ Data Source: The 
Urban Institute and Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured Estimates Based 
on Data from Medicaid Statistical Information System (MSIS) Reports from the Centers 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), 2010.‖ [accessed on: March 3, 2011]. . 
Available at: http://www.statehealthfacts.org. 
———. 2011b. ―Medicaid Enrollment: June 2010 Data Snapshot‖. 8050-03. Washington, DC: 
Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, February 23. [accessed on: March 3, 
2011]. . Available at: http://www.kff.org/medicaid/enrollmentreports.cfm. 
Katz, B.P., A.M. Holmes, T.E. Stump, S.M. Downs, A.J. Zillich, R.T. Ackermann, and T.S. Inui. 
2009. ―The Indiana Chronic Disease Management Program‘s Impact on Medicaid 
Claims: A Longitudinal, Statewide Evaluation.‖ Medical Care 47(2): 154-160. 
doi:10.1097/MLR.0b013e3181844df7. 
Kaye, N. 2005. ―Medicaid Managed Care: Looking Forward, Looking Back‖. Portland, ME: 




Kenkel, D.S. 2000. ―Prevention.‖ In Handbook of Health Economics, edited by A.J. Culyer and 
J.P. Newhouse, vol. 1, pp.1675-172. Amsterdam: North-Holland. 
Kenney, G.M., J. Ruhter, and T.M. Selden. 2009. ―Containing Costs and Improving Care for 
Children in Medicaid and CHIP.‖ Health Affairs 28(6): w1025 -w1036. 
doi:10.1377/hlthaff.28.6.w1025. 
Knight, K., E. Badamgarav, J.M. Henning, V. Hasselblad, A.D. Gano Jr., J.J. Ofman, and S.R. 
Weingarten. 2005. ―A Systematic Review of Diabetes Disease Management Programs.‖ 
American Journal of Managed Care 11(4): 242-250. 
Kominski, G.F., D.E. Morisky, A.A. Afifi, and J.B. Kotlerman. 2008. ―The Effect of Disease 
Management on Utilization of Services by Race/ethnicity: Evidence from the Florida 
Medicaid Program.‖ American Journal of Managed Care 14(3): 168-172. 
Kronick, R., M. Bella, and T. Gilmer. 2009. ―The Faces of Medicaid III: Refining the Portrait of 
People with Multiple Chronic Conditions‖. Hamilton, NJ: Center for Health Care Strate-
gies, October. 
Kronick, R., M. Bella, T. Gilmer, and S. Somers. 2007. ―The Faces of Medicaid II: Recognizing 
the Care Needs of People with Multiple Chronic Conditions‖. Hamilton, NJ: Center for 
Health Care Strategies, October. Available at: 
http://www.chcs.org/publications3960/publications_show.htm?doc_id=540806. 
Kronick, R., T. Gilmer, T. Dreyfus, and L. Lee. 2000. ―Improving Health-Based Payment for 
Medicaid Beneficiaries: CDPS.‖ Health Care Financing Review 21(3): 29. 
Krumholz, H.M., P.M. Currie, B. Riegel, C.O. Phillips, E.D. Peterson, R. Smith, C.W. Yancy, 
and D.P. Faxon. 2006. ―A Taxonomy for Disease Management: A Scientific Statement 
From the American Heart Association Disease Management Taxonomy Writing Group.‖ 
Circulation 114(13): 1432-1445. doi:10.1161/CIRCULATIONAHA.106.177322. 
Kuo, A.D. 2004. ―State Approaches to Medicaid Disease Management‖. Report for the Centers 
for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) Boston Regional Office. Cambridge: Harvard 
School of Public Health, September. Available at: 
www.nescso.org/libraries/library_item_detail.cfm?library_item=297. 
Lairson, D.R., S.-J. Yoon, P.M. Carter, A.J. Greisinger, K.C. Talluri, M. Aggarwal, and O. 
Wehmanen. 2008. ―Economic Evaluation of an Intensified Disease Management System 
for Patients with Type 2 Diabetes.‖ Disease Management 11(2): 79-94. 
doi:10.1089/dis.2008.1120009. 
Lambert, D., J. Gale, D. Bird, and D. Hartley. 2001. Medicaid Managed Behavioral Health in 
Rural Areas. Working Paper # 24. Maine Rural Health Research Center, University of 
Southern Maine, January. Available at: 
http://muskie.usm.maine.edu/Publications/rural/pb24.pdf. 
Lancaster, T. 2000. ―The Incidental Parameter Problem Since 1948.‖ Journal of Econometrics 
95(2): 391-413. doi:10.1016/S0304-4076(99)00044-5. 
 
178 
Leung, S.F., and S. Yu. 1996. ―On the Choice Between Sample Selection and Two-part Models.‖ 
Journal of Econometrics 72(1-2): 197-229. 
Lewis, A. 2009. ―How To Measure the Outcomes of Chronic Disease Management.‖ Population 
Health Management 12(1): 47-54. doi:10.1089/pop.2008.0035. 
Li, J., A.M. Holmes, M.B. Rosenman, B.P. Katz, S.M. Downs, M.D. Murray, R.T. Ackermann, 
and T.S. Inui. 2005. ―Indiana Chronic Disease Management Program Risk Stratification 
Analysis.‖ Medical Care 43(10): 979-984. 
Liang, K.-Y., and S.L. Zeger. 1986. ―Longitudinal Data Analysis Using Generalized Linear 
Models.‖ Biometrika 73(1): 13-22. 
Lind, A., L. Kaplan, and G.D. Berg. 2006. ―Evaluation of an Asthma Disease Management 
Program in a Medicaid Population.‖ Disease Management & Health Outcomes 14(3): 
151. 
Linden, A. 2006. ―What Will It Take for Disease Management to Demonstrate a Return on 
Investment? New Perspectives on an Old Theme.‖ The American Journal of Managed 
Care 12(4): 217-222. 
Linden, A., J.L. Adams, and N. Roberts. 2003. ―Evaluation Methods in Disease Management: 
Determining Program Effectiveness‖. Washington, D.C.: DMAA: The Care Continuum 
Alliance, October. Available at: www.dmaa.org/pdf/Evaluation_Methods_in_DM.pdf. 
———. 2005. ―Using Propensity Scores to Construct Comparable Control Groups for Disease 
Management Program Evaluation.‖ Disease Management & Health Outcomes 13: 107-
115. 
Linden, A., G.D. Berg, and S. Wadhwa. 2007. ―Evaluation of a Medicaid Asthma Disease 
Management Program.‖ Disease Management 10(5): 266-272. 
doi:10.1089/dis.2007.105711. 
Lipson, D., M. Colby, T. Lake, S. Liu, and S. Turchin. 2010. ―Value for the Money Spent? 
Exploring the Relationship Between Medicaid Costs and Quality‖. Final Report to U.S. 
Dept. of Health and Human Services Mathematica Reference Number 6547-800. Wash-
ington, D.C.: Mathematica Policy Research, Inc., August. Available at: 
http://www.mathematica-mpr.org/publications/PDFs/health/medicaid_costs_quality.pdf. 
Lundy, J., B. Wentworth, I. Gil, B. Finder, A. Salganicoff, S. McMenamin, H. Halpin, J. Mroz, 
and C. Keeler. 2004. ―California Health Care Chartbook: Key Data and Trends‖. 7086. 
Kaiser Family Foundation, July 1. [accessed on: November 29, 2010]. . Available at: 
http://www.kff.org/statepolicy/7086/. 
MacDowell, M., and T. Wilson. 2002. ―Framework for Assessing Causality in Disease 
Management Programs‖. Washington, D.C.: Disease Management Association of Ameri-
ca. Available at: www.dmaa.org/pdf/FrameworkCausalityDM.pdf. 
Manning, W.G. 1998. ―The Logged Dependent Variable, Heteroscedasticity, and the 
Retransformation Problem.‖ Journal of Health Economics 17(3): 283-295. 
 
179 
Manning, W.G., and J. Mullahy. 2001. ―Estimating Log Models: To Transform or Not to 
Transform?‖ Journal of Health Economics 20(4): 461-494. 
Manning, W.G., J.P. Newhouse, N. Duan, E.B. Keeler, and A. Leibowitz. 1987. ―Health 
Insurance and the Demand for Medical Care: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment.‖ 
American Economic Review 77(3): 251-277. 
Martin, A., D. Lassman, L. Whittle, A. Catlin, and National Health Expenditure Accounts Team. 
2011. ―Recession Contributes To Slowest Annual Rate Of Increase In Health Spending In 
Five Decades.‖ Health Affairs 30(1): 11 -22. doi:10.1377/hlthaff.2010.1032. 
Matheson, D., A. Wilkins, and D. Psacharopoulos. 2006. ―Realizing the Promise of Disease 
Management: Payer Trends and Opportunities in the United States‖. Boston: The Boston 
Consulting Group, February. Available at: 
www.bcg.com/impact_expertise/publications/files/Realizing_the_Promise_of_Disease_
Management_Feb06.pdf. 
Mattke, S., G. Bergamo, A. Balakrishnan, S. Martino, and N.V. Vakkur. 2006. ―Measuring and 
Reporting the Performance of Disease Management Programs‖. WR-400. RAND Health, 
August. Available at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/working_papers/WR400/. 
Mattke, S., F. Martorell, P. Sharma, L.K. Morse, N. Lurie, and M. Lara. 2006. ―Estimating the 
Impact of Improving Asthma Treatment: A Review and Synthesis of the Literature‖. 
Working Paper WR-448. RAND Health, November. Available at: 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/working_papers/WR448/. 
Mattke, S., M. Seid, and S. Ma. 2007. ―Evidence for the Effect of Disease Management: Is $1 
Billion a Year a Good Investment?‖ American Journal of Managed Care 13(12): 670-
676. 
McCall, N., J. Cromwell, C. Urato, and T. Eng. 2010. ―Evaluation of Medicare Care Management 
for High Cost Beneficiaries (CMHCB) Demonstration: Care Level Management (CLM)‖. 
Final Report CMS Contract No. 500-00-0024 TO#25, RTI Project Number 
0207964.025.000.001. Research Triangle Park, NC: RTI International, January. Availa-
ble at: http://www2.cms.gov/reports/downloads/CMHCB_CLM_McCall_2010.pdf. 
McCall, N., J. Cromwell, C. Urato, and D. Rabiner. 2008. ―Evaluation of Phase I of the Medicare 
Health Support Pilot Program Under Traditional Fee-for-Service Medicare: 18-Month 
Interim Analysis‖. Report to Congress CMS Contract No. 500-00-0022, RTI Project 
Number 0207960.002. Washington, DC: RTI International, October. Available at: 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/reports/downloads/MHS_Second_Report_to_Congress_October
_2008.pdf. 
McCarthy, D., and K. Mueller. 2009. ―Community Care of North Carolina: Building Community 
Systems of Care Through State and Local Partnerships.‖ Case Study: Organized Health 








McDonald, K.M., V. Sundaram, D.M. Bravata, R. Lewis, N. Lin, S.A. Kraft, M. McKinnon, H. 
Paguntalan, and D.K. Owens. 2007. ―Closing the Quality Gap: A Critical Analysis of 
Quality Improvement Strategies.‖ In Care Coordination, byK.G. Shojania, K.M. McDo-
nald, R.M. Wachter, and D.K. Owens, vol. 7. vol. 7. Closing the Quality Gap: A Critical 
Analysis of Quality Improvement Strategies Technical Review 9 (Prepared by the Stan-
ford University-UCSF Evidence-based Practice Center under contract 290-02-0017). 
AHRQ Publication No. 04(07)-0051-7. Rockville, MD: Agency for Healthcare Research 
and Quality (AHRQ), June. 
McGlynn, E.A., S.M. Asch, J. Adams, J. Keesey, J. Hicks, A. DeCristofaro, and E.A. Kerr. 2003. 
―The Quality of Health Care Delivered to Adults in the United States.‖ The New England 
Journal of Medicine 348(26): 2635-2645. 
McInerney, M. 2010. ―Privatizing Public Services and Strategic Behavior: The Impact of 
Incentives to Reduce Workers‘ Compensation Claim Duration.‖ Journal of Public Eco-
nomics 94(9-10): 777-789. 
Moreno, L., A. Chen, L. Foster, and N.D. Archibald. 2005. ―Second Interim Report on the 
Informatics for Diabetes Education and Telemedicine (IDEATel) Demonstration: Final 
Report on Phase I‖. Final Report MPR Reference No.: 8753-400. Princeton, N.J.: Ma-
thematica Policy Research, June 10. Available at: 
http://www.cms.gov/DemoProjectsEvalRpts/downloads/IDEATel_SecondReport.pdf. 
Morisky, D.E., G.F. Kominski, A.A. Afifi, and J.B. Kotlerman. 2009. ―The Effects of a Disease 
Management Program on Self-reported Health Behaviors and Health Outcomes: Evi-
dence from the ‗Florida: A Healthy State (FAHS)‘ Medicaid Program.‖ Health Education 
& Behavior: The Official Publication of the Society for Public Health Education 36(3): 
505-517. doi:10.1177/1090198107311279. 
Mullahy, J. 1998. ―Much Ado About Two: Reconsidering Retransformation and the Two-part 
Model in Health Econometrics.‖ Journal of Health Economics 17(3): 247-281. 
Mullen, K.J., R.G. Frank, and M.B. Rosenthal. 2009. ―Can You Get What You Pay For? Pay-For-
Performance and the Quality of Healthcare Providers‖. NBER Working Paper No. 14886. 
National Bureau of Economic Research, April. [accessed on: July 20, 2009]. . Available 
at: http://www.nber.org/papers/w14886. 
National Association of State Budget Officers (NASBO). 2010. ―2009 State Expenditure Report‖. 
Washingon, D.C. Available at: http://www.nasbo.org. 
National Association of State Medicaid Directors. 2006. ―Health Promotion and Prevention 
Programs‖. Washington, D.C.: American Public Human Services Association, Novem-
ber. Available at: 
http://www.nasmd.org/issues/docs/Health_Promotion_and_Prevention_Programs.doc. 
———. 2007. ―State Perspectives on Emerging Medicaid Long-Term Care Policies and 
Practices‖. Washington, D.C.: American Public Human Services Association, October. 
Available at: www.nasmd.org/resources/docs/LongTermCareRpt1007.pdf. 
 
181 
National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA). 2007. ―The State of Health Care Quality 
2007‖. Washington, D.C.: National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA). Availa-
ble at: www.ncqa.org/Portals/0/Publications/Resource%20Library/SOHC/SOHC_07.pdf. 
National Conference of State Legislatures. 2003. ―50 States Summary of Disease Management 
Legislation‖. August 22. [accessed on: July 3, 2008]. . Available at: 
www.ncsl.org/programs/health/diseasemgmt50.htm. 
———. 2007a. ―50 State Summary of Disease Management Laws‖. July. [accessed on: July 3, 
2008]. . Available at: www.ncsl.org/programs/health/diseasemgtleg04.htm. 
———. 2007b. ―State Medicaid Disease Management Program Descriptions‖. July. [accessed on: 
July 3, 2008]. . Available at: www.ncsl.org/programs/health/StateDiseasemgmt1.htm. 
National Governors Association Center for Best Practices. 2004. ―State Disease Management 
Programs, June 2004‖. Washington, D.C.: National Governors Association, June. Availa-
ble at: www.nga.org/Files/pdf/0408DISEASEMGTPROGRAMS.pdf. 
———. 2006. ―Creating Healthy States: Promoting Healthy Living in the Medicaid Program.‖ 
Issue Brief. Washington, D.C.: National Governors Association, August. Available at: 
www.nga.org/Files/pdf/0608creatinghealthystatesmedicaid.pdf. 
Ofman, J.J., E. Badamgarav, J.M. Henning, K. Knight, J.A.D. Gano, R.K. Levan, S. Gur-Arie, 
M.S. Richards, V. Hasselblad, and S.R. Weingarten. 2004. ―Does Disease Management 
Improve Clinical and Economic Outcomes in Patients with Chronic Diseases? A Syste-
matic Review.‖ The American Journal of Medicine 117(3): 182-192. doi:10.1016. 
Owens, M.K. 2006. ―State Medicaid Resource Kit: Maintaining Quality and Patient Access to 
Innovative Pharmaceuticals in Challenging Economic Times, 2006‖. National Pharma-
ceutical Council, December. Available at: 
www.npcnow.org/resources/PDFs/MedicaidKit.pdf. 
Peikes, D., R. Brown, A. Chen, and J. Schore. 2008. ―Third Report to Congress on the Evaluation 
of the Medicare Coordinated Care Demonstration‖. MPR Reference No.: 8756-430. Prin-
ceton, N.J.: Mathematica Policy Research, Inc., January 3. Available at: 
www.mathematica-mpr.com/. 
Peikes, D., A. Chen, J. Schore, and R. Brown. 2009. ―Effects of Care Coordination on 
Hospitalization, Quality of Care, and Health Care Expenditures Among Medicare Benefi-
ciaries: 15 Randomized Trials.‖ JAMA: The Journal of the American Medical Association 
301(6): 603-618. doi:10.1001/jama.2009.126. 
Qualis Health. 2008. ―Evaluation of Washington State Medicaid Chronic Care Management 
Projects‖. Report for Washington Department of Social and Health Services. November 
13. Available at: http://hrsa.dshs.wa.gov/healthyoptions/NewHO/Reports/CCM.htm. 
Quast, T., D.E.M. Sappington, and E. Shenkman. 2008. ―Does the Quality of Care in Medicaid 




RAND Corporation. 2011. ―Analysis of Disease Management.‖ RAND Health COMPARE. 
[accessed on: February 7, 2011]. . Available at: http://www.randcompare.org/analysis-of-
options/analysis-of-disease-management. 
Rein, D.B. 2005. ―A Matter of Classes: Stratifying Health Care Populations to Produce Better 
Estimates of Inpatient Costs.‖ Health Services Research 40(4): 1217-1233. 
doi:10.1111/j.1475-6773.2005.00393.x. 
Ricketts, III, T.C., S. Greene, P. Silberman, H.A. Howard, and S. Poley. 2004. ―Evaluation of 
Community Care of North Carolina Asthma and Diabetes Management Initiatives: Janu-
ary 2000-December 2002‖. Chapel Hill, N.C.: North Carolina Rural Health Research and 
Policy Analysis Program, April 15. [accessed on: December 29, 2010]. . Available at: 
http://www.communitycarenc.com/PDFDocs/Sheps%20Eval.pdf. 
Roby, D.H., G.F. Kominski, and N. Pourat. 2008. ―Assessing the Barriers to Engaging 
Challenging Populations in Disease Management Programs: The Medicaid Experience.‖ 
Disease Management & Health Outcomes 16(6): 421-428. 
Rosenbaum, S., A. Markus, J. Scheer, and M.E. Harty. 2008. ―Negotiating the New Health 
System at Ten: Medicaid Managed Care and the Use of Disease Management Purchas-
ing‖. Hamilton, NJ: Center for Health Care Strategies, May. Available at: 
www.chcs.org/publications3960/publications_show.htm?doc_id=684299. 
Rosenman, M.B., A.M. Holmes, R.T. Ackermann, M.D. Murray, C.C. Doebbeling, B. Katz, J. Li, 
A. Zillich, V.M. Prescott, S.M. Downs, and T.S. Inui. 2006. ―The Indiana Chronic Dis-
ease Management Program.‖ The Milbank Quarterly 84(1): 135-163. 
Rossiter, L.F., M.Y. Whitehurst-Cook, R.E. Small, C. Shasky, V.E. Bovbjerg, L. Penberthy, A. 
Okasha, J. Green, I.A. Ibrahim, S. Yang, and K. Lee. 2000. ―The Impact of Disease Man-
agement on Outcomes and Cost of Care: A Study of Low Income Asthma Patients.‖ 
Inquiry 37(2): 188-202. 
Rothman, R.L., D.A. DeWalt, R. Malone, B. Bryant, A. Shintani, B. Crigler, M. Weinberger, and 
M. Pignone. 2004. ―Influence of Patient Literacy on the Effectiveness of a Primary Care–
Based Diabetes Disease Management Program.‖ JAMA: The Journal of the American 
Medical Association 292(14): 1711 -1716. doi:10.1001/jama.292.14.1711. 
Rust, G., H. Strothers, W.J. Miller, S. McLaren, B. Moore, and U. Sambamoorthi. 2011. 
―Economic Impact of a Medicaid Population Health Management Program.‖ Population 
Health Management 14(X): 1-8. doi:10.1089/pop.2010.0036. 
Saunders, S. 2009. Engaging Providers to Achieve Chronic Care Improvement for Medicaid 
Populations. In  Washington, D.C.: Center for Studying Health System Change, April 8. 
Schwartz, S., and R. Mollica. 2007. ―Ideas for Managing Costs and Improving Care Delivery for 
High-Cost Medicaid Beneficiaries‖. Portland, ME: National Academy for State Health 




Selden, T.M. 2009. ―The Within-Year Concentration of Medical Care: Implications for Family 
Out-of-Pocket Expenditure Burdens.‖ Health Services Research 44(3): 1029-1051. 
doi:10.1111/j.1475-6773.2009.00963.x. 
Shekelle, P.G., M. Maglione, J. Chodosh, W. Mojica, S.C. Morton, M. Suttorp, E. Roth, L. 
Hilton, S. Rhodes, S.-Y. Wu, and L. Rubenstein. 2003. ―Chronic Disease Self Manage-
ment for Diabetes, Osteoarthritis, Post-Myocardial Infarction Care, and Hypertension‖. 
RP-1258. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. Available at: 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/RP1258. 
Shelton, P.S. 2002. ―Disease Management Programs: The Second Generation.‖ Disease 
Management & Health Outcomes 10(8): 461-467. 
Sidorov, J., R. Shull, J. Tomcavage, S. Girolami, N. Lawton, and R. Harris. 2002. ―Does Diabetes 
Disease Management Save Money and Improve Outcomes? : A Report of Simultaneous 
Short-term Savings and Quality Improvement Associated with a Health Maintenance 
Organization-sponsored Disease Management Program Among Patients Fulfilling Health 
Employer Data and Information Set Criteria.‖ Diabetes Care 25(4): 684-689. 
doi:10.2337/diacare.25.4.684. 
Sin, D.D., F.A. McAlister, S.F.P. Man, and N.R. Anthonisen. 2003. ―Contemporary Management 
of Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease.‖ JAMA: The Journal of the American Medi-
cal Association 290(17): 2301 -2312. doi:10.1001/jama.290.17.2301. 
Smith, V., E. Ellis, K. Gifford, R. Ramesh, and V. Wachino. 2002. ―Medicaid Spending Growth: 
Results from a 2002 Survey‖. Washington, D.C.: Kaiser Family Foundation, September. 
Available at: www.healthmanagement.com/news_details.asp?newsarticleid=4. 
Smith, V., K. Gifford, E. Ellis, R. Rudowitz, M. O‘Malley, and C. Marks. 2007. ―As Tough 
Times Wane, States Act to Improve Medicaid Coverage and Quality: Results from a 50-
State Medicaid Budget Survey for State Fiscal Years 2007 and 2008‖. Washington, D.C.: 
Kaiser Family Foundation, October. Available at: 
www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7699.pdf. 
———. 2008. ―Headed for a Crunch: An Update on Medicaid Spending, Coverage and Policy 
Heading into an Economic Downturn: Results from a 50-State Medicaid Budget Survey 
for State Fiscal Years 2008 and 2009‖. No. 7815. Washington, D.C.: Kaiser Family 
Foundation, September. Available at: www.kff.org/medicaid/7815.cfm. 
Smith, V., K. Gifford, E. Ellis, A. Wiles, R. Rudowitz, and M. O‘Malley. 2005. ―Medicaid 
Budgets, Spending and Policy Initiatives in State Fiscal Years 2005 and 2006: Results 
from a 50-State Survey‖. Washington, D.C.: Kaiser Family Foundation, October. Availa-
ble at: www.kff.org/medicaid/7392.cfm. 
Smith, V., K. Gifford, E. Ellis, A. Wiles, R. Rudowitz, M. O‘Malley, and C. Marks. 2006. ―Low 
Medicaid Spending Growth Amid Rebounding State Revenues: Results from a 50-State 
Medicaid Budget Survey State Fiscal Years 2006 and 2007‖. Washington, D.C.: Kaiser 
Family Foundation, October. Available at: www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7569.pdf. 
 
184 
Smith, V., K. Gifford, R. Ramesh, and V. Wachino. 2003. ―Medicaid Spending Growth: A 50-
State Update for Fiscal Year 2003‖. Washington, D.C.: Kaiser Family Foundation. Avail-
able at: www.healthmanagement.com/news_details.asp?newsarticleid=16. 
Smith, V., R. Ramesh, K. Gifford, E. Ellis, R. Rudowitz, and M. O‘Malley. 2004. ―The 
Continuing Medicaid Budget Challenge: State Medicaid Spending Growth and Cost Con-
tainment in Fiscal Years 2004 and 2005: Results from a 50-State Survey‖. Washington, 
D.C.: Kaiser Family Foundation, October. Available at: www.kff.org/medicaid/7190.cfm. 
Smith, V., R. Ramesh, K. Gifford, E. Ellis, and V. Wachino. 2003. ―States Respond to Fiscal 
Pressure: State Medicaid Spending Growth and Cost Containment in Fiscal Years 2003 
and 2004: Results from a 50-State Survey‖. Washington, D.C.: Kaiser Family Founda-
tion, September. Available at: 
www.healthmanagement.com/news_details.asp?newsarticleid=35. 
Smith, V., R. Ramesh, K. Gifford, E. Ellis, V. Wachino, and M. O‘Malley. 2004. ―States 
Respond to Fiscal Pressure: A 50-State Update of State Medicaid Spending Growth and 
Cost Containment Actions‖. Washington, D.C.: Kaiser Family Foundation, January. 
Available at: www.kff.org/medicaid/7001.cfm. 
Social Security Administration. 2011. ―Annual Statistical Supplement, 2010‖. SSA Publication 
No. 13-11700. Social Security Bulletin. February. Available at: 
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/supplement/2010/. 
Sommers, A., and M. Cohen. 2006. ―Medicaid‘s High Cost Enrollees: How Much Do They Drive 
Program Spending?‖ KCMU Issue Paper 7490. Washington, D.C.: Kaiser Family Foun-
dation, March. Available at: www.kff.org/medicaid/7490.cfm. 
Taylor, S.J.C., B. Candy, R.M. Bryar, J. Ramsay, H.J.M. Vrijhoef, G. Esmond, J.A. Wedzicha, 
and C.J. Griffiths. 2005. ―Effectiveness of Innovations in Nurse Led Chronic Disease 
Management for Patients with Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease: Systematic Re-
view of Evidence.‖ British Medical Journal 331(7515): 485. 
doi:10.1136/bmj.38512.664167.8F. 
Thiebaud, P., M. Demand, S.A. Wolf, L.L. Alipuria, Q. Ye, and P.R. Gutierrez. 2008. ―Impact of 
Disease Management on Utilization and Adherence With Drugs and Tests: The Case of 
Diabetes Treatment in the Florida: A Healthy State (FAHS) Program.‖ Diabetes Care 
31(9): 1717-1722. doi:10.2337/dc07-2118. 
Tobin, J. 1958. ―Estimation of Relationships for Limited Dependent Variables.‖ Econometrica 
26(1): 24-36. doi:10.2307/1907382. 
U.S. Congress, C. on W. and M. 2004. ―Green Book 2004: Background Material and Data on the 
Programs Within the Jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means‖. Representa-
tives, House of: GPO. Available at: http://waysandmeans.house.gov/documents.asp. 
U.S. Office of Management and Budget. 2011. ―Historical Tables, Budget of the United States 
Government, Fiscal Year 2012‖. Washington, D.C.: Executive Office of the President, 
February. Available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals. 
 
185 
United Healthcare Services, Inc.,  (AmeriChoice). 2005. ―Proposal Re: The Georgia Department 
of Community Health, State of GeorgiaDisease Management Services for Medicaid 
Aged, Blind and Disabled Members, Request for Proposals (RFP) No. 41900-001-
0000000025‖. Proposal. April 27. Available at: 
http://ssl.doas.state.ga.us/PRSapp/PR_bid_notice.jsp?bid_op=054190041900-001-
0000000025. 
———. 2011. ―Georgia Enhanced Care (Program Website).‖ Available at: 
www.georgiaenhancedcare.com. 
Von Korff, M., J. Gruman, J. Schaefer, S.J. Curry, and E.H. Wagner. 1997. ―Collaborative 
Management of Chronic Illness.‖ Annals of Internal Medicine 127(12): 1097. 
Wagner, E.H., B.T. Austin, and M.V. Korff. 1996. ―Organizing Care for Patients with Chronic 
Illness.‖ The Milbank Quarterly 74(4): 511-544. 
Weingarten, S.R., J.M. Henning, E. Badamgarav, K. Knight, V. Hasselblad, A.G. Jr, and J.J. 
Ofman. 2002. ―Interventions Used in Disease Management Programmes for Patients with 
Chronic Illness - Which Ones Work? Meta-analysis of Published Reports.‖ British Medi-
cal Journal 325(7370): 925. doi:10.1136/bmj.325.7370.925. 
Weir, S., G. Aweh, and R.E. Clark. 2008. ―Case Selection for a Medicaid Chronic Care 
Management Program.‖ Health Care Financing Review 30(1): 61-74. 
Wheatley, B. 2001. ―Medicaid Disease Management: Seeking to Reduce Spending by Promoting 
Health‖. Washington, D.C.: AcademyHealth, August. Available at: 
www.statecoverage.net/pdf/issuebrief0801.pdf. 
———. 2002. ―Disease Management: Findings from Leading State Programs‖. Washington, 
D.C.: AcademyHealth, December. Available at: 
www.statecoverage.net/pdf/issuebrief1202.pdf. 
White, C., C. Fisher, D. Mendelson, and K.A. Schulman. 2005. ―State Medicaid Disease 
Management: Lessons Learned from Florida‖. Fugua School of Business at Duke Univer-
sity and The Health Strategies Consultancy, LLC (Avalere Health), March. Available at: 
http://www.avalerehealth.net/research/docs/Duke_DM-Florida.pdf. 
Williams, C. 2004. ―Medicaid Disease Management: Issues and Promises‖. Issue Brief 7170. 
Washington, D.C.: Kaiser Family Foundation. Available at: 
www.kff.org/medicaid/7170.cfm. 
Wilson, T. 2007. ―Enhanced Care Management (ECM) Claims-Based Evaluation: Findings and 
Recommendations‖. Kansas Health Policy Authority Contract DHPF-2006-022. Lovel-
and, Ohio: Trajectory Healthcare, LLC, December 20. Available at: 
http://www.khpa.ks.gov/AuthorityBoard/PreviousMeetingInformation/Handouts/2-19-
08ECM%20FINAL%20REPORT%20_12-20-07_.pdf. 
Wilson, T.W. 2003. ―Evaluating ROI in State Disease Management Programs‖. Issue Brief Vol. 




Winkelman, R., and S. Mehmud. 2007. ―A Comparative Analysis of Claims-Based Tools for 
Health Risk Assessment‖. Society of Actuaries, April 20. 
Wooldridge, J.M. 2002. Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. Cambridge & 
London: MIT Press. 
Yelowitz, A.S. 1995. ―The Medicaid Notch, Labor Supply, and Welfare Participation: Evidence 
from Eligibility Expansions.‖ The Quarterly Journal of Economics 110(4): 909-939. 
doi:10.2307/2946644. 
Zeger, S.L., K.-Y. Liang, and P.S. Albert. 1988. ―Models for Longitudinal Data: A Generalized 
Estimating Equation Approach.‖ Biometrics 44(4): 1049-1060. 
Zhang, N.J., T.T.H. Wan, L.F. Rossiter, M.M. Murawski, and U.B. Patel. 2008. ―Evaluation of 
Chronic Disease Management on Outcomes and Cost of Care for Medicaid Beneficia-
ries.‖ Health Policy 86(2-3): 345-354. doi:10.1016/j.healthpol.2007.11.011. 
Zillich, A.J., R.T. Ackermann, T.E. Stump, R.J. Ambuehl, S.M. Downs, A.M. Holmes, B. Katz, 
and T.S. Inui. 2008. ―An Evaluation of Educational Outreach to Improve Evidence-based 
Prescribing in Medicaid: A Cautionary Tale.‖ Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 
14(5): 854-860. 
 
